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Confronted by persistent expenditure growth in their health care sectors, governments 
in OECD countries are searching for ways to bend the cost curve. Changing the way 
we pay for health care is increasingly seen as a promising approach to containing the 
growing costs while simultaneously improving the quality of the care delivered.
 
Although theoretically a lot is known about how payment models can create incentives 
for curbing cost growth and improving quality, little is known about how such payment 
models can best be designed and implemented in practice. Nor is it clear to governments 
how they can effectively regulate health care systems in which competitive private 
parties purchase care. As a result, payers, providers and politicians are increasingly 
interested in the performance and potentials of health care purchasing schemes that 
focus at once on cost containment and quality improvement. This thesis explores how 
those two focuses can be strengthened in health care purchasing within the Dutch 
health care system. 
 
This general introductory chapter begins with a brief description of the Dutch 
health care system. Section 3 introduces different types of payment models and 
their underlying theoretical considerations, and it gives a brief overview of contract 
innovation in practice. Section 4 describes how patients choose health care providers 
in the health care provision market, and section 5 describes the research aims and 
outline of this study.
2. The Dutch health care system at a glance
Following a short overview of the origins of the Dutch health care system, we will 
describe the current model of regulated competition and examine how the Dutch 
health care system now performs in terms of affordability, quality and accessibility. 
2.1. Origins of the Dutch health care system
First we shall briefly trace some historical trends in the organisation of the Dutch health 
care system. Comprehensive descriptions of the system can be found in publications by 
Kroneman and colleagues [1] and Schut and colleagues [2]. 
 
The Dutch health care system was founded on the Bismarck model. Health care 
systems based on the Bismarck model are characterised by private property rights, 
limited governmental influence, funding based on premiums rather than taxes, and 
ready accessibility of both primary and secondary care [3]. Other countries like Austria, 
Belgium, France and Germany also have systems based on the Bismarck model [3], 
although major differences exist. In the Netherlands, for instance, a patient’s general 
practitioner serves as a gatekeeper to specialist medical and hospital care. On the other 
side of the spectrum are health care systems based on the Beveridge model. Beveridge 
systems are characterised by public property rights, stronger governmental influence, 
funding based on taxes, and a required GP referral to specialist medical care [3]. 
Examples of countries in this category are Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway and the 
United Kingdom [3]. 
From the early 19th century, mutual funds were organised by private parties such as 
charities or doctors. Dutch governmental attempts to introduce a national insurance 
programme had persistently failed until the German occupiers introduced a compulsory 
insurance scheme for employees earning below a certain income level in 1941. Under 
that scheme, the insured population enjoyed a uniform benefit package that was 
broader than the former insurance package, and relatives were now also covered. The 
remainder of the population, consisting of self-employed people and retirees, could 
take up voluntary insurance in the private market or from the sickness funds. 
 
The Dutch government attempted several times to expand the insurance scheme to 
a larger share of the population, but without success. Providers resisted expansion of 
the scheme, fearing loss of income. It was not until 1964 that the government finally 
succeeded in implementing the Compulsory Health Insurance Act (Ziekenfondswet 
or ZFW). Insurance in sickness funds was compulsory for a large segment of the 
population below a specified income level [2]. At that point, more than 60 per cent of 
the Dutch population was insured [2]. Further attempts to unite the sickness funds and 
voluntary private health insurance provision failed in the 1980s and 1990s [1]. Smaller 
reforms were introduced instead, and these paved the way for a system of regulated 
competition, launched in 2006. 
2.2. Regulated competition in the Netherlands
When regulated competition was introduced in 2006, the sickness fund system and the 
voluntary insurance schemes in the private market were replaced by a single mandatory 
insurance scheme for the entire population. The model of regulated competition relies 
on market principles to achieve maximum value for consumers and employers. It is 
based on Alain Enthoven’s model of regulated competition [4].
 
Three interrelated markets were introduced under the new model: the health care 
provision market, the health insurance market and the health care purchasing market 
(figure 1). In the health care provision market, health care providers provide care to 
patients. In the health insurance market, consumers buy insurance products from 
health care insurers. And in the health care purchasing market, insurers purchase care 
from health care providers. The government regulates the markets in order to sustain 
solidarity and guarantee accessibility of care [5]. 
Ten years after the introduction of managed competition, Van de Ven and colleagues 




that the Netherlands still did not satisfy all the preconditions for the functioning of 
a health care system that is both efficient and affordable. The most pressing issues 
were room for risk selection, inadequate transparency with respect to the quality of 
care, inadequate provider payment models and ineffective merger control [5]. Overall, 
the authors of both studies concluded that progress had been made on almost all 
preconditions relating to the overall functioning of the managed competition model. 
Examples included ‘consumer information and market transparency’, ‘free consumer 
choice of insurer’ and ‘cross-subsidies without incentives for risk selection’ [6]. 
By and large, considerable attention has been directed towards the functioning of the 
health care insurance market. Research studies have also focused predominantly on 
that market, addressing issues such as insurance design (e.g. mandatory and voluntary 
deductibles, co-payments, no-claim rebates) [7], the avoidance of risk selection (e.g. 
design of a risk equalisation scheme [5, 8]) and competition in the insurance market 
[9]. In recent years, the purchasing market has acquired more interest, and research in 
that area has started to develop as well (see e.g. [10-13]). 
Nonetheless, relatively little is known as yet about how the health care purchasing 
market functions and performs in practice within the Dutch managed competition 
model. This book therefore focuses largely on the purchasing market. As the functioning 
of the purchasing market is interrelated with, and supportive of, the performance of 
the other two markets, we also make a sidestep to the functioning of the health care 
provision market. 
Figure 1. Actors and markets in the Dutch health care system since 2006
Source: Kroneman, M. et al., 2016  [1].
2.3. The performance of the Dutch health care system
Health care systems, including the Dutch system, seek to satisfy several goals 
simultaneously, namely the accessibility of care, the affordability of care and the quality 
of care. The Dutch Health Care Performance Report 2014 provided a comprehensive review 
of health system performance of the Dutch healthcare system [14]. Several scientific 
studies have made international comparisons of health care systems, including Davis 
and colleagues [15], who compared 11 countries with respect to quality, access and 
efficiency (as well as other dimensions).1 According to the above studies, the Dutch 
health care system scores relatively well when it comes to quality and accessibility. It 
is also amongst the most expensive in the OECD (measured as a share of GDP) [16]. 
 
Health care expenditures have been rising in the Netherlands, both in absolute terms 
and as a percentage of GDP (figure 2) [17]. After the United States, the Netherlands 
shared second and third place with Switzerland in 2012 in terms of the highest health 
care expenditure as a share of GDP in the OECD countries (figure 3) [16]. In the 
period 2000–2013, the average cost growth was about 5.5%, but it started to diminish 
towards the end of that period [14]. The decline was partly due to economic recession 
and partly due to policies introduced by government. For example, the Medicine Prices 
Act (Wet geneesmiddelenprijzen or WGP) contributed to a reduction in cost growth for 
pharmaceuticals [14] by requiring that prices not exceed the average prices across a 
predefined selection of surrounding countries [18].2
 
The quality of care in the Netherlands ranks high in the OECD; the country is above 
average on most quality indicators [14]. The Dutch health care system has also helped 
to enhance the health of the population [1]. Life expectancy has increased by over 7 
years since 1950, and that can be attributed in part to health care [19]. The Netherlands 
does particularly well on quality indicators such as low levels of antibiotics prescribed 
in primary care and high percentages of hip fracture operations within 48 hours 
[14]; avoidable hospital admissions are low in comparison with many other Western 
countries [1]. However, the performance of the Dutch health care system is ranked 
more moderately in terms of admission rates for heart failure and chronic diabetes 
as well as on survival ratios for various cancer types (including breast, cervical and 
colorectal cancer) [14, 20]. With respect to long-term care, the Dutch system is much 
more comprehensive than those in other countries, especially with regard to elder care. 
Staff capacity is relatively low, however, and patients report insufficient attention from 
staff [1]. Despite such criticisms, increased investments in elder care have been at least 
partially associated with increased life expectancy among the Dutch elderly [21].
 
1 The 11 countries included were Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.




The Dutch health care system performs particularly well in terms of accessibility [14]. 
Overall, the concentration of providers is such that patients do not need to travel far to 
see a primary care doctor or to access a hospital. Waiting times have started to decline 
as from 2008. Status is not linked to substantial differences in accessibility of care 
in the Netherlands. Rates of health care neglect for financial reasons have remained 
low, although they have increased somewhat in recent years. That may be attributable 
to increases in deductibles, to a lower uptake of supplementary insurance or to the 
economic crisis [14]. 
In conclusion, the Dutch health care system performs quite well in terms of accessibility 
and quality of care, but the affordability of care is under threat from rising health 
care costs.
Figure 2. Health care expenditures in the Netherlands, 2000–2015
Source: Statistics Netherlands (CBS), 2016 [17]. 
Figure 3. Health spending (excluding investment) as share of GDP in OECD countries, 2013
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2015, 2015 [16].
3. Paying for health care in the health care purchasing market
This section starts with an introduction about different types of payment models. I 
then discuss some theoretical considerations about the different types of models and 
provide examples of innovative models that have been implemented in practice. 
3.1. Payment model types
We follow Frakt and colleagues [22] in their classification of five different payment 
models: cost-based reimbursement, fee-for-service (FFS), per-diem payments, per-
episode payments and capitation.3
Cost-based reimbursement entails payment of providers on the basis of the actual costs the 
provider incurred. Under FFS, providers are paid a set fee for each service delivered. 
Per-diem payments are based on a daily rate per patient. Per-episode payments (bundled 
payments) are reimbursements based on costs for all services for one patient per episode. 
Capitation is a payment for a specific period for all (or a subset of) the health care for 
one patient. For an overview of the different payment models and their definitions, 
see box 1. 
* No single universal type classification of payment models exists, nor are there any single agreed-up-
on definitions. We have therefore composed our own scheme of payment model types and their 
respective definitions.
3 Miller and Frakt employ different categorisations of payment models. Whereas Frakt identifies 
cost-based, fee-for-service, per-diem, per-episode and capitation reimbursement, Miller 
differentiates fee-for-service payment, episode-of-care payment, comprehensive care payment 
(condition-adjusted capitation) and traditional capitation.
Box 1. Payment models*
Cost-based reimbursement
Providers are paid on the basis of the actual costs incurred.
Fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursement
Providers are paid a separate fee for every service rendered.
Per-diem reimbursement
Providers are paid one fee per patient per day (covering all the care provided).
Per-episode reimbursement (bundled payment) 
Providers are paid one fee for an episode of care for one patient
Capitation reimbursement




Currently existing payment models such as capitation, fee-for-service (FFS) and 
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs)4 have strong roots in history, but they do not necessarily 
reflect current policy objectives [23]. For example, FFS may incentivise providers to 
greater production, but it may also encourage overprovision of care; capitation may 
help contain cost growth but it may lead to ‘stinting’ on care [23]. Both such effects are 
undesirable. Rather than spending more or less money, it would seem that changing 
the ways we pay for health care – so as to better reflect the policy goals of quality, 
affordability and accessibility is one way to improve system performance.
3.2. Theoretical considerations
Payment models vary in the allocation of financial risk between payers and providers 
[22, 24, 25], as illustrated in figure 4 [22]. The differing levels of financial risk under 
various payment models can be explained by the differing aspects for which a provider 
is at risk. For example, FFS and capitation shift almost all risk either to the payer (FFS) 
or to the provider (capitation). Under FFS, providers are at risk for each single service 
they provide (and the various processes included in that service). To make profits, they 
must ensure that the cost of the respective service is lower than the fee they receive for 
the service. Under capitation, a provider is additionally accountable for the number of 
services per episode of care, the number of episodes per condition and the number of 
conditions per patient [25], as can be seen in figure 5. 
Figure 4. Financial risk of health care for provider and payer, by payment method
Source: Frakt, A.B. et al., 2012 [22]
 
4 A diagnosis-related group (DRG) is a product including a set of hospital services related to a single 
diagnosis (DRGs are part of a classification system).
Figure 5. Aspects for which the provider is at risk under different payment models
Source: Miller, R.D., 2009 [25]. Miller did not incorporate per-diem payment in this figure. 
By shifting risk to providers, payment models can create incentives for value by holding 
providers accountable for outcomes, in terms of both the cost and the quality of care 
to be delivered. In line with the incentives deriving from these payment models, FFS 
tends to stimulate volume, whereas capitation may lower cost growth but possibly at the 
expense of the quality of care. Payment models towards the right end of the spectrum 
increasingly encourage providers to be affordable.
 
Such payment models may be further fine-tuned by adding other components. For 
example, bundled payment arrangements may include a two-sided risk component, 
implying that providers share both in savings (should costs lie below a certain target) 
and in losses (in case costs exceed a certain threshold). Add-on payments, such as pay 
for performance (P4P), may be incorporated as well. Add-on payments are made over 
and above the base payment and are designed to for instance reward providers for 
enhancements such as coordination or quality [23]. Such adjustments further refine 
the level of financial risk for the provider. 
 
The payment model and the inclusion of such components thus determine the final 
allocation of risk between the provider and payer. Risk can then be further subdivided 
into roughly two types, performance risk and insurance risk [25]. Miller defines 
performance risk as risks that are related to the provider’s own share in providing high-
quality and efficient care, and insurance risk as risks that stem from differences between 
patients and their respective needs [25]. Performance risks increase the incentives to 
create value, whereas insurance risks increase a provider’s level of financial risk without 
the provider being able to control it. 
Given that providers have a maximum level of risk they can safely take on (depending 
on factors like size), the optimal allocation is one where insurance risk is minimised, 




3.3. Provider–payer contract innovation in practice
3.3.1. Historical experiences with payment reforms
In view of experiences in practice with shifting more risk to providers, we observe that 
this is not without its hazards. For example, in the period 1980–1990 in the United 
States, some providers were accepting risk levels under capitation contracts that were 
too high, possibly giving them incentives to ‘stint’ on care [26]. Such incentives were 
strengthened by inadequate risk adjustment arrangements and insufficient insights 
into quality of the care delivered [23, 26]. One of the lessons learnt from this backlash 
is that more attention must be put on quality and that some form of risk adjustment is 
needed to compensate providers. As the cost curve continues to rise, payment models 
on the right side of the spectrum (figure 4) are again gaining more interest [26], though 
with caution about excessive risk levels for providers. 
3.3.2. Current innovations in payment reforms 
Countries are increasingly experimenting with innovative payment models to the 
right of the spectrum [27-29]. We shall now describe some current initiatives that 
experiment with bundled payments and global payments, as well as some that 
experiment with add-on payments. Add-on payments are made alongside a base payment 
for purposes such as improving the quality of care (in which case they may be called 
P4P) or improving the coordination of care [23]. Experimentation in OECD countries 
with population-based payments, bundled payments and add-on payments has helped 
to enhance the quality of health care, leading in turn to better health outcomes [23, 
q.v. for an elaborate overview]. 
Per-episode payment (bundled payment) 
Bundled payments may be agreed for specific activities and or (chronic) conditions. 
In various OECD countries bundles have been adopted for different conditions, 
including diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), HIV/AIDS, 
multiple sclerosis, orthopaedic care, maternity care and Parkinson’s disease [23]. 
Bundled payments may enhance care experiences, care effectiveness, cost savings 
and protocols [23]. However, determining a fee for a bundle of services can be rather 
complicated and tends to increase administrative burdens [23]. Other problems may 
also arise from bundled payment arrangements, such as antitrust issues (excessive market 
power for organised care groups) and restricted provider choice (when care groups 
work with preferred providers) [30]. Consequently, the implementation process for 
bundled payment schemes may take several years, as occurred in the PROMETHEUS 
experiment in the United States [31]. 
 
In the Netherlands, bundled payments now exist for several chronic conditions [30]. 
Experimentation began in 2007 with a bundled payment scheme in diabetes care, and 
this was converted into a permanent payment model in 2010, together with chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and vascular risk management (VRM) [30]. 
In 2017, a voluntary bundled payment arrangement for pregnancy and childbirth was 
introduced  [32]. Initial results on bundled payments for diabetes show that both the 
costs and the mortality rates have declined [33]. Improvements have also been observed 
in the process of care and the transparency of care [30]. 
Global payments
Global payment models cover the costs of the entire spectrum (or a large share) of health 
care from multiple providers for a population that is assigned to them. Global payments 
have been introduced in countries including the United States (e.g. accountable care 
organizations (ACOs) [23] and the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) [28, 34-36]) 
and Germany (Gesundes Kinzigtal) [23, 37]. Overall experiences with global payments 
have shown that they can help reduce fragmentation in health care delivery, improve 
outcomes and contain cost growth [23]. Global payment schemes are complex to set 
up, however, and they increase administrative burdens and require advanced data and 
IT systems [23]. 
 
In the Netherlands, several regional initiatives are now experimenting with population-
based payment [38]. In 2013 the health ministry designated nine such initiatives as 
‘pioneer sites’ and they are now being evaluated. Thus far, the sites have reported 
improved collaboration between stakeholders (including health care providers, 
insurers, local government and representatives of patients or local residents) [38]. At the 
current stage, the pioneer sites are working on the design of the payment models and 
transparency with respect to both quality and cost [38]. So far, the payment models are 
still limited to shared-savings models for pharmaceuticals and to extensions of existing 
bundled payment models. Population-based shared-savings models such as the AQC or 
Gesundes Kinzigtal are not being implemented at this time in the Netherlands. 
Add-on payments
Add-on payments can be employed for various purposes, such as improving coordination 
(e.g. paying physicians to consult about patient files), care efficiency (e.g. prescribing 
generic drugs), quality of care (e.g. managing chronic diseases) or accessibility of care 
(e.g. expanded consultation hours) [23]. In 2012, some two thirds of OECD countries 
were experimenting with P4P add-on payments [23]. P4P may have a positive impact 
on performance with respect to the process of care. It is less evident, however, what 
effect P4P might have on health outcomes and the quality of care [23]. Add-ons are less 
complex to implement than reforms that introduce models like bundled payment or 
population-based payment. In 2012, the Netherlands adopted add-on payments (in the 
form of P4P) in primary care, specialist care and hospital care [39].
3.3.3. Transferability of lessons from abroad 
Although theoretically a lot is known about the incentives that different payment 




practice and how outcomes will be affected. This is partly because reforms are still 
relatively scarce and evaluations are mostly of recent date. The full implementation 
of a payment reform may take several years, and it may take some time for the impact 
of a reform to be fully observable. The effect of payment reforms on quality is usually 
difficult to gauge, because data on quality is often inadequate. Moreover, it is usually 
difficult to attribute quality gain or diminished cost growth directly to the payment 
reform, as they could also result from other trends, such as overall developments in the 
surrounding providers. And finally, health is local, and it may be unclear whether the 
success of one payment reform can be replicated elsewhere (in another country or even 
in another region of the same country). Consequently, it is not always clear whether 
international experiences with payment models will be transferable to the Netherlands. 
Careful analysis of the payment model will be required, as well as an understanding of 
the characteristics of the health care system and its performance. One of the aims of 
this thesis is to draw lessons for the Netherlands from experiences abroad. 
Changing the ways in which health care providers are reimbursed can create incentives 
for value in health care. Shifting more risk to providers can encourage them to improve 
quality and or contain cost growth. However, since such an operation is not without risk, 
we must find a balance by creating optimal incentives while not exposing providers to 
excessive risk levels. More and more countries are experimenting with payment models, 
such as bundled payments and capitation-based payments, which shift more risks to 
providers. This thesis will explore how the Netherlands can put payment reforms to use 
in creating incentives for quality while curbing the growth of health care expenditure. 
4. Choosing a health care provider in the health care provision market
Thus far we have focused on the health care purchasing market. For effective functioning 
of the health care system, it is also important that patients make the right choices. In 
the health care provision market, patients choose their health care providers, and it is 
important that they are sensitive to quality differences between providers. This should 
translate into an effective functioning of the purchasing market, whereby payers will 
reward high-quality providers. 
In addition to quality, other factors such as distance from home, a patient’s insurance 
policy, and referrals and recommendations from other health professionals may also 
influence a patient’s choice of providers [40]. In the international literature, several 
papers have investigated how patients make trade-offs in choosing providers or how 
factors such as quality may affect provider volume (see for example [40-48]). Overall, 
quality tends to play a minor or insignificant role. Some studies have found the effect 
of quality on hospital choice to be non-linear; more specifically, poor reported quality 
may reduce hospital volume, while high quality does not necessarily boost it [49-51].  
The impact of quality on provider choice has been investigated in several Dutch 
studies as well. Varkevisser and colleagues (2012), for example, investigated how overall 
hospital reputation and cardiology reputation affected hospital demand [52]. They 
found that a decrease of one percentage point in readmission rates was associated with 
a 12 per cent increase in hospital volume. Patients also responded to overall hospital 
reputation [52]. Furthermore, Varkevisser and colleagues (2007) explored the effects 
of patient decisions to bypass nearby hospitals when seeking orthopaedic care and 
neurosurgery [53]. One finding was that these two types of treatment differed in the 
trade-offs patients made between distance and waiting times (an aspect of quality), 
with neurosurgery patients more likely than orthopaedic patients to choose the nearest 
hospital if waiting times were favourable [53]. Beukers and colleagues (2014) explored 
the effects of provider choice for hip replacement surgery in 2008–2010 in an analysis 
that included several patient and hospital characteristics. They found that quality and 
waiting times played significant roles in hospital choice, but that travel time appeared 
to be the most important indicator for patient choice. Chapter 6 of this thesis will 
explore how Dutch patients choose providers for cataract treatment. 
5. Research aims and thesis outline
In the foregoing sections we have highlighted the possible significance of innovative 
payment models (section 3) and patients’ choice of providers (section 4) for the 
performance of the Dutch health care system (section 2). We also pointed to the gap 
in the literature with regard to research on health care purchasing markets. This thesis 
hopes to fill that gap. It explores provider–payer contract innovation, whose aim is to 
improve quality and contain cost growth. In the chapters below, we study the incentives 
stemming from payment models and how these may contribute to quality improvement 
and cost containment in the Dutch health care market. This aim unfolds into six 
research questions related to the health care purchasing and provision markets.
Research questions related to the health care purchasing market
1. What are the key elements of current contracting practice for hospital-based 
care in the Netherlands? (chapter 2)
2. What elements would an optimal provider–payer contracting strategy have? 
Balancing customisation and transaction costs in contracting care (chapter 3)
3. What elements are involved in the purchasing and contracting process for 
specialist medical care? (chapter 4)
4. What is the role of health insurers in a managed competition model? (chapter 
4)





Research question related to the health care provision market
6. To what extent do patients take quality into consideration in choosing health 
care providers? (chapter 6)
Chapter 2 explores current contracting practice for medical specialist care in the 
Netherlands. We build a theoretical framework based on economic contract theory 
(principal–agent theory, transaction cost theory and the property rights approach) and 
then use it to analyse provider–payer contracts for hospital-based specialist medical care 
in 2012. Chapter 3 explores trade-offs between transaction costs and provider-tailored 
contract design. This is done by analysing the payers’ contracting strategies and the 
provider–payer contracts concluded for behavioural health. Chapter 4 investigates the 
process of contracting medical specialist care. This is done based on interviews with 
Dutch hospitals and insurers. Chapter 5 explores what the Netherlands can learn from 
experiences with payment reforms abroad. We analyse the Alternative Quality Contract 
(AQC) developed by the US health insurance company Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts, identifying the AQC’s key drivers and drawing transferable lessons for 
the implementation of a similar payment reform elsewhere. Chapter 6 investigates the 
degree to which Dutch patients take hospital quality into account when choosing a 
hospital for cataract treatment. Chapter 7 provides a general discussion and conclusion 
of the thesis.     
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Abstract
In 2006, a new Health Insurance Act was introduced in the Netherlands. Health 
insurance companies began negotiating with the providers of specialist medical 
services about fees and about the volume and quality of care. This article reviews 
the contracts concluded between Dutch insurance companies and hospitals for the 
provision of outpatient and inpatient specialist medical care in 2012. The resulting 
information can serve as baseline data for studying how such contract negotiations 
have since evolved. We analysed the contracts as systematically and comprehensively as 
possible on the basis of economic contract theory. Results showed that uncertainty and 
market complexity were major factors governing the ultimate content of the contracts. 
Virtually all of the contracts were of short duration, were incomplete and allowed for 
renegotiations during the term of validity. We found that health care quality played 
a limited role in the contracts for 2012. More emphasis on quality will be needed if 
regulated competition is to successfully promote the government-defined system goals 
of quality, accessibility and affordability of health care.
1. Introduction
In 2006, a reformed Health Insurance Act (ZVW) took effect in the Netherlands. It 
gave a stronger role to managed competition in the Dutch health care system. Managed 
competition was said to promote quality, accessibility and affordability in health care. 
Consumers would gain more freedom of choice, whilst also bearing more responsibility 
with regard to their health care. Health insurance organizations were no longer to serve 
as mere funders of health care, but were assigned a crucial directive role. They were to 
perform that role by negotiating with providers in the health care market about the 
fees, the volume and the quality of health services, including the specialist medical care 
provided in hospital settings. The assumption underlying the government-promoted 
model of regulated competition is that insurance companies will purchase services 
from providers on a cost-effective basis – that is, that they will obtain quality services at 
the lowest possible price.
 
The purchasing of such services takes place in a changing context, in which government 
and stakeholders in the health care domain are still seeking the best ways to structure 
and perform their roles and responsibilities. Health care purchasing by insurance 
companies is still in a rather early stage. This article is an incipient attempt, based on 
the present state of knowledge, to obtain accurate, cohesive insights into the contracts 
between health insurance companies and hospitals for the provision of outpatient 
and inpatient medical specialist care. Important issues in the background are whether 
cost-effective health care purchasing is being sufficiently achieved and whether the 
contracting parties have managed to find their appropriate roles.
 
This article analyses the contracts concluded between Dutch health insurance companies 
and hospitals for the year 2012. It is intended as a kind of baseline assessment, to 
which subsequent developments, or other purchasing approaches like the Alternative 
Quality Contracts used in the United States [1], can be compared at a later stage. We 
reviewed several hundred contacts signed for hospital-based specialist care in 2012. The 
contracts were made available to us by the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa), which 
obtained them from the large insurance organizations Achmea, VGZ, CZ, Menzis and 
Multizorg. Using insights from economic contract theory, we analyze the health care 
contracts as thoroughly and systematically as possible. None of the data we report here 
is traceable to individual insurers or hospitals.
 
Our article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the 
purchasing market for hospital-based specialist care in the Netherlands and recent 
developments in that market. Section 3 introduces the key factors which, according 
to the economic literature, may influence contract characteristics. Section 4 
examines the identified characteristics of contracts between the insurance companies 
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2. The purchasing of hospital-based specialist care
This section describes how insurance companies purchase hospital-based specialist care. 
It explores the roles of the various players that are involved in or exert influence on 
the purchasing process, and thereby on the content of the contracts. This is followed 
by a brief account of recent developments in the Dutch health care purchasing market.
 
Hospital-based care in the Netherlands has a history of  government imposed global 
budgets for each individual hospital. Until 2006, annual budgets were imposed on 
hospitals, determined for each hospital by the Dutch Healthcare Authority. In the year 
2012, hospital-based care found itself in a transitional phase, in which both budget-based 
and value-based funding models were employed [2]. Since the Health Insurance Act 
came into effect in 2006, hospital-based specialist care has been distinguished into an 
A-segment and a B-segment. In 2012, the A-segment encompassed about 30% of such 
care, for which maximum fees applied, determined annually by the Dutch Healthcare 
Authority. The B-segment consists predominantly of elective, non-emergency care; it 
comprised approximately 70% of the hospital-based specialist care delivered in 2012. 
Payments for services in the B-segment are negotiated between health insurers and 
hospital managements. The B-segment had been gradually expanded from 10% in 
2005, to 20% in 2008, to 34% in 2009 and to 70% in 2012 [2, 3].
 
Although the hospital managements negotiate with the insurers and bear overall 
responsibility for the integrated care that is delivered, a hospital’s medical specialists 
ultimately decide what care they will provide. Specialists working in independent 
practices bill the insurance company directly. Working relationships between hospitals 
and their specialists are set out in documents such as the Model Access Contract, 
or MTO [4], which ensure specialists the right to make use of hospital assets such as 
equipment and operating theatres.
2.1. Roles of the parties involved in the purchasing process
Before examining the contracts and their characteristics in more detail, we shall first 
describe the major parties in the purchasing process and their roles in the purchasing 
of hospital-based specialist medical care.
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport.
The Dutch health ministry (VWS) is charged with safeguarding the three ‘system 
goals’ for health care: quality, accessibility and affordability. The ministry is to ensure 
that health insurance companies and hospitals are able to perform their roles in the 
purchasing process, and it is to regulate that process if necessary. It has a range of 
measures available to provide incentives and to influence the balance of power between 
hospitals and insurers. The Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) has an important role in 
implementing ministerial policy. Available macro-level mechanisms are administrative 
outline agreements (Dutch abbreviations; BHAs) between government, insurers and 
providers and macro-management instruments (Dutch abbreviations; MBIs) to deal 
with cost overruns. Micro-level mechanisms include the elements of a transparency-
oriented insurance claims system (known as DOT) for bundled episodes of specialist 
care, which show great similarity with DRGs. We return to these in section 2.2. These 
examples show how the negotiation outcomes between insurance companies and 
hospitals are partly governed by the role that government plays in the background.
Hospitals. 
The primary aim of a hospital is to deliver quality medical care at reasonable cost. 
Good-quality care may help hospitals to attract new patients. It may also strengthen 
their negotiating positions vis-à-vis insurance companies. This aspect of the purchasing 
process is of growing importance, because hospitals are now subject to greater financial 
risks as an effect of the expanding B-segment, which makes their revenues increasingly 
dependent on performance. The introduction of a minimum number of procedures 
in hospitals has further mounted the pressure on them; it has led to increasing market 
concentration, as seen in a tendency to hospital mergers, of which seven occurred in 
2012 [5].
 
An additional issue during negotiations between hospitals and insurance companies 
may be differential interests of hospital managements and their medical specialists. 
Managements try to limit the total costs, whereas the specialists in independent practice 
have financial motives to deliver more production [6]. Such encouragements have been 
weakened, however, by a series of policy guidelines since 2012 setting out a fee control 
model for medical specialists in independent practice (e.g. [7]).
Health insurance companies. 
The aim of health insurance companies is to promote the interests of their policyholders 
in matters of health care. The website of the Menzis insurance company expresses 
this as follows: ‘Our goal is to provide quality health care and to maintain a healthy 
financial status.’ Other companies use similar wordings. By ensuring the delivery of 
quality care at low cost, a company can hold onto its current policyholders and try 
to attract new ones. The stakes are high for health insurers. In the current health 
care system, they have been assigned the role of purchasing care more cost-effectively. 
They can apply pressure by declining to engage services from certain providers, thereby 
containing costs and enhancing quality [8].
Policyholders/patients. 
Customers take out health insurance policies with insurance companies. They may 
choose between two types of reimbursement policies, namely a ‘restitutiepolis’ or a 
‘naturapolis’. A restitutiepolis allows patients to contact freely their own health care 
providers, whose services are then covered whether or not they have been previously 
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contracted by the insurer. Under a naturapolis, the health insurance company is 
responsible for the care provided to the patient. They may contractually engage preferred 
providers. If policyholders opt to obtain services from non-preferred providers, they 
must pay part of the cost themselves. The assumption is that insurers will select 
predominantly cost-effective, good-quality hospitals as preferred providers. This type 
of competition can function well if the patients, too, have the conscious intention of 
engaging high-quality health care providers.
2.2. Recent developments
The enactment of the 2006 Health Insurance Act marked the starting point of health 
care purchasing by Dutch insurance companies. Since that time, a whole series 
of further changes have affected the market parties and the contracts they sign. In 
addition to the expansion of the B-segment as traced above, there was the transition 
in 2012 from the DBC (diagnosis-treatment combinations) insurance claims system 
to the new DOT (DBCs on its way to transparency) insurance claims system. The 
switch to a modified claims system could potentially trigger shifts in hospital revenues 
and insurance company claims costs. Those systemic risks were mitigated in the years 
2012 and 2013 by the calculation of a ‘transition balance’, the discrepancy in revenues 
between a hypothetical budget calculated according to the previous system (referred to 
as the ‘shadow budget’) and the actual revenues under the DOT system. Each hospital 
then settled the disparity with the Healthcare Insurance Fund at a rate of 95% for 2012 
and 70% for 2013 [9]. The changeover to the comprehensive DOT fee structure for 
hospital-based specialist medical care was completed by 2015 [10], after which a single 
bundled fee applied for each predefined episode of care.
 
An additional change took place in 2012 when a new policy option known as macro 
budget instruments (MBIs) was introduced as a measure to help keep costs within the 
Health Care Budgetary Framework (BKZ), established by the government each year. 
Although budget-based funding is no longer practised, authorities may now intervene 
nonetheless if health care expenditures overshoot the politically desired levels as set out 
in the BKZ. In such cases, all hospitals are subject to a blanket (‘generic’) funding cut 
[11]. At this writing, no macro-management instruments had yet been applied.
 
Also in 2012, the fee control model for specialists in independent practice was 
introduced [7], imposing on health care institutions a yearly ‘macro budget’ containing 
a cost ceiling for insurance claims for the fees of independent specialists working there. 
Institutions exceeding the BKZ are to reimburse a prorated amount to the Healthcare 
Insurance Fund.
 
A final change affecting health care purchasing by hospitals in recent years involves 
quality criteria and volume standards that have been developed by various specialist 
disciplines at the request of the Health Care Inspectorate (IGZ). These necessitate the 
creation of regional arrangements between hospitals about which procedures will be 
delivered by which hospitals. This results in shifts in the market concentrations of 
hospital services [12].
 
Health insurance companies have been subject to a host of recent changes as well. 
They now bear additional risks after the phase-out of a retrospective risk equalisation 
mechanism. Companies now receive only prospective compensation prior to each 
new insurance year, calculated on the basis of the risk profiles of their policyholders; 
the previous post-hoc cost settlement with the Healthcare Insurance Fund has been 
discontinued. This strongly increases the insurers’ interests in cost-effective health 
care purchasing in comparison with the period shortly after adoption of the Health 
Insurance Act. 
 
The Dutch health minister had earlier concluded the 2012–2015 BHA with all 
health care providers and insurance companies to ensure joint efforts to control cost 
trends [13]. It included provisions to limit the overall cost increment to 2.5% in 2012 
(excluding wage and price adjustments). In a more recent adaptation, the parties 
committed themselves to expenditure growth limits of 1.5% for 2014 and 1% for 
subsequent years [14].
3. A brief explanation of economic contract theories
In this section we outline economic contract theory and how it can be applied in the 
empirical analysis of contracts. We use contract theory to highlight essential factors that 
influence the ultimate content of contracts and we describe the contract characteristics 
generally deriving from those factors. We then investigate whether those characteristics 
were identifiable in the contracts between Dutch health insurance companies and 
hospitals for the year 2012. That should produce the first systematic picture of this 
element of the health care purchasing market in the Netherlands.
 
In the economic literature, a contract is defined as an agreement between two parties 
characterised by a joint advance commitment to the performance of specified actions’ 
[15]. The three foremost contract theories are principal-agent theory, transaction costs 
theory and the property rights approach [16].
 
Principal-agent theory describes contracts under which an implementing party (the agent) 
is to perform a task for a commissioning party (the principal). Since the aims of the 
two parties are not necessarily congruent, performance monitoring and performance 
rewards are potential means of ensuring that the contract objectives and the agent’s 
behaviour remain compatible with those of the principal. Transaction costs theory assumes 
that the parties to a contract will choose an organisational form (free-market, a hybrid 
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form or vertical integration) on the basis of the lowest transaction costs; transaction 
costs are all the costs incurred to enable the transaction to take place. The property 
rights approach emphasises the allocation of rights amongst the contract parties; the way 
that those rights are allocated influences the behaviours of the parties, and hence the 
outcomes and the distribution of those outcomes.
 
Scant empirical literature has been published about how contract theories can be 
applied to contracts in practice. As a literature review by Smith and King (2009)[17] 
has shown, many available reports are limited to a research question tested using one 
of the theories. A notable cause of the scarcity of research lies in the confidential 
nature of contracts. Often researchers are unable to gain access to private contracts 
[17, 18], including private contracts between insurance companies and hospitals. Some 
fragmentary information is available involving contracts of insurers such as the British 
National Health Service NHS [19] and about the Alternative Quality Contracts (AQCs) 
of Blue Cross Blue Shield in the United States [1].
 
To document the insurer-hospital contracts as thoroughly as possible, we need to 
engage all three of the economic contract theories in the analysis. Though our 
description above shows a degree of overlap between the theories, there are also 
significant distinctions deriving from their differing focuses. Figure 1 gives a schematic 
view of various complementary contract characteristics that may be derived using the 
theories. We take those contract characteristics as the basis for our analysis of health 
care purchasing contracts.
 
The outcomes of contract negotiations between hospitals and health insurance 
companies depend on a variety of factors. We have distinguished these factors into 
four categories (figure 1, column 2): structure of the market and (more specific for our 
purposes) the health care purchasing market; characteristics of the health care services 
that are the subject of the contract; characteristics of the contracting parties; and the 
behaviour of those parties.
Figure 1. Schematic representation of three economic contract theories, contract characteristics and 
influencing factors
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3.1. Structure of the Dutch health care purchasing market
Number of potential business partners. 
The Netherlands has a relatively small number of companies providing health care 
insurance. Four large establishments (Achmea, VGZ, Menzis and CZ) jointly hold 90% 
of the market [20]. The collaborative organisation Multizorg purchases health care 
on behalf of a number of smaller insurance companies. Despite regional differences 
in scale of influence, the largest four companies thus have a large market share in 
every hospital.
 
The market for hospital-based care is less concentrated, with 84 general hospitals, 8 
teaching hospitals and 59 specialized single issue hospitals (e.g. hospital focusing on 
total hip total knee replacement) in 2011 [20]; the latter provides specialist care to 
specific types of patients. Health insurers may also purchase care from independent 
treatment centres known as ZBCs [20], clinics that engage two or more medical 
specialists. In October 2012, 282 independent treatment centres were holding contracts 
with at least one insurance company [2]. Because they do not perform all treatment 
procedures, they cannot automatically be regarded as equivalent to hospitals. All in 
all, each health insurance company may conclude contracts with large numbers of 
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Information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry exists if one of the stakeholding parties has more or superior 
information available relative to other parties. Between patients and specialists, for 
example, there is significant information asymmetry; given the more specialised 
knowledge of the specialists, these are often more capable than patients or their health 
insurers of determining the appropriate treatment. Between insurance companies 
and specialists, information asymmetry also exists with regard to the quality of the 
health care provided. A possible means of reducing that asymmetry is the monitoring 
of performance [21]. A company may therefore have provisions included in a contract 
that require hospitals to report data based on quality indicators. Performance that 
is not directly measurable may be quantified using a proxy indicator that is strongly 
correlated with that performance [22, 23]. A possible proxy indicator would be the 
number of sessions per patient with a specified medical condition; if that number is 
higher at one hospital than in comparable hospitals, that might prompt an insurer to 
investigate further. At the same time, a minimum number of sessions might also serve 
as an indicator for the more difficult-to-measure quality.
3.2. Health care characteristics
Uncertainty. 
Uncertainty about the volume of health care plays a major role in contract negotiation 
[24]. The amount of care needed in a specific population cannot be predicted without 
a wide margin of error. In addition to uncertainty about medical technology and the 
speed at which new developments will be introduced, the decision-making behaviour 
of patients is also a significant factor. Recent and future policy changes are also 
considerable sources of uncertainty; in other words, the political context is an inherent 
source of uncertainty that is difficult to allow for in advance. At this writing, for instance, 
there is a lack of clarity as to precisely how the new system of single bundled fees will 
function after it is fully implemented [6]. An unsettled policy environment also makes 
performance more difficult to assess. In an urgent letter to the health ministry in late 
2012, the Royal Netherlands Institute of Chartered Accountants (NBA) warned that 
accountants might refuse to approve the annual accounts of Dutch hospitals because 
the whole string of modifications to the system had produced so many uncertainties 
[25]. A further significant source of uncertainty lies in technological developments that 
may influence the demand for care and the associated costs; new treatment procedures 
or improved alternatives may become available at any time. By and large, uncertainty 
results in less complete contracts and shorter contract durations.
Specific product characteristics. 
Transaction costs theory distinguishes a number of product characteristics: complexity, 
quantity of products and transaction-specific investments. The product ‘hospital-based 
specialist medical care’ is highly complex, because hospitals provide broad spectrums 
of health care whose quality is often difficult to assess; many treatments are also 
patient-specific. 
For complex health care products, then, provisions concerning quality or performance 
are often included in contracts [26]. Contract negotiations may be conducted at the 
product level. At the time the Health Insurance Act took effect in 2006, the number of 
health care products was very high: about 30,000 DBCs existed. Since 2012 these have 
been brought back to approximately 4,400 DOTs, but the system still encompasses a 
large number of products.
 
Transaction-specific investments may play a part in contracts. Those are investments 
that lose some of their value if they are not used or are used for some other purpose 
[27]. An example is the recently developed cancer treatment called proton therapy. 
For a hospital, acquiring a proton beam machine entails an investment of some €100 
million [28]. Should health insurance companies decide to no longer contract cancer 
treatments at that hospital, and if the hospital is unable to sell the equipment on to 
a new buyer (such as another treatment provider that does have contracts for that 
service), then the hospital’s investment will lose some or all of its value. In such cases, 
long-term contracts may offer a solution, providing financial certainty to the hospital.
3.3. Characteristics of the contracting parties
Bounded rationality. 
The ability of contracting parties to make rational decisions is limited. For one thing, 
the information needed to fathom all the potential alternatives and consequences is 
often not available. Second, human beings are limited in their capacity to weigh up 
the information that they do have. Moreover, the time available for making decisions 
is often limited. As a consequence of bounded rationality, contracts are incomplete by 
definition, because contracts cannot contain full accounts of all rights and obligations 
of both parties in all possible scenarios.
Risk preferences.
Contract parties may differ in the preferences they have for risks. A contracting party 
is risk-neutral if contract outcomes are not governed by future risks. Risk-seeking or 
risk-avoiding behaviour occurs when a party allows uncertain outcomes to carry more 
weight, or less weight, in its decisions. Under the current system, health insurance 
companies and hospitals are gradually taking on more risks than they previously did. 
In contracts, parties may try to hedge their risks or shift them to the other party. If an 
insurer and a hospital agree on a lump-sum payment for the health care to be delivered, 
that affords the insurance company certainty, whilst the hospital must assume the 
resulting loss or profit. In such a case, the hospital has a maximum incentive to remain 
within the predetermined lump-sum. It is unknown what form an optimal contract 
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3.4. Behavior of the contracting parties
Professional conduct ver sus potential for opportunistic behavior. 
Health insurance companies, hospital managements and medical specialists have many 
rights and obligations that derive from their respective functions or professions. Yet 
there is always room for discretionary decisions, and this can open opportunities to act 
opportunistically (whether purposely or not). That may lead to undesired consequences. 
A health care provider may deliver more care than necessary, or run waiting lists, or 
choose more profitable patients or DOTs (upcoding), or may economize at the expense 
of quality [29]. The potential for opportunistic behavior may give health insurers 
reason to insert provisions in hospital contracts that limit the maneuvering room 
that hospitals and doctors have within the contracts, with the aim of minimizing such 
behaviors and their unwanted consequences.
4. Characteristics of the health care contracts
In drafting their contracts, insurance companies and hospitals take six contract 
characteristics into consideration (figure 1, right-hand column). (1) Allocation of 
property rights. Various types of property rights exist (including rights to make use of 
specified resources and rights to claim residual profits); those rights may be distributed 
between the contracting parties. (2) Contract duration, the period extending from a 
contract’s start date to its intended end date. (3) Incentive alignment. Provisions may 
be included that encourage desired behaviour and inhibit inappropriate behaviour; 
examples are value-based purchasing and performance bonuses. (4) Degree of contract 
completeness, the extent to which the rights and obligations of each party are specified 
for all contingencies. (5) Risk allocation, the distribution of (financial) risk between the 
contracting parties. (6) Protective measures. Contracting parties must have the assurance 
that agreements will be fulfilled; they therefore include protective measures such as 
performance monitoring, dispute resolution, penalties and termination clauses in 
contracts. We shall now further examine the contract characteristics we identified in 
the contracts between Dutch health insurers and hospitals for 2012.
4.1. Allocation of property rights
The relationships of governance in a hospital are legally defined. Those relationships 
thus constitute the baseline governance structure under which a contract between 
a hospital and an insurance company is signed. It sometimes happens that the 
governance relationships change, as when a merger occurs or when arrangements are 
modified between management and medical specialists working in the hospital. Some 
insurance companies therefore included conditions enabling contract dissolution in 
the event of altered governance relations within a hospital. Two insurers stipulated that 
they had the right to immediate contract termination if ‘the relations of governance 
in the hospital become altered through the transfer of shares, conversion, demerger, 
merger, changes to the governing board or changes in the composition or powers of a 
supervisory board’. One insurer had agreed with some hospitals that hospital-employed 
specialists were prohibited from switching to independent practice unless authorized 
by the insurer.
4.2. Contract duration
The duration of most contracts we studied was one year. Three insurance companies 
worked exclusively with one-year contracts, and one had both one- and two-year 
contracts. One insurer employed supplementary ‘framework agreements for specialist 
medical care’, under which subcontracts were signed for a five-year time span; the 
framework agreements included provisions for quality control and information sharing 
for a limited number of services over the five-year period.
 
Virtually all contracts specified similar conditions for possible early termination, 
including mutual agreement, bankruptcy, suspension of payments, or complete or 
partial transfer of the health care establishment to new ownership.
4.3. (Ex ante) incentive alignment
Provisions were made in all contracts regarding the costs, volume and quality of care. 
Some insurers granted performance rewards in the form of selective contracting or 
incremental per-patient reimbursements.
Costs
Insurers and hospitals negotiate about the fees for DOT care products. The data we 
had available omitted the specific fee or volume provisions per DBC agreed with 
hospitals by insurers. Roughly, though, we could identify three different reimbursement 
methods employed in the contracts: lump-sum payments, global hospital ceilings and 
fee schedules. In the lump-sum approach, hospitals receive a predetermined lump-sum 
payment for specified types of care, irrespective of output. With global hospital ceilings, a 
hospital could submit claims to the insurer until the global hospital ceiling is reached. 
The Dutch health ministry he amounts of the contracted lump-sums or global hospital 
ceilings are stated in the contracts. When contracts contained fee schedules, the hospitals 
were reimbursed for every completed episode of care according to the fees set in 
the schedules.
 
Almost all contracts employed either lump-sum payments or global hospital ceilings. 
Two insurance companies worked with ceiling provisions exclusively; two others had 
ceiling provisions with some hospitals and lump-sum provisions with others. One 
company worked with all three payment methods, although the fee schedules were used 
only for a limited number of hospitals in which the company had a small market share. 
Two companies referred in their contracts explicitly to the spending growth limits set 
by the current Administrative Outline Agreement.
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Virtually all contracts stated that the health care must not be unnecessarily costly or 
complex. Four companies included provisions about prescribing drugs; one obligation 
in three of these was prescribing by generic names, save in cases of medical necessity. 
Two companies required that hospitals prescribe the lowest-priced alternatives if 
different types were available.
Volume
The payment methods employed by the insurance companies impacted the volume of 
care as well as the costs. Some insurers tried to minimise the risks of undertreatment 
and overtreatment by including additional provisions in the contracts. To discourage 
undertreatment, many insurers prohibited hospitals from declining patients or 
discontinuing their treatment except for well-grounded reasons. Some contracts 
required hospitals to continue care delivery even after a global hospital ceiling 
or a lump-sum was exceeded. One insurer also required hospitals to continue 
dispensing medicines.
 
Provisions to discourage overtreatment were also included. Virtually all contracts 
stated that hospital-based specialist care would be reimbursed exclusively for patients 
with GP or other referrals, except in emergencies. Three insurance companies explicitly 
required prior authorisation by the insurer for treatment episodes from a restricted list. 
The restricted list is a list of treatments that require prior authorization. One insurer 
required authorisation for specific interventions, such as upper eyelid or prominent 
ear corrections. Some contract criteria were highly detailed. One criterion for upper 
eyelid corrections, for instance, was that ‘the skin redundancy on the upper eyelids 
must be so substantial that the skin drapes over a minimum of half of the eyelashes 
on straight ahead gaze with upright head orientation and/or slackness or paralysis 
of the levator palpebrae muscle’. There was one insurance company that stipulated a 
maximum reimbursable volume for certain services.
Quality 
General provisions on quality of care were contained in all contracts. The care was 
to be consistent with the state of the art in medical research and practice. It was to 
conform to the standards of care, protocols and guidelines most recently in effect. 
Some more specific requirements were for implementation of safety management 
systems and for accreditations conferred by recognised certification or accreditation 
bodies for 2012. General provisions were included about waiting times, such as that 
care was to be delivered within the maximum times specified in the legally determined 
Treek standards. For some specific services, provisions were included that referred to 
minimum quality requirements set by professional organisations such as the Association 
of Surgeons of the Netherlands (NVvH). In some cases, an insurance company had 
formulated its own quality criteria or improvement provisions.
Performance rewards
Various types of performance rewards may exist, including selective contracting and 
bonuses for each treatment episode in which a hospital fulfils specified standards. In 
2012, one insurance company included bonuses for hospitals meeting quality criteria 
for certain types of services. Three companies engaged in selective contracting by 
purchasing only specified types of services, or no services at all, from certain hospitals. 
Most insurers had contracts with practically all Dutch hospitals, but not always for 
all services.
 
The criteria applied in selective contracting or incremental per-patient reimbursements 
corresponded mainly to the guidelines (minimum quality requirements) already 
established by the professional associations, and hence already known to hospitals. 
In some cases, an insurer had defined its own quality indicators. For some services, 
explicit improvement provisions were also included in contracts.
4.4. Degree of contract completeness
The contracts we studied were incomplete in terms of performance requirements and 
the allocation of financial risk. Four of the five insurance companies provided room 
for fee adaptations during the term of a contract; the fifth company stated that fees 
would be reimbursed until a specified ceiling was reached. In the event that volumes 
were lower than expected, or exceeded contracted ceilings or global-sum payments, 
per-episode fees could be adjusted up or down to make total claims match the 
intended level.
 
An additional provision included by three insurers allowed for payment adjustments 
in the event that changes were made to fixed or maximum fees in the categories 
of care whose pricing was controlled by the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa). In 
some cases, contracts also provided for reassessment of lump-sum payments or global 
hospital ceilings. Two insurers reserved the right to raise or lower ceilings should 
their numbers of policyholders diverge from the numbers on which calculations had 
been based; another left room for budget renegotiation should a hospital experience a 
‘substantial’ increase in volume that was beyond its reasonable risk. Other sources of 
incompleteness in contracts involved performance. Although provisions about quality 
were included, none of the contracts specified what the desired quality would be in all 
conceivable scenarios.
4.5. Risk allocation
The risks of the two parties were distributed between them via the agreed payment 
methods. Under Incentive Alignment above, we have discussed the various payment 
methods and the incentives for both parties in the agreements. In agreements with 
contracted lump-sum payments or global hospital ceilings, the hospitals bore the 
bulk of the risk; the risk was greater under ceiling provisions than under global-sum 
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provisions, because the former carried no revenue guarantees. Provisions allowing 
episode fees, and in some cases lump-sums or global hospital ceilings, to be adjusted 
during the contract period heightened the risks for insurance companies, especially if 
the size of such adjustments was not precisely delimited in the contracts.
4.6. Protective measures
Measures were included in all contracts for overseeing hospital performance and for 
averting or resolving any conflicts that might arise. Such measures included monitoring, 
dispute resolution procedures and penalties. The precise terms of such measures varied 
by insurance company.
Monitoring 
Various arrangements were made for the monitoring of hospitals. First, there were 
requirements for the routine reporting of volume, quality, treated policyholders 
and hospital financial status. An example was monthly reporting by hospitals of the 
numbers of closed (completed) episodes of care and the value of any work in progress 
(OHW). The latter was defined by the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) as ‘the value 
of the treatment episodes active at the end of a financial year for which a care product 
has been initiated/opened, but for which insurance claims cannot be submitted 
until after year-end’ [30]. One insurer requested notification if a hospital anticipated 
overshooting the contracted lump-sum or global hospital ceiling. Hospitals were also 
subject to requirements to keep records of scores on specified quality indicators and, 
in some cases, to report these on their websites. Most such indicators were obtained 
from the quality programme Visible Care (ZiZo), from the Association of Dutch Health 
Insurers (ZN) or from the Health Care Inspectorate (IGZ). One insurer for example 
requested ZiZo and IGZ indicators; another required ZiZo and ZN indicators. Some 
insurers included provisions requiring hospitals to report daily on all policyholders 
currently in treatment for purposes of insurance cover verification. Insurers also 
required information on the financial standing of hospitals in the form of annual and 
semi-annual reports.
In addition to such reporting requirements, two insurance companies standardly 
required intermediate consultation meetings to discuss performance and new 
developments relating to the volume, nature and quality of care and the associated 
costs, as well as reviewing the hospitals’ financial management and monitoring 
policyholders’ complaints.
Dispute resolution
The contracts stated that the parties would, by preference, resolve disputes mutually 
as much as possible. If parties failed to comply with provisions, consultations would 
be held to seek joint solutions. Parties would resort to legal action only if attempts 
at mutual resolution failed. In the worst case, contracts could be dissolved. One 
insurance company included provisions stating that it could require hospitals to draw 
up improvement plans and giving the insurer the right to publish a public warning 
should the hospital fail to correct deficiencies.
Penalties 
No directly imposed penalty sums were provided for in the contracts. Five insurance 
companies did include specific provisions enabling revocation of a hospital’s 
entitlement to provide, or submit claims for, services for which it did not satisfy the 
quality or volume standards. One company required hospitals to notify the insurer 
if it were to deviate from standards, in which case an improvement plan would be 
drawn up. Should the hospital not satisfy the requirements within the specified 
period, the insurer would cease reimbursing the care. The insurance company that 
paid incremental reimbursements for specific services meeting specified quality criteria 
also included a provision declaring that bonus immediately null and void should the 
quality criteria not be maintained.
Table 2. Summary of contract characteristics
Content of contracts between Dutch health insurance companies and hospitals
Property rights allocation The relationships of governance in a hospital are legally defined, thus 
constituting the baseline situation in which a contract is signed. Some 
insurers included contract provisions to obtain more certainty about those 
relationships.
Contract duration The duration of most contracts was one year. One company worked with 
both one- and two-year contracts. One company employed supplementary 
framework agreements containing arrangements about quality control and 
data sharing over a five-year period.
Incentive alignment Provisions were made in all contracts about costs, volume and quality of 
care. Some insurers provided performance rewards in the form of selective 
contracting or incremental reimbursements if specified standards were met.
Degree of contract 
completeness
Contracts were incomplete in terms of performance requirements and 
the allocation of financial risk. Some left room for fee renegotiation, 
including reassessment of contracted lump sums or global hospital ceilings. 
Arrangements were included about quality, albeit with little detail. No 
contracts specified desired quality in differing scenarios.
Risk allocation The risks of the two parties were distributed between them via the agreed 
payment methods. Though hospitals appeared to bear the bulk of the risk 
in both the lump-sums and the global hospital ceilings methods, it was 
unclear how profits and losses might ultimately be distributed.
Protective measures All contracts included measures for overseeing hospital performance and 
for averting or resolving conflicts. Examples were monitoring, dispute 
resolution procedures and indirect penalties.
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5. Discussion
5.1. Uncertainty and complexity strongly influence the content of contracts
Uncertainty and complexity are significant factors determining the structures of 
contracts between Dutch hospitals and health insurance companies for the delivery of 
specialist medical care services. Such influences are reflected in rather short contract 
durations, in contract incompleteness and in provisions for renegotiation during the 
term of validity.
 
Most contracts we analysed had one-year durations, and only a few spanned two 
years. Long-term supplementary contracts may be useful if large investments need to 
be made, affording certainty to both parties and hence reducing transaction costs. 
A disadvantage of long-term contracts is a potential reduction in flexibility, as well 
as in market efficiency. Given the numerous uncertainties, long-term contracts will 
often need to be renegotiated in practice, thus raising transaction costs. Crucial 
considerations in long-term contracts are how the parties deal with uncertainty and 
whether they regard such contracts as a basis of trust and confidence for addressing 
any uncertainties that arise, without the need to tightly regulate everything in advance.
 
The contracts we studied were incomplete in terms of performance issues and financial 
risk allocation. The fact that hospitals perform wide arrays of procedures on many 
types of patients makes it complicated and unfeasible for a hospital and an insurer 
to determine in advance exactly what will happen in all contingencies. That is why 
many contracts allowed for renegotiation. Strict adherence to contracts could entail 
great financial risks. Should health care volumes far exceed contracted global hospital 
ceilings, for example, that could jeopardise a hospital’s financial standing. It is still 
unclear what measure of contract completeness would be achievable in practice.
5.2. The role of the Dutch Ministry of Health
Policy uncertainty
Contracting parties have many uncertainties to cope with. As well as the lack of 
foreknowledge about health care volume and technological developments, there 
is uncertainty about policy shifts. The latter may be even more unpredictable 
than the former. The health ministry may try to mitigate such uncertainties by 
negotiating agreements with stakeholders and by pursuing long-term policies. 
That can be quite a challenge in practice, as was seen in the transition to the more 
transparently bundled DOT payment system just when market parties had become 
accustomed to the earlier DBC care bundles. At the time of our study in 2012, 
insurance companies and hospitals still had little clarity about the costs of the new 
product structures [31]. When policy measures are launched in rapid succession, 
market parties no longer find it feasible to formulate competitively priced and 
binding contracts.
The political environment and the regular changes of government constitute, as it 
were, an inherent source of uncertainty about the direction in which the health care 
system is moving. For market parties, clarity and certainty about future expectations 
are essential conditions for fulfilling their roles and responsibilities in the system. A 
good example of policy for the longer term was the 2012–2015 Administrative Outline 
Agreement (BHA) with health care providers and insurance companies, whereby the 
health ministry secured commitments to limit the yearly cost rises. Once signed, that 
agreement provided guiding premises for contracting parties in their negotiations. 
The agreed growth curbs were reflected in the contracts we studied. From a public 
welfare perspective, however, it is important that BHA provisions not be transferred 
one to one into the contracts; differences between hospitals need to be allowed for. It 
is also important that such an outline agreement not be nullified by a succession of 
operational-level measures, such as the transfer of payment for hospital-prescribed to 
hospital budgets.
5.3. What was missing or lacking in the contracts?
Little use of value-based payment models
Performance rewards can give a strong impetus to competition in the hospital market. 
The idea is to reward hospitals that deliver higher-quality care. Value-based remuneration 
was evident on a limited scale in the contracts for 2012; that is, limited numbers of 
treatment bundles were contracted selectively or were eligible for quality-related 
incremental reimbursements. Whether value-based reimbursement is desirable, and in 
what form, will depend partly on the type of health care involved. For emergency care, 
reimbursement bonuses would be more appropriate than selective contracting, because 
geographic proximity is important. Complex care that benefits from economies of scale 
and care concentration would be more suited for selective contracting. Health insurers 
have an interest in employing value-based remuneration in particular for services that 
are frequently performed or for which large variations in fees and/or quality exist. A 
prerequisite in any case is the availability of adequate information about quality [32]. 
The criteria used in selective contracting in 2012 were mainly the existing standard 
quality criteria. It seems probable that health insurance companies still had too little 
reliable data on quality available.
Payment mechanisms were not used in practice to allocate risks
Various payment methods might be included in contracts to spread risks across the 
contracting parties. Both ceiling provisions and lump-sum arrangements placed a large 
share of the risk on the hospitals, yet it still remained to be seen whether renegotiations 
would take place and how profits or losses would ultimately be distributed. 
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Our review also revealed that insurers had taken some initial steps towards payment 
differentiation; that is, a limited degree of value-based payment models was observed, 
as well as some initial arrangements about quality. This is a step in the right direction. 
If managed competition is to make a genuine contribution to the system goals of 
quality, accessibility and affordability of health care, then future contracts will need to 
put more emphasis on the quality of care and on the necessary financial incentives for 
achieving it.
Little use of sanctions or penalties
Evidently the well-known Dutch consensus model is also at work in the health care 
purchasing market. Health insurance companies and hospitals do their best to reach 
mutually satisfactory solutions. Although contracts may be terminated prematurely if a 
party fails to comply, that is unlikely to happen in practice. Other considerations such 
as mutual dependence and reputation preservation seem to play much stronger roles 
in contract compliance. Contracting parties benefit from good reciprocal relationships 
because the probability is high that they will be dealing with each other in the future.
5.4. Limitations of empirical research in contracts
This study has its limitations. Some dimensions, such as contract duration, were easily 
quantifiable. Discrete variables containing options, such as whether or not hospitals 
were required to continue delivering care beyond a maximum, could be unambiguously 
scored. However, factors regarded in contract theory as highly instrumental in 
determining contract content, such as complexity and uncertainty, were mostly difficult 
or impossible to measure [18].
 
In addition, precisely worded provisions in contracts may be given a modified 
interpretation by both contracting parties, or they may diverge in their interpretations. 
Parties may have also made mutual arrangements that are not specified literally in the 
contracts, making them unidentifiable for outsiders [18].
6. Conclusions
Uncertainty about future developments has had a significant impact on the contracts 
concluded between Dutch health insurance companies and hospitals for the 
reimbursement of hospital-based specialist medical care. So far, the uncertainty has 
resulted in short contract durations, incompleteness in contracts and provisions for 
intermediate renegotiation. Many insurers include reimbursement ceilings or global-
sum payments in contracts with the aim of curbing the cost growth of health care 
and limiting their own risks. The fact that many hospitals agree to such provisions is 
an indication that insurers have sufficient bargaining power vis-à-vis hospitals. The 
Administrative Outline Agreement (BHA) between government, insurers and hospitals 
to stem the overall growth of health care expenditure has probably been a major factor 
in the cost restraint during the recent economic crisis. Since both hospitals and 
insurers had committed themselves in the BHA to jointly limit the costs of hospital 
care nationwide, those commitments were also recognisable in the individual contract 
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Abstract
Context: The way we pay for health care is increasingly seen as an opportunity to 
increase value, both by improving quality and by reducing cost. Health care can be 
purchased on the basis of ‘any-willing-provider’ (AWP) contracts or payers and 
providers may negotiate about contractual conditions. Which contracting strategy is 
welfare-enhancing depends on the mutual added value for the market parties involved. 
As regulation does not allow public payers to distinguish between providers, they must 
default to AWP contracts. Private payers do have opportunities to tailor contract design 
to specific provider characteristics; theoretically that could create stronger incentives to 
deliver value in health care.
Methods: We explore how the purchasing of behavioral health contributes to the 
incentive to deliver value by analyzing the insurers’ purchasing policies and 31 private 
provider–payer contracts for behavioural health. The contracts were signed in the 
Netherlands in 2014 and 2015. 
Findings: Provider-tailored contract design existed at two levels: (1) private payers 
employed different contract templates across different provider groups and (2) 
negotiations could lead to further tailoring to individual providers. The use of different 
templates across provider groups explained most of the provider-level variation. 
However, because payers employed their own contract templates, most of the contract 
variation we observed was across payers and not across providers. Such payer-level 
variation increased provider transaction costs. 
Conclusions: Private payers negotiated with behavioural health care providers about 
contract provisions, and this led to some degree of provider-level tailoring of the 
contract templates. It is difficult to determine how the benefits of provider-tailored 
contract design might weigh up against the added transaction costs for providers. In 
any case, current contracting practice could be improved both by reducing transaction 
costs for providers and by seeking higher levels of provider-tailored contract design. 
This would require greater transparency about provider performance. 
Key words: financial incentives, pay for performance, global budget, behavioural health
1. Introduction
The way we pay health care providers is increasingly seen as an opportunity to enhance 
value-based health care delivery [1–3]. With the emergence of alternative payment 
models such as bundled payments [4, 5], shared savings [6, 7] and other hybrid forms of 
capitation, many countries are shifting away from paying for volume towards paying for 
value. Nonetheless, fee-for-service (FFS) payment, capitation, salaries, global budgets 
and diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) remain the most dominant payment forms in 
OECD countries [8]. Depending on characteristics of the countries’ health systems, 
health care is purchased by either public payers, private payers or both. In the United 
States, for instance, public agencies purchase through Medicare and Medicaid and 
private insurers may purchase on behalf of private individuals and/or employers. 
Public payers are only able to offer ‘any-willing-provider’ (AWP) contracts, with 
contractual conditions laid down beforehand; any provider may sign the contract 
under those conditions. Private payers, on the other hand, can negotiate with providers 
about contract design and may thereby employ different contracts across providers. 
Because contextual factors may play an important role in the effectiveness of a payment 
model, the opportunity that private payers have to tailor contract design by negotiating 
with providers about specific provider characteristics may theoretically help to create 
stronger incentives to deliver value in health care.
Little is known as yet, however, about the extent to which private payers are actually 
tailoring contract design to individual providers, since accessibility to contracts for 
research purposes is limited by the confidential nature of contracts. Consequently, 
current knowledge about private contract design is limited because research is mostly 
based on interviews (see e.g. Muhlestein et al., Conrad et al., [9, 10]). To the best of our 
knowledge, only the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) from Massachusetts has been 
described in detail by Chernew and colleagues [11]. It is therefore still unclear to what 
extent provider-tailored contract design exists in practice. 
In the Netherlands, we did gain access to private contracts for behavioural health care 
that were concluded by all purchasing parties in the country. By analysing these contracts 
and the purchasing policies of the individual payers, we seek to address the research 
gap with regard to provider-tailored contract design. In this chapter, we determine the 
level of provider-tailored contract design by examining the variation in contract design 
that exists across payers and providers. We further explore what provider characteristics 
might explain the amount of variation. From that analysis we draw general conclusions 
and make recommendations for future health care contracting practice. 
  3
54 55
In search for the optimal provider-payer contractChapter 3
2. Conceptual considerations in contract customization
Payers contract providers for health care on behalf of their insured populations. 
An important aspect of contract design is the choice of payment model. There are 
roughly five payment model types: cost-based reimbursement, fee-for-service (FFS) 
reimbursement, per-diem payments, per-episode (bundled) payments and capitation 
[12]. The providers’ level of financial risk increases in the order of that sequence, as 
illustrated in figure 1; correspondingly, the payers’ level of financial risk decreases in 
that order. With an increased interest in efficiency improvement in health care, we 
are gradually shifting away from paying for volume to paying for value; that is, we are 
moving from the left side of the spectrum to the right side – towards payment models 
that are generally associated with higher levels of risk for providers. 
Within any particular payment model, there are multiple ways to increase or decrease 
a provider’s financial risk by adding other contract provisions. For example, under a 
capitation contract, the inclusion of a stop-loss provision1 lowers the risk, whereas the 
introduction of a maximum treatment volume clause raises it. Ultimately, the specific 
design of such provisions will determine the risk level; for instance, stop-loss provisions 
have thresholds, and the lower the threshold, the more risk reduction for the provider. 
Hence, both the inclusion and the design of such provisions translate into a bandwidth 
of financial risk, as depicted by the grey area in figure 2A. 
In figures 2A–2E, we attempt to illustrate the search for an optimal provider–payer 
contract by using provider A and provider B as illustrative examples. We assume that 
provider A has a maximum risk level as indicated by line A in figure 2B. Payment 
models that exceed that level of financial risk may cause provider A to go bankrupt, 
should costs rise unexpectedly for reasons beyond the provider’s control. Bankruptcy of 
well performing providers like provider A would be undesirable from a societal point of 
view. In search for the optimal contract, we are thus aiming for a payment model that 
is furthest to the right, without the threat of provider A going bankrupt. That balance 
is to be found in the grey segment of line A. 
Other providers, like provider B, may be associated with different maximum risk levels, 
depending on factors such as care volume, type of care delivered and the sophistication 
of the provider’s IT infrastructure. As illustrated in figure 2C, provider B has a lower 
maximum level of risk. Consequently, we seek to offer provider B a contract that lies 
in the grey segment of line B. 
1 A stop-loss provision is a threshold that caps the maximum amount to which the provider is at 
risk; or, in some cases, costs that exceed that threshold may be shared between the payer and 
provider (13. Porter, M.E. and B. Kaplan, How should we pay for healthcare. 2015. 
When contracting providers A and B, payers may offer an any-willing-provider (AWP) 
contract or they may negotiate with the providers individually [14]. Public payers 
employ AWPs only, because legislation does not allow them to distinguish between 
providers (for non-objective reasons, that  is).2 Private payers may, however, choose 
between providing AWPs and negotiating contracts with providers. In our example, 
employing an AWP will either result in provider B having excessive risk levels or in 
provider A operating at a risk level with suboptimal incentives (for example AWP’ in 
figure 2D). Theoretically, employing AWPs will always yield suboptimal outcomes.3
Private payers can choose to negotiate with individual providers and offer provider A 
and provider B each a unique contract. A private payer can theoretically offer provider 
A a contract in the grey segment of line A, for example A’, and offer provider B a 
contract in the grey segment of line B, for example B’ (see A’ and B’ in figure 2E). 
The payer would thereby introduce the highest attainable value incentives for both 
providers without exposing them to unacceptably high levels of risk that might result 
in bankruptcy. 
Although a provider-tailored contract may generate optimal incentives, a private payer 
must decide whether the transaction costs associated with offering every single provider 
a customised contract are worth the potential gains. After all, provider-tailored contracts 
lead to higher transaction costs in the form of time investment for negotiating with 
individual providers about contract terms and the administrative costs of writing the 
contracts. From a societal point of view, it is desirable to keep transaction costs down 
for both payers and providers. Higher transaction costs for the payer are likely to result 
in higher policy premiums and higher provider transaction costs will probably result 
in less time for the patients. Transaction costs thus create downward pressure on the 
desired level of provider-tailored contract design from a societal point of view.
In addition, whether negotiations will indeed result in an optimal contract (in this case 
A* for provider A and B* for provider B) also depends upon the bargaining position 
of the payer vis-à-vis the provider. If the payer is more dominant, compensation may 
be lower (and providers may operate at excessive risk levels); conversely, if the provider 
is more dominant, compensation may be higher (with providers operating below their 
optimal risk levels). The optimal contract is thus more likely to be reached when both 
parties are able to exert some pressure on the other party. It is therefore of the essence 
that parties have balanced bargaining positions, so as to increase the likelihood that 
contracting practice will be in line with what is optimal from a societal point of view.
2 Although public payers may offer different contract options in the market, they must make those 
options available to all providers and may not distinguish between providers. Thus, if Medicare 
or Medicaid offers the choice between both upside and downside or only upside risk, that option 
is available to all providers. A public payer may not offer that option to a limited segment of the 
market. 
3 An exception would be if all providers in the market enjoy equal levels of financial risk.
  3
56 57
In search for the optimal provider-payer contractChapter 3
In the Netherlands, we found that private payers were employing both contracting 
strategies. AWP contracts were used primarily for smaller health care providers [15], 
whereas payers might choose to negotiate with larger health care providers such as 
hospitals and behavioural health care providers. 
 
The different strategies may have arisen from the fact that the mutual added value from 
negotiating is larger in contracting larger parties, such as a hospital or a behavioural 
health care provider, than in contracting a primary care physician. 
Figure 1. Payment models and financial risk allocation in payer–provider contracting
Source: Frakt, A.B., et al., 2012 [12]
Figure 2 (A–E). Optimal provider–payer contract
Source: Authors’ own analysis, based on Frakt, A.B., et al 2012 [12] (figure 1).
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3. Description of purchasing policies and provider–payer contracts for 
behavioural health care
In this section we explore how contract negotiations have translated into contract design 
by analysing variation in private provider–payer contracts for behavioural health care 
(for a detailed description of the behavioural health care market in the Netherlands 
see appendix 1). As all contracts were based on global budgets, we take Dredge’s 
(2004) framework in describing global budgets [16]. He defines a global budget as ‘an 
overall spending target or limit that constrains the price and the quality of the services 
provided’ [16]. Because Dredge’s framework is very elaborate, we have chosen to focus 
for the purpose of this article on the most relevant aspects in a global budget contract 
design: (1) scope, (2) setting the budget, (3) performance incentives and (4) annual 
adjustments. The scope is the ‘definition of volume and services to be purchased 
and provided’ [16]. Setting the budget involves the ‘approaches to the mechanics of 
setting the global budget’ [16]. Performance incentives are contractual provisions that 
encourage good performance and penalise poor performance [16]. Annual adjustments 
involve measures to maintain the real-terms value of the global budget [16]. 
 
Relying on these four dimensions, we have systematically described the insurers’ 
purchasing policies for behavioural health care.4 Table 1 provides a general, condensed 
description of the contracts based on the purchasing parties’ policies in 2015.5 Note 
that this is a simplified version of the purchasing policies, which were much more 
complex in reality. Payers might differ in their purchasing strategies, as one insurer 
might selectively contract a condition like depression while another might not. Or 
an insurer might pursue different strategies across different groups of providers, for 
example employing pay-for-performance indicators solely for providers with revenue 
levels above a certain threshold.
4 In examining purchasing policies for behavioural health care, we excluded purchasing from 
independent practices from the analysis.
5 The purchasing parties were the insurance organisations Zilveren Kruis, VGZ, CZ, Menzis, DSW 
and Multizorg (the latter of which purchased services on behalf of the four remaining smaller 
insurers, ONVZ, Zorg en Zekerheid, A.S.R. and Eno).
Table 1. General description of Dutch health insurers’ purchasing policies for behavioural health 
care in 2015 
1. SCOPE
Volume and services
Contracts covered care for all insured persons (aged 18+) who applied 
to a provider for behavioural health care. Contracts could cover all 
basic and specialised behavioural health care, or basic and specialised 
care might be contracted separately. Payer-level variation existed with 
regard to the number of excluded services. 
2. SETTING THE BUDGET
The mechanics of setting the 
budget
Global budgets were based either on the historical budget or on claims 
data. Both could be adjusted for insurer mutations, changes in relevant 
policies and legislation, mutations in services delivered and a yearly 
index. A global budget might be further subdivided into sub-budgets 
(for example basic vs specialised behavioural health care). Providers 
were reimbursed at fee-for-service rates. Should the total reimbursed 
amount exceed the global budget, the difference was transferred back 
to the insurer.
3. PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES
Incentives for good 
performance and penalties for 
poor performance
Contracts contained written agreements with respect to quality. A 
pay-for-performance component was often included, with increases 
for both fee-for-service rates and global budgets based on process and/
or structure indicators (for examples of such criteria see appendix 3). 
Additional provisions might be incorporated, including maximum-
cost-per-patient/policyholder/client clauses and maximum volume 
clauses. 
4. ANNUAL ADJUSTMENTS
Measures to maintain the 
real-terms value of the global 
budget
The size of the global budget could be adjusted in response to events 
that led to unanticipated changes in volume, such as changes in the 
size and case mix of the population or changes in pertinent legislation 
and regulations (e.g. adjustments to the NZa maximum rates).
The level of provider and payer variation across the payers’ purchasing strategies with 
respect to contract scope, financial budgets and performance incentives is illustrated 
in table 2.6 We define payer-level variation as the number of methods used to purchase 
care (with the number of dots representing the number of methods pursued) and 
provider-level variation as the number of insurers that employ different purchasing 
strategies depending on provider characteristics (with the number of dots representing 
the number of insurers that distinguish between providers). The table reveals more 
variation in contract design (number of methods) across payers than across providers, 
especially in terms of the design of financial budgets and performance incentives. 
6 The most relevant and tangible aspects with respect to contract scope, financial budget and 
performance incentives have been included in table 2. Annual adjustments have not been 
included, as they are part of the ex-post calculations. 
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Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) ●●● ●●
Methadone ● ●●
Crisis ●●●●● ●●
Eating disorder ● ●●
Dementia ● ●●
Addiction ● ●●
DBC-stay (levels A–G) ● ●●
DBCs > 18,000 minutes ● ●●
2. SETTING THE BUDGET
Number of sub-budgets ● ●●●
Generic starting rate(s) for all or selected services (yes/no) ●● ●●●●
Number of generic starting rates ●● ●●●
Fees based on NZa fee scheme or payer’s fee scheme ●● ●●●
Starting reimbursement rates (%) ●●● ●●●●●●●
3. PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES 
Number of global budget increments ●● ●●●●●●
Number of fee increments ●●● ●●●●●●●●
Potential fee increases (%) ●●● ●●●●●●●●●●●
Potential budget increases (%) ●● ●●●●●●
1 Provider-level variation: the number of dots represents the number of insurers that pursue different 
purchasing strategies based on provider characteristics. 
2 Payer-level variation: the number of dots represents the number of methods used to purchase care.
With respect to contract scope (dimension 1), table 2 shows that ten products (or types of 
care) might be subject to selective contracting. Eight of the ten products were diagnosis-
based (e.g. anxiety, depression and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT)), one product 
represents ‘stay’, and one product represents products that exceed 18.000 minutes (that 
is, treatment plans that exceed 18.000 minutes). Payer variation with regard to these 
products derived from two methods: pursuing selective contracting or not pursuing 
selective contracting, as depicted by two dots in the payer-level variation column. 8
7 Annual adjustments (dimension 4) have been left out of this analysis, as these are part of the 
ex-post calculations. 
8 This refers to anxiety in which no physical condition had been diagnosed as the cause by either 
a primary care doctor or a medical specialist.
Selectively contracting a specific product might involve meeting a set of criteria (whereby 
not meeting the criteria implies that the product would not have been purchased from 
that specific provider), as with products like anxiety and depression. Alternatively, selective 
contracting might be based on whether the payer and provider had a contract in the 
previous year (whereby new providers would not have been eligible for having the product 
reimbursed), as with products like ECT and methadone. The product ‘crisis’ showed the 
greatest provider-level variation. All five payers selectively contracted crisis interventions, 
with some insurers using specific eligibility criteria and others using prior contracting. 
 
With regard to budget setting (dimension 2), table 2 shows that payer-level variation 
exceeded provider-level variation on all five components. Provider-level variation was 
explained by three provider characteristics: provider revenue level (in relation to the 
respective payer), provider type and provider training level. The component ‘starting 
reimbursement rates’ was explained by all three characteristics and showed the largest 
payer-level variation (for a full description of the starting rates see appendix 2).
 
Table 2 reveals the largest payer-level variation with respect to performance incentives 
(dimension 3). Practically all insurers employed different numbers of fee and/or budget 
increments, and the potential increases associated with pay-for-performance schemes 
varied by insurer as well. In terms of fee increments, providers might be subject to 0, 
1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 12 or 36 indicators (hence the 8 dots). Some payers again adjusted their 
lists of indicators to provider-specific characteristics. One payer adopts 10 indicators 
for clinical providers that are not hospital based psychiatric care (Dutch abbreviations 
PAAZ/PUK), 12 indicators for exclusively ambulant providers and 10 for PAAZ/PUK, 
in case negotiated face to face; the remaining providers that were contracted digitally 
were eligible for 8 BGGZ and 2 SGGZ indicators.9 For a comprehensive list of all 
indicators used for either fee and/or global budget increments, see appendix 3. 
 
Performance incentives were not limited to pay-for-performance indicators. Additional 
provisions might be incorporated, including maximum-cost-per-patient/policyholder/
client clauses, maximum volume clauses, clinical downsizing targets and caps on hourly 
fees. At the end of the year, such provisions could be used either to settle the final 
budget or as guidelines.  
Overall we found that provider-level variation was largely explained by the providers’ 
revenues (in relation to the respective insurer), provider type and satisfaction of sets 
of criteria. Other characteristics, such as the spectrum (and relative proportion) of 
care delivered, practitioner training levels, historical volume levels and previous-year 
contracting, were sometimes used as well. For additional examples that illustrate 
provider-level variation, see table 3. 
9 BGGZ and SGGZ are the Dutch abbreviations referring respectively to basic behavioural health 
care and specialised behavioural health care.
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New or previously contracted provider: Some complex or 
expensive services (such as ECT) are best concentrated with 
a limited number of providers. ECT might therefore not be 
contracted with new providers. 
Crisis Selective contracting based on satisfaction of specific criteria: 
Crisis care was contracted only with providers authorised for 
regional crisis care services, i.e. on the basis of a recent arrangement 
with police and other relevant partners to provide 24-hour crisis 
emergency services. 
Depression Selective contracting based on satisfaction of specific criteria: 
Provider must meet the specific criteria derived from guidelines laid 





Market share or revenue: Providers with revenue levels below €4 
million were assigned two sub-budgets, one for BGGZ and one 
for SGGZ. Providers responsible for over 50% of a payer’s insured 
population in the provider’s region were assigned three sub-budgets: 
BGGZ, SGGZ-stay and SGGZ-treatment 
Fees based on 
NZa fee scheme or 
payer’s fee scheme 
Market share or revenue: For providers with insurer revenue levels 
above €250,000, the payer employed its own fee scheme; for other 
providers the NZa fee scheme was employed for BGGZ and the 
payer’s fee scheme for SGGZ. 
Starting rates (%) Practitioner training level: Starting rates for BGGZ were 
dependent on practitioners’ training levels, with higher rates for 




Number of fee 
increments (#)
Provider type and revenue: Amongst providers with insurer 
revenue levels above €250,000, a distinction was made between 
provider types. Integrated care providers were eligible for 10 
increments, providers of inpatient care (except hospital psychiatric 
units) were eligible for 12 increments and providers delivering 
exclusively outpatient care for 10 increments. 
Potential fee 
increase (%)
Revenue and provider type: Integrated care providers were eligible 
for a maximum fee increase of 5% and providers responsible for 
over 50% of the insurer’s population in the provider’s region were 
eligible for maximum increases of 15% for both BGGZ and SGGZ. 
Potential budget 
increase (%)
Revenue and provider type: Only providers with revenue levels 
above €300,000 were eligible for maximum budget increases of 
12%.2 
10 The minimum guaranteed budget was 88% of the maximum available budget. The maximum 
available budget was derived by taking the previous year’s global budget corrected for child and 
adolescent behavioural health care. In the event of persistent underproduction, the previous year’s 
realised revenue levels were used instead. Providers meeting all criteria were eligible for 100% of 
the maximum available budget.
In addition to the insurers’ purchasing policies, we analysed provider–payer contracts. 
The sample consisted of 31 contracts from three large behavioural health care providers 
for two separate years (2014–2015 and 2015–2016); it included all six Dutch purchasing 
parties. The sample does not include all contracts from all separate insurers during the 
two-year period. 
 
Negotiations could lead to some further adjustments, such as supplementary agreements 
about the head- and fellow practitioner, the maximum number of weeks to report a 
treatment episode, or exceptions involving additional settlements. For example, some 
contracts allowed for an expanded range of specialists, such as addiction specialists or 
geriatrists, who were eligible to serve as the head practitioner. One contract extended 
the deadline for reporting a treatment episode to 6 weeks, instead of the 3 weeks stated 
in the template. Another provider was exempted from the clause requiring an intention 
to treat at least 15% of all patients at the basic behavioural health care level.
4. Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter we have explored the level of contract customisation in the purchasing 
policies of Dutch health care insurance companies and analysed contracts for 
behavioural health care. We found that contracts were provider-customised along 
two routes: (1) payers employed different templates across different provider groups 
and (2) provider–payer negotiations could lead to adjustments to the payers’ contract 
templates. Most provider-level variation was actually explained by the use of different 
contract templates for different provider groups. However, because payers employed 
their own contract templates, most of the contract variation we observed was across 
payers rather than across providers. 
Are current contracts at the sweet spot?
Providers are currently contracted based on global budgets, with possible constraints 
such as sub-budgets, maximum cost figures per average patient or maximum lengths 
of stay, which increase provider-level financial risk. The question is whether we are 
currently operating at the highest attainable level of financial risk for providers. A 
limited number of providers have exited the market [17] and providers have also been 
merging [18].11 From this information, it is unclear whether providers are currently at 
their maximum risk level. But if they are not, we may want to move on to payment 
11 In 2010 and 2011, there were respectively 6 and 7 (secondary care) non-budgeted care providers. In 
2010 and 2011, respectively 312 and 698 primary psychological care providers exited the market. 
The large number of primary psychological care providers exiting the market is explained by 
the fact that some providers may treat in one year but not in the next year, resulting in a large 
number of providers exiting the market [17]. 
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models that are associated with higher levels of risk, such as global payments,12 because 
such payment models are expected to improve societal value.
Internationally, several initiatives have been started to experiment with global payments 
for behavioural health with the aim of improving coordination with primary care 
[19–21]. Because these experiments have just begun, there is still little evidence as to 
how much global payments can contribute to value. Should international experiences 
show that they can substantially enhance value, then global payments may be worth 
considering in the Netherlands as well. 
Payers make trade-offs between the option of negotiations and the associated 
transaction costs
Instead of writing a unique contract for every provider–payer combination, payers 
lower their transaction costs by incorporating in their global budget templates different 
clauses for different provider groups; that way a payer can benefit from some degree of 
customisation, while keeping transaction costs at an acceptable level. Payers may also 
choose to negotiate face to face only with providers with which they enjoy revenue levels 
above a certain threshold. The benefits, or added value to be shared, of negotiating with 
smaller providers probably do not weigh up against the higher level of transaction costs 
that are associated with negotiating. Whilst negotiating with a larger provider may be 
worthwhile, smaller providers may have to accept the contract template as it is. Thus, 
payers appear to make trade-offs between the benefits of negotiating and the associated 
transaction costs; they can thereby enjoy some of the benefits of customisation while 
keeping transaction costs low. 
 
Although employing different contract templates for different provider groups helps 
to keep transaction costs low for payers, the providers may now be confronted by six 
different contracts (one for every payer), thus resulting in high provider transaction 
costs. Nonetheless, were providers to impose their own contracts on payers, that would 
lead to even higher transaction costs, because payers would then face a substantial 
increase in contracts for behavioural health care alone, alongside their contracts with 
health care providers such as hospitals and primary care practices. 
 
Viable options for reducing provider transaction costs might be to create more uniformity 
in contract details across payers and to reduce the number of purchasing parties. Some 
possibilities for achieving more uniformity in contract design would be to adopt the 
payment design of the dominant insurer in the region or to coordinate contract details 
together with Zorgverzekeraars Nederland (ZN), the umbrella organisation of Dutch 
12 Global payments are based on a per-member-per-month (PMPM) payment, in contrast to global 
budgets, which constitute spending targets. 
health insurers,13 and the ministry of health. To reduce the number of payers, an 
option worth considering would be to transfer the purchasing of care from the local 
authorities back to the health insurers. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Dutch transition from a health care system based on public 
payers to one based on private payers has spurred provider-tailored contract design 
for behavioural health care. Private payers make trade-offs between the degree of 
provider-tailored contract design and the transaction costs associated with contracting 
providers. The private payers’ contribution to societal value could increase further if 
they were to employ higher levels of provider-tailored contract design and take steps to 
reduce provider transaction costs. Payers have initiated a significant trend towards the 
increasing transparency that will be necessary to take provider-tailored contract design 
to the next level. The benefits will most likely be reaped in the near future. 
13 Zorgverzekeraars Nederland (ZN) is an organisation comprised of nine Dutch health insurance 
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Appendix 1. Behavioural health care in the Netherlands
Behavioural health care expenditure amounted to about €6.6 billion in the Netherlands 
in 2013 [23]. In the Dutch health care system, behavioural health care is subdivided 
roughly into three segments: primary care with support from a mental health practice 
nurse (POH), basic behavioural health care (BGGZ) and specialised behavioural health 
care (SGGZ). Patients consult their primary care doctor first and require referral to 
see a specialist. The basic behavioural care segment serves patients with mild, non-
complex psychological problems or with long-term but stable mental health problems. 
Specialised behavioural care serves patients with more severe and complex mental 
health disorders. 
 
As from 2006, private insurers contract behavioural health care in a health care 
system based on regulated competition. Seven private insurance companies have been 
charged with this responsibility, but government continues to play an important role in 
regulating the market. Regulation defines the contracting environment and determines 
the level of flexibility that market parties have in contracting. The Dutch Healthcare 
Authority (NZa) has defined the product structure for behavioural health care in terms 
of DBCs (similar to diagnosis-related groups, DRGs) and it has set maximum fees for 
the majority of these DBCs [24, 25]. 
Recent changes in the organisation and regulation of the behavioural health care 
segment include the introduction of basic behavioural health care and the introduction 
of mental health practice nurses (known in Dutch as POHs), the transfer of youth and 
child psychology to local authorities, and an increase in the number of contracting 
parties for providers (phasing out of the representatiemodel). In addition, all relevant 
parties signed the Administrative Agreement (BHA) for behavioural health care [26], 
in which they jointly agreed on a set of national targets for behavioural health care, 
including the curtailment of annual expenditure growth to below 1 per cent, clinical 
downsizing targets for 2008–2020), and substitution from specialized care to basic 
mental care (of at least 20 per cent).
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Appendix 2. Starting reimbursement rates in behavioural health care 
contracting
One payer adopts a starting percentage for SGGZ for hospital psychiatry, adopts a 
generic rate of 85% for BGGZ14 and negotiates two separate starting rates for SGGZ-
stay and SGGZ-treatment with providers that provide more than 50% of care in 
their region, and adopt two basic starting rates for BGGZ and SGGZ of 85% for 
smaller providers. A second payer adopts a starting rate of 88% for SGGZ and 83% 
or 85% for BGGZ depending on the physicians training level (where 83% applies 
to GGZ psychologists, and 85% applies to registered primary care psychologists, 
psychotherapists, and psychiatrists) for smaller providers. for larger providers, a general 
starting rate of 79% applies for all GGZ. A third payer contracts SGGZ on a basic rate 
of 85%, and applies fixed percentages for BGGZ as well for providers with revenue 
levels below 300.000 euro. For providers with revenue levels above 300.000 euro, no 
basic starting rate applies. Finally, the last two payers do not differentiate between 
providers; one does not adopt a basic starting rate at all, and the other payer adopts a 
starting rate for BGGZ and SGGZ of 85% for all providers. 
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Abstract  
Background: In 2006, the Netherlands introduced a system of regulated competition 
inspired by Alain Enthoven’s theoretical model. Health care insurers are expected to 
purchase specialist medical care on the basis of price and quality. This paper investigates 
whether insurers succeed in fulfilling that role. 
Method: First we defined the role of the insurers in the system by analysing Enthoven’s 
theoretical model and the insurers’ statutory tasks as laid down in the Dutch Health 
Insurance Act. We then assessed to what extent insurers are able to fulfil their 
purchasing role for specialist medical care by analysing the purchasing cycle, consisting 
of four phases: (1) defining and publishing a mission/vision statement, (2) provider–
payer negotiations, (3) monitoring and (4) reconciliations. For phase 1 we drew on 
the insurers’ mission and vision statements as laid down in their purchasing policy 
documents for specialist medical care. For phases 2 to 4, we conducted interviews with 
officials from various insurers and hospitals to determine how insurers are fulfilling 
their role in practice. 
Findings: The insurers do well in fulfilling their statutory tasks, but in practice they 
were hampered by several difficulties in meeting the expectations for price- and quality-
based purchasing. They pursued various strategies to influence quality, affordability 
and volume, but practical hurdles existed. These included difficulties in defining 
quality, the fact that shifting volume is usually at the expense of another provider, and 
the difficulty of sustaining spending targets in a changing environment. 
Conclusions: Ten years after the reform, health insurers do well in fulfilling their 
statutorily assigned tasks, but still appear constrained in their ability to purchase care 
based on price and quality. Their role should possibly be reconsidered. In the meantime, 
government appears to have taken on a stronger role in the system, particularly in 
facilitating target setting and sustaining pressure on the system.
1. Introduction
Health care spending in OECD countries has been growing in recent decades, albeit 
at varying paces [1]. Around 2010, health care spending growth was almost zero, but 
the growth has gradually resumed since then [1]. Some countries among the the 
Netherlands, have introduced managed competition in the health care system in an 
attempt to contain cost growth while still maintaining or improving quality of care. 
The managed competition model is based on Alain Enthoven’s model so as to achieve 
maximum value for both health care consumers and employers [2]. The model assumes 
that competing health plans purchase high-quality and affordable care on behalf of 
their insured population. The Dutch health care system is now based on this model, 
but it is structured rather differently in a number of key elements. The system now 
comprises three markets: the health care purchasing market, the health care insurance 
market and the health care provision market. In the purchasing market, private health 
care insurers contract health care providers on behalf of their insured population. In 
the health care insurance market, consumers purchase health insurance. In the health 
care provision market, providers deliver health care to patients.
 
Within the Dutch managed competition model, the insurer thus operates in two 
markets simultaneously: the insurance market and the purchasing market. Recent 
evaluations of the Dutch system concluded that insurers are competing aggressively on 
the insurance market with many different insurance policies, with varying premiums 
and provider networks [3], even though the basic benefits package is a comprehensive 
standard package and the number of policyholders switching between health insurers 
has been relatively low [4]. Room for improvement exists when it comes to issues like 
consumer information provision [5].
 
In the health care purchasing market, insurers contract various providers and adopt 
different purchasing strategies per care segment. In purchasing specialist medical 
care, insurers experience difficulties to steer directly quality and affordability [6]. The 
selective contracting of providers is almost non-existent [7], and the selective contracting 
of specialist care so as to consolidate services is also limited. Overall, it appears that 
quality plays a minor [7], although somewhat growing role in the purchasing of 
health care. This is partly because it is rather difficult to develop quality indicators, 
and stakeholders are concerned about the reliability of such indicators. The role of 
quality does appear to be increasing, as smaller quality initiatives have recently started 
to emerge [6]. According to providers, however, the overall focus of the negotiations 
between insurers and providers is predominantly on the financial aspects of health 
care and reimbursement [6, 7]. In the purchasing of specialist care, contracts are mostly 
based on lump-sum payments or global budgets [8]. Loozen and colleagues have also 
concluded that the bargaining positions are not balanced, with hospitals tending to 
have stronger bargaining positions than insurers [9]. 
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Previous research has focused on limited aspects of health care purchasing, and it 
remains unclear what issues beyond bargaining positions hinder the health insurers 
in fulfilling their role. Previous research focused on limited aspects of purchasing 
healthcare, but the health care purchasing is an ongoing process, including different 
phases such as developing a strategy, negotiating about contract details, monitoring 
providers’ performance and possible reconciliations. Deeper insights into the full 
purchasing cycle will therefore be essential to understanding where health insurers 
experience obstacles to fulfilling their role. 
 
The aim of this article is to gain a clearer understanding of how purchasers are fulfilling 
their role in the purchasing market by analyzing the full purchasing cycle. Interviews 
about the purchasing of specialist medical care were conducted with both health care 
insurers and hospitals and the existing literature on the purchasing of care in the 
Netherlands was reviewed. 
2. Research methods and data
Our research methods involved a document analysis and interviews. The document 
analysis was conducted to elucidate the role of health care insurers in a system of managed 
competition. Enthoven’s theoretical model formed the starting point for our analysis. 
We next looked into the role of the insurers as laid down in the Dutch Health Insurance 
Act. We then went on to analyse the document entitled Onderhandelaarsresultaat medisch 
specialistische zorg 2014 t/m 2017 (Negotiators’ Agreement on Specialist Medical Care 
in 2014–2017), which outlined intentions agreed by various stakeholders in the health 
system (health ministry, providers, insurers) to amongst other things contain cost 
growth [12]. 
 
To explore how insurers are fulfilling their role in practice, we began by drawing on 
the vision/mission statements of the individual insurance companies, as articulated 
in purchasing documents for specialist medical care. This enabled us to distil how 
individual insurers intended to fulfil their role in the Dutch system. To uncover how 
this strategy translated into practice, we conducted twelve semi-structured interviews 
with insurance company officials (members of managing boards or boards of directors, 
purchasing department officials or officials responsible for long-term vision) and 
with providers of specialist medical care (members of sales departments or boards of 
directors). More specifically, five insurers, and seven specialist care providers (including 
both general hospitals and teaching hospitals) were interviewed. The interviews were 
conducted from June 2016 to January 2017. A different topics list was adopted for the 
insurers and providers, albeit with considerable overlap. Providers’ questions related 
to the strategy of the provider, the negotiation process and contract incompleteness 
and reconciliations. Insurers’ questions related to the insurers’ purchasing strategy, the 
negotiation process, contract incompleteness and reconciliations, and the monitoring 
of health care providers. All interviews were transcribed verbatim and coded inductively 
in MAXQDA 12. 
3. What do we expect from an insurer in a managed competition model?
We start by describing the insurers’ role according to Enthoven’s theoretical model. 
After which we lay down what we expect from the insurers in the Dutch competition 
model, as specified in the Dutch Insurance Act and the above-cited Negotiators’ 
Agreement on Specialist Medical Care in 2014–2017. 
Theoretical expectations as set out in Enthoven’s model
Enthoven defined managed competition as ‘a purchasing strategy to obtain maximum 
value for consumers and employers, using rules for competition derived from 
microeconomic principles’ [2]. The model was originally designed for the US health 
care system and involves the following key players: a sponsor (an employer, government 
entity or health insurance purchasing cooperative), health plans and consumers.
  
In this model, sponsors contract health plans. Sponsors play an important role in 
the system and are assigned the following tasks: establishing rules of equity (through 
measures such as guaranteeing access to care and employing ‘community rating’, whereby 
all plan enrolees pay the same premium for a given insurance product), selecting health 
plans (choosing which plans are to participate), managing the enrolment process (e.g. 
defining procedures for new enrolees, providing opportunities for switching insurers), 
creating price-elastic demand (making it profitable for plans to reduce premiums) and 
managing risk selection (preventing parties from avoiding high-risk profiles). 
Expectations as set out in the Dutch Health Insurance Act
In 2006, the Netherlands introduced a system of regulated competition based on the 
principles of Enthoven’s model. The primary goals of the reform were to enhance 
efficacy, improve accessibility and reduce centralised control [10]. Although Enthoven’s 
model formed an important starting point, the design of the Dutch system, as laid 
down in the Health Insurance Act, manifested some significant differences. The 
Health Insurance Act defined a different set of players than Enthoven did – namely, 
private health insurance companies, health care providers and consumers. In the 
Dutch system, the insurers were to play more active roles in purchasing high quality 
and affordable care on behalf of their insured populations.
 
According to the Dutch Health Insurance Act, health insurers must fulfil six statutory 
obligations, relating to the overall functioning of the system: (1) acceptance obligation 
(in Dutch: ‘acceptatieplicht’), (2) duty of care (in Dutch: ‘zorgplicht’), (3) prohibition of 
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premium differentiation, (4) transparency in offers for insurance policies, (5) financial 
accountability in accordance standards of the branch (6) and invoice monitoring.1 
To ensure solidarity, insurers have a statutory obligation to accept all applicants for 
the basic benefits package; they are not allowed to refuse any individual (acceptance 
obligation).  They may set their own premiums but are prohibited from charging 
different premiums to different individuals for the basic package. They are permitted 
to offer supplementary insurance beyond the basic package; they are free to define that 
package and premium and are under no obligation to accept all applicants for it. 
 
To safeguard the accessibility of health care, insurers have a duty of care, whereby they 
must both ensure payment for necessary care and ensure that the necessary care is 
available when needed. They may choose to contract selectively, offering policyholders a 
choice of providers within a contracted network. Another option is to give policyholders 
freedom of choice of providers and to offer to find a suitable provider on request.
 
For the insured population to perform its intended role in the competitive health 
system, consumers must be able to make informed choices with respect to insurance 
products. Insurers are therefore required to provide transparency in the policies they 
offer. Accordingly, insurers must lay their insurance policies down in model contracts 
(modelovereenkomsten) that are made publicly available. 
 
In terms of financial matters, insurers must meet the standards of financial 
accountability in accordance with this sector. In addition, insurers must monitor the 
invoices they receive to ensure that the care in question is covered by the patient’s 
policy. Invoice monitoring also helps prevent unjustified payments to providers that do 
not meet the requirements. 
Enthoven and the Dutch Health Insurance Act: Similarities and differences
To clarify the overlap between the Enthoven and the Dutch model, we have juxtaposed 
Enthoven’s sponsor roles with the statutory tasks of the Dutch health insurance 
companies in table 1, columns 1 and 2. We classified these roles according to the 
three interrelated markets contained in the Dutch model (the purchasing market, 
the insurance market and the health care provision market). We found overlap only 
in Enthoven’s sponsors’ tasks and the Dutch insurers’ statutory tasks in the health 
insurance market. We found no overlap between the tasks in the health care provision 
and purchasing markets (see empty cells in column 2). The lack of overlap in the 
provision market is not surprising, as Dutch insurers are not active in that market. 
With regard to the purchasing market, there is some overlap in the sense that a sponsor 
1 The Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) monitors the functioning of the insurer in the system. 
We follow the six statutory tasks that the Dutch healthcare Authority monitors the insurers on. 
contracts a care plan and an insurer contracts a provider, but Enthoven describes only 
a degree of freedom in contracting care plans and no further concrete actions for 
sponsors. Moreover, two of the six tasks defined for Dutch insurers in the Health 
Insurance Act – duty of care and invoice monitoring – do not derive from Enthoven’s 
theoretical model. These are shown in table 1 column 3. 
Expectations as set out in the Negotiators’ Agreement on Specialist Medical Care
In 2012 – six years after the implementation of regulated competition – the umbrella 
organisations of insurers and providers of specialist medical care and the Dutch 
ministry of health signed the Administrative Headlines Agreement 2012–2015 
(Bestuurlijk Hoofdlijnenakkoord 2012–2015) setting out concrete aims for fulfilling 
mutual responsibilities with respect to health care expenditures for specialist medical 
care [11]. Parties shared the ambition to contain medical expense growth of specialist 
medical care expenditures to 2.5 per cent (excluding wage and price adjustments). To 
realize this target, insurers were to expand selectively contracted care (by purchasing 
care on the basis of quality, price and efficacy). The stakeholders additionally 
agreed to address matters such as reducing practice, concentrating and substituting 
care, reducing overcapacity, prescribing medicines efficiently and providing safety 
management systems. 
In 2013, a new agreement was concluded covering the period 2014–2017 [12], and 
a further extension was recently signed covering 2018 [13]). As our interviews were 
conducted in 2016 and 2017, we provide an overview of arrangements relating to the 
period 2014–2017 (table 2). We again classify these into the three markets as they 
exist in the Netherlands. The agreements set out concrete targets relating to various 
themes: affordability, quality and effectiveness, provision of information, process, 
equal level playing field (columns 2 and 3). Examples of such targets are a maximum 
volume growth target of 1 per cent for specialist medical care, the intention to prevent 
upcoding, acceleration of invoicing and reimbursement processes, and moving towards 
paying for results. 
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Affordability National volume growth of 1 per cent for specialist medical care 
in 2015–2017 and 1.5 percent in 2014 (excluding wage and price 
adjustments)
Reducing undesirable practice variations
Monitoring expenses carefully (so that meeting or not meeting 
targets will be promptly evident)
Quality and 
effectiveness
Stricter adherence to protocols (in the purchasing of health care, 
insurers will incentivise the use of guidelines and ensure care is 
delivered appropriately and efficiently) 
Preventing upcoding and inappropriate use
Rewarding better performance and moving towards paying for 
results
Arrangements for monitoring (to obtain clarity about progress 
on agreed arrangements, parties will collectively develop a 
monitoring instrument that will at least provide insights into service 
substitution)
A health ministry plan to address fraud, to be submitted to 
Parliament in September 2013 
Better information 
provision
Joint arrangements between providers and insurers for dealing with 
consumer complaints about invoices 
Efforts to make arrangements between parties for speeding up the 
invoicing and reimbursement processes for care (provider invoicing 
preferably within one month after closing s treatment episode and 
insurer payment preferably within one month of invoice receipt) 
As from autumn 2013, periodic consultations between market 
parties convened by the health ministry to discuss standardisation to 
enhance transparency and reduce administrative burdens
3 Table 2 is based on the authors’ own analysis. The Negotiators’ Agreement on Specialist Medical 
Care in 2014– 2017 included arrangements that apply to the entire health care system (all three 
markets). Because the insurers operate solely in the health insurance market and the health care 
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Theme Concrete goals
Process, level playing 
field
Contracts between providers and insurers on an individual basis, to 
ensure a level playing field for providers 
Equal access by equal providers to allocation of resources
Purchasing cycle preferably finished by 19 November of year t-1
Information on contracted care available to consumers by 19 
November of year t-1
Open and transparent purchasing strategies, purchasing processes 
and options for advance payments (simultaneous publication of 
purchasing strategy for all providers, providers’ proposals to insurers 
in the same time period, equal requirements for equal care)
Insurer monitoring of providers on efficiency and quality of care
Performance-based payments to incentivise high-quality care 
Transparent and understandable explanations of insurance policies 
available to consumers, including a clear overview of distinctions 
between reimbursement policies (restitutiepolissen) and services-in-
kind policies (naturapolissen).4 If insurers have contracted care on the 
basis of price and quality, the purchasing criteria should be clear. It 
should also be clear to consumers what care is contracted and what 
is not contracted. Any reimbursement rates for non-contracted care 
should be clear. For non-contracted providers, insurers are free to 
decide what share of costs will be reimbursed, but they should be 
transparent in this regard so that providers know what to expect. 
Exploring controlled 
introduction of care 
facilities
Joint exploration by 1 July 2014 of how expensive care facilities can 
be created 





Improving cost awareness by providing understandable cost 
overviews
Better provision of 
information
Correct invoices 
Improving consumer invoicing by stating at least the diagnosis (first 
half of 2014)
Joint arrangements on dealing with consumer complaints about 
invoices where appropriate
Improving and expanding IT by mid-2014; improving clarity of 
invoices (e.g. treatment, data, description of procedure)
Theme Concrete goals
Process, equal level 
playing field
Informing policyholders about contracted and non-contracted 
providers by 19 November
Clear information distinguishing services-in-kind from 
reimbursement policies in insurers’ offers to consumers
Information on contracted care made available to consumers by 19 
November of year t-1 
Transparent and understandable explanations of insurance policies 
available to consumers, including a clear overview of distinctions 
between reimbursement policies (restitutiepolissen) and services-in-
kind policies (naturapolissen)6. If insurers have contracted care on the 
basis of price and quality, the purchasing criteria should be clear. It 
should also be clear to consumers what care is contracted and what 
is not contracted. Any reimbursement rates for non-contracted care 
should be clear. For non-contracted providers, insurers are free to 
decide what share of costs will be reimbursed, but they should be 
transparent in this regard so that providers know what to expect.
4. Are the expectations of the insurers’ role in the system being fulfilled? 
In this section we describe whether the expectations as laid down in the Dutch Health 
Insurance Act and the Negotiators’ Agreement on Specialist Medical Care in 2014–
2017 are being fulfilled. To do so we draw on literature (for meeting expectations 
according to the Dutch Health Insurance Act and the Negotiators’ Agreement on 
Specialist Medical Care in 2014–2017). The insurers’ mission and vision statements for 
how the individual insurers intend to fulfill their role and the interviews conducted 
(for meeting expectations based on the insurers purchasing strategy).
Expectations of Health Insurance Act fulfilled? 
The Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) monitors whether the insurers fulfil the 
statutory tasks assigned to them by the Health Insurance Act [5]. It has concluded that 
they generally fulfil those tasks well. There is some room for improvement in terms of 
the duty of care and the provision of transparency. Insurers could put more effort, for 
example, into dealing with complex care and ensuring that waiting times do not exceed 
maximum standards. Also, despite continuous efforts to improve transparency, insurers 
could still improve on the information provided on their websites or communicated 
by telephone [5]. 
Expectations based on Negotiators’ Agreement on Specialist Medical Care fulfilled? 
The Netherlands Court of Audit has researched the impacts of various negotiated 
agreements in the care sectors specialist medical care, behavioural health care and 
primary care over the years 2012 to 2015 [14]. It concluded that in terms of the financial 
1
4 Reimbursement policies cover full reimbursement for all providers; services-in-kind policies 
require co-financing for services from non-contracted providers.
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target the agreements had very likely contributed to the affordability of the system, but 
that arrangements such as those on quality and effectiveness appeared to have gained 
less ground and had therefore achieved less in terms of the system goals. 
Expectations based on insurers’ purchasing strategies fulfilled?
On the insurers purchasing strategy documents and literature, we identified roughly four 
phases in the purchasing cycle for specialist medical care: (1) developing a purchasing 
strategy, (2) provider–payer negotiations, (3) monitoring and (4) reconciliations. In 
phase 1 insurers individually develop their own vision and mission statements. In 
phase 2, providers and insurers meet to negotiate about provider–payer contracts. In 
phase 3, insurers monitor the providers’ performance. In phase 4, reconciliations may 
possibly take place. 
 
We observed that the purchasing of health care is a highly dynamic process, in which 
many aspects play a part and in which the four phases are somewhat intertwined. 
Themes that received considerable attention in the interviews were the quality, volume 
and financial aspects of care. We also found that the focus was very much on the two 
initial phases, the purchasing strategies and negotiations. Phase 3 played a smaller role 
in the interviews, and phase 4 applied mainly to the theme of financial aspects. 
 
Table 3 reports our main findings concerning the quality, financial and volume aspects 
per phase. The sections to follow now will describe the key findings per theme for the 
different phases. 
4.1. Quality aspects
Phase 1. Insurers pursue various strategies to take quality into account in their 
purchasing strategy. for example, they make efforts to increase transparency about 
quality of care so that consumers can make more informed choices. In purchasing 
care, they sometimes used indicators as a motive to contract selectively; that is, they 
might employ entry conditions which is a set of criteria that providers must meet in 
order to be eligible for a contract. Alternatively, insurers may choose to apply selective 
contracting to a subset of medical conditions, with providers having to satisfy specific 
criteria to be eligible to deliver that particular treatment (such as meeting Netherlands 
Society of Cardiology NVVC standards for pacemakers [15]). Open-ended contracts 
may be adopted for segments of care in which providers perform particularly well (as is 
for instance the case for colorectal cancer [16]). Another route is to work more closely 
with physicians in pilots. Additionally, offering long-term contracts may help to give 
parties more room to find ways to improve quality; such long-term contracts may also 
exist for segments of care.
Phase 2. Although hospitals were currently reporting on several thousand indicators, 
the use of such indicators in the purchasing of health care remained limited. Several 
reasons for this were reported in the interviews. One insurance official argued that ‘for a 
great many of treatments there are no adequate quality indicators available’; in addition 
it appears there is no consensus on how to define quality. And most quality indicators 
were still process indicators, although outcome indicators were increasingly being 
developed. Hence, despite the vast number of indicators, the usability of indicators for 
the purpose of health care purchasing was somewhat limited; for instance, given that 
there is no consensus on quality, indicators might cause confusion in some cases. As 
one health care provider observed, ‘Sometimes one insurer says you are best practice, 
[…] and another insurer says “We don’t want to contract this anymore.”’ This could 
send confusing signals to patients, and one provider mentioned that they had had 
people phoning because they want to understand what was going on.
With regard to quality indicators, there was a shift away from individual indicators 
towards indicators developed by professional groups. Two providers reported that 
insurers did attempt in the beginning to put their own indicator lists on the table. 
One observed that this was not a very workable situation and that they had discussed 
with insurers that it would be better to have one set of indicators instead. In 2015, the 
Dutch health minister announced that insurers would indeed meet with providers 
and patients to collectively compose a list of indicators for thirty designated health 
conditions, also known as the ZN standards with reference to the insurers’ umbrella 
organisation Zorgverzekeraars Nederland [17]. Overall, insurers were increasingly 
relying on standards developed by professional groups.5 A provider observed that ‘really 
steering on indicators is also entering a new, is slowly starting to emerge to a new phase 
of “What is really important? [...] and what really determines the quality of life, of a, of 
a patient, […] and how can you bring that to light?” ’
5 Examples are standards developed by the Oncological Collaboration Foundation (SONCOS) 
and the Dutch Institute for Clinical Audit (DICA). 
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4.2. Financial aspects 
Phase 1. Health care costs and affordability were amongst the frequently mentioned 
focus areas in purchasing strategies. First of all, hospitals were contracted mostly on the 
basis of a global budget or a lump-sum payment, with underlying fees. Again, insurers 
adopted various ways of pursuing affordability. One cost-reducing measure was to 
narrow price differences between providers. By mapping price variation and clarifying 
why such differences exist, an insurer would aim to make prices more efficient. In 
addition, arrangements were made on matters such as prescribing drugs. Efforts to 
prevent fraud in health care costs were undertaken by asking providers to check invoices 
and by asking patients to check their invoices online. Efforts to transfer care to primary 
care settings were included, which could improve affordability. Insurers might refuse 
to contract relatively expensive care or care deemed unnecessary. Experimenting with 
other forms of payment such as shared savings may contribute too. 
 
Phase 2. While total sums (that is, the global budgets or lump-sum payments) were 
negotiated first, the underlying fees might be negotiated halfway through the contracting 
year. In the meantime, advance payments might be possible, as invoices tended to 
not be accepted without a fee list. With respect to the negotiations, one insurance 
official noted that benchmarking information (comparing similar providers) helped 
in countering arguments from hospitals as to why they were more expensive. ‘We have 
figures that can help us in that discussion […] that we can say, “Well, we compared you, 
you are actually not, you actually don’t have such an elderly population erm, erm, that 
make […] that the prices should deviate that much.” And that helps.’ 
 
Phase 4. Specialist medical care was contracted mostly on the basis of a lump-sum 
payment or a global budget with underlying fees.  However, the health care sector 
was subject to many changes outside the direct scope of providers or insurers, and 
these could cause unexpected deviations in volume and or cost levels. Examples are 
the introduction of new medicines, changes in the system or the closure of nearby 
providers. These changes might result in different cost and volume outcomes than 
the contracting parties had predicted beforehand. When a negotiated budget was 
exceeded, renegotiations might take place in which parties may try to determine the 
underlying causes of the budget overrun. As one insurance official remarked, ‘There is 
no computer answer, that is always again tailor-made, and the work of human beings 
and tailor-made, and the relevant question there is “What is the cause of the budget 
overrun?” ’ In some cases the negotiations might lead to additional compensation, 
with the overproduction possibly reimbursed at a lower rate. As an insurance official 
pointed out, ‘Because with a global budget as a provider you have, er, your fixed costs 
covered, and you have a little increment [...]  going to produce more than we think you, 
should not pay the full price anymore […] no, than it must show that you must have 
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So even though a lump-sum or global budget had been negotiated in phase 2, the 
contracting parties might decide in practice to deviate from such targets if circumstances 
require. An insurance official continued with a metaphor: ‘So I always say, it’s like a 
velvet wall [...] If it’s not there, we don’t know where the wall is, […] but you mustn’t 
have the illusion that […] it can block things like a brick wall.’ Another official reported 
that insurers were increasingly specifying what happens in the event of budget overruns 
[Phase 1].  
4.3. Volume aspects
Phase 1. The insurers purchasing strategy may affect volume levels. Two ways for 
an insurer to for example steer on volume is in the form of substituting care (that 
is shifting volume from one provider to another) and to selectively contract services 
(not contracting certain providers that failed to meet specific criteria). One reason for 
substituting care was to enable patients to receive care closer to home. Substitution 
could take on different forms, including substitution from secondary to primary settings, 
from tertiary to secondary settings (with low-complexity care transferred from teaching 
hospitals to general hospitals) and from hospitals to independent treatment centres 
(ZBCs). One insurer had specified that service substitution would be pursued only if 
it was at least budget-neutral. Another way of managing volume was to contract care 
selectively – that is, to exclude some providers from contracting, or not to contract all 
types of treatment with every provider – and some insurers indeed chose not to contract 
the entire spectrum of care with every provider. That applied to a limited number of 
medical conditions or interventions, including knee prosthesis, hip prosthesis, breast 
cancer surgery and colonoscopy. The sets of conditions or interventions that insurers 
chose to contract selectively might differ, as could the sets of criteria used to determine 
whether those were contracted. 
 
Phase 2. Efforts were indeed made to substitute care. Although theoretically appealing, 
negotiating a volume shift in practice was not without difficulty. As one insurance 
official pointed out, if a provider wants to increase volume, that means another 
provider’s volume must decline in accordance to make it budget-neutral. Another 
observed that a provider who gets a budget increase proposed is more likely to agree than 
a provider who must undergo a budget reduction – making it somewhat challenging 
to shift volume levels. The official continued that providers are not obliged to sign a 
contract: ‘Hospital downsizing? Then they’ll say, “Then I won’t sign the contract […].” 
They aren’t obligated to sign a contract.’ On the other hand, one provider pointed 
out that the nature of contracts with global budgets did not facilitate substitution in 
the past, but that insurers were now increasingly growing into their role ‘In my view, 
insurers weren’t taking on their role to facilitate this, that’s slowly starting to come, 
[…] also because we’re increasingly gaining insights about well and beforehand making 
such plans together’. Health care providers were increasingly seeking cooperation with 
other providers; hospitals were seeking cooperation with other hospitals as well as 
with other types of providers such as primary care practices or rehabilitation centres. 
Collaborations tended to concentrate mostly around particular medical conditions. 
Collaboration could assume various forms, such as multidisciplinary consultations, 
patient referral, aligning care pathways and setting protocols. Insurers did not always 
play direct roles in such collaborations.
 
With regard to selectively contracting care, different insurers had adopted different 
views as to what types of care were eligible for selective contracting. As insurers might 
differ as to whether they wanted to selectively contract a particular health condition or 
not, one provider observed that this could lead to practical difficulties: providers did 
not wish to select patients based on where they were insured. There is no solution in 
the current system for how to deal with different insurers adopting different policies in 
this regard, because collusion is not allowed. 
 
Even though selective contracting with respect to particular medical conditions applied 
to a limited number of conditions, it did seem to have had an effect. One insurance 
official noted that, as a result of selective contracting, ‘there are multiple providers who 
have stopped, or have sought cooperation, or one is doing this, the other is doing that’. 
In addition, selective contracting has perhaps also put some pressure on the remainder 
of care too. As one provider observed, ‘With a couple of those conditions, you use 
them as metaphors, also in-house, to say “Well it’s no longer evident that everything is 
purchased by all insurers, so you’ll have to do your best to price technically in relation 
to costs […], do better, or sometimes in quality do better.” ’ 
5. Discussion and conclusions
This article sought to gain a deeper understanding of the Dutch health care 
purchasing process and of the roles and expectations of health care insurers in a 
regulated competition model. In 2006, regulated competition was introduced in the 
Netherlands. As laid down in the Dutch Health Insurance Act, the health insurers 
are expected to play a more active role in obtaining high quality health care at an 
affordable price on behalf of their insured populations. That role proves difficult to 
fulfil in practice, although progress is being made. First of all, it appears as though 
health care purchasing on the basis of quality is difficult to execute in practice, despite 
the vast number of quality indicators being reported. Instead, insurers are increasingly 
working on improving quality on a project basis. Secondly, although the selective 
contracting of care for certain health conditions has resulted in some shifts in volume 
across providers, it has so far been applied to only a handful of diagnoses. And thirdly, 





Challenging the theoretical model of managed competitionChapter 4
From our results, we find that Dutch insurers fulfil some of the roles that Enthoven 
envisioned for the ‘sponsor’ in the health insurance market, in particular the roles 
of safeguarding health care coverage and providing transparency. The remainder of 
the sponsor roles is with the Dutch government. The Netherlands appears to have 
taken on a system rather different to that described in the theoretical model. That 
made it difficult for us to draw on the model to determine which tasks are better 
assigned to insurers or to government. But ten years into the reform, we may now 
draw some conclusions based on the experiences thus far with the roles of insurers 
and government. 
 
The insurers’ role. 
The insurers perform well when it comes to executing the statutory tasks that were 
assigned to them [5]. However, when it comes to meeting the expectation of purchasing 
care on the basis of price and quality, it gets rather complicated. Starting with the fact 
that the Dutch Health Insurance Act does not specify exactly how this ought to be 
done. At the same time tough when parties do attempt to fulfill this role, considerable 
resistance arises. In the negotiations with health care providers, for instance, we saw 
a shift away from insurer-specific quality indicators towards indicators developed by 
professional groups. The uptake of insurance products that provide limited coverage for 
non-contracted providers is low [4], consumers apparently prefer not to be confined to a 
selected number of providers. In the discussion surrounding article 13 much resistance 
in bringing down the emerged to the proposed lowering of the reimbursement rate 
for non-contracted care. The upper house of the Dutch Parliament ultimately decided 
against bringing down the reimbursement rate. Hence, despite the several attempts 
that have been made, insurers encounter substantial resistance from various parts of 
the health care system. 
 
In 2015, the Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research (NIVEL) conducted a 
survey on the relationship between Dutch consumer confidence in health insurance 
companies and consumer perceptions of the insurers’ tasks [18]. It found that a share 
of consumers did not want insurers to select providers and did not want insurers to 
negotiate on quality. This raises the question of whether we know what we expect from 
this party, and whether we want insurers to contract care on the basis of quality and 
price, as stipulated in the Health Insurance Act. 
 
Ten years into the reform, we must perhaps decide whether we want to afford insurers 
the latitude to perform that task, or otherwise whether we might want to reconsider 
the role we assigned them. Their task seems meaningful, but it is feasible only if the 
insurers have room to carry it out. The challenging part here is that we cannot force 
the market parties in the system to allow the insurers that room, we cannot force the 
uptake of limited insurance products and we cannot force the acceptance of individual 
quality indicators in the purchasing process between private parties. Nonetheless, we 
can facilitate them in some cases, for example by bringing down the reimbursement 
rates for non-contracted care or imposing minimum price differences between different 
insurance product types (as has been done in Massachusetts [19]).6
The government role. 
The Dutch Health Insurance Act formulated the 6 statutory tasks and the expectation 
of contracting health care on the basis of quality and price. These tasks and expectations 
are very broad, however, and in 2013 parties felt the need to sign the Negotiators’ 
Agreement on Specialist Medical Care in 2014–2017, leading to the formulation of 
more concrete goals. Whereas the statutory tasks predominantly apply to the insurance 
market, we observe a shift in the focus of the arrangements in the Negotiators’ 
Agreement towards greater emphasis on the health care purchasing market than on the 
insurance market. According to the Netherlands Court of Audit, such agreements likely 
helped contain cost growth in the period 2012–2015, whereas other arrangements on 
issues such as care substitution and drug prescribing were unlikely to have contributed, 
because not enough progress had been made. The court concluded that linking such 
agreements to financial targets would improve their efficacy, and they recommended a 
stronger role for the government with respect to the execution of such agreements [14]. 
 
Alain Enthoven did not favour government-imposed budgets, as those were not 
thought helpful in reallocating resources efficiently [2]. Regulators would be unlikely 
to favour closing down providers or insurers. Enthoven believed that the market was 
the only place where such downsizing can take place. Should government intervention 
be needed, he recommended more specific tools that address problems more directly, 
such as reducing insurance coverage, increasing co-payments or acting against cartel 
formation. Although the Dutch Negotiators’ Agreement on Specialist Medical Care 
in 2014–2017 is not entirely in line with Enthoven’s model, it does seem to be a more 
pragmatic solution to facilitate setting things in motion. At least for now, the role of 
government in the Netherlands appears to be leaning towards setting more concrete 
targets and putting more pressure on the system.
 
Limitations. 
Our study comes with some limitations. First, it is limited to the purchasing of specialist 
medical care. In a system of managed competition, insurers purchase all types of care, 
including primary care and behavioural health care. As insurers tend to adopt different 
purchasing strategies per care type, the impact they have with their strategies on quality 
and affordability of one type of care may not be generalizable to other segments. 
6 In 2010, a law was enacted in Massachusetts requiring that health plans (active in the segment 
for individuals and smaller businesses) provide at least one tiered-network or limited-network 
option (at a minimum of 12-per-cent price difference compared to other options that are similar 
but do not limit provider choice). 
  4
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Hence, our conclusions on the purchasing of specialist medical care are not necessarily 
generalizable to the entire spectrum of care. 
 
Second, we spoke with a limited number of providers and insurers, and the interviewees 
had different functions in their organisations (board members, purchasing department, 
sales department or those responsible for long-term vision). The views of different 
people within one organisation may differ to some degree. Our study therefore gives 
merely an impression of the purchasing of care; it is rather difficult to get a broad view 
of such a dynamic market, and this is therefore just a first attempt. 
Conclusions. 
After ten years into managed competition in the Netherlands, health insurers are 
evolving in their roles but still appear persistently limited in their ability to fulfil the 
role of ‘critical purchasers’, as was initially envisaged. Rather than opting to alter the 
managed competition model, we may want to give insurers more space to fulfill their 
intended role, and at the same time we might reconsider what we expect from this 
party. In addition, government could take on a larger role than first envisaged, helping 
to set more concrete goals and putting more pressure on the system.   4
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Appendix 1
In the Dutch health care purchasing market, nine private health insurer concerns 
[20] contract healthcare providers on behalf of their insured populations. The four 
largest insurers collectively had a market share of 88.5 per cent in 2016 [20]. Although 
insurers were not obliged to contract all providers, the government mandates that they 
reimburse the majority of the medical expenses for non-contracted care. To control cost 
growth, the government had introduced medical expense caps for specialist medical care 
providers, primary care providers and behavioural health care providers. In addition, 
it had structured the purchasing market for specialist medical care by defining product 
codes and introducing maximum fees for selected codes.
 
In the health insurance market, residents of the Netherlands purchase insurance policies 
from health insurers. Roughly three types of insurance products exist: services-in-kind 
policies (naturapolissen), reimbursement policies (restitutiepolissen) and combination 
policies (combinatiepolissen) [20]. Under a reimbursement policy, the medical costs are 
covered for non-contracted as well as for contracted health care providers. Under a 
services-in-kind policy, only contracted care is fully reimbursed, and non-contracted 
care is co-financed. A combination policy embodies features from both other types 
[20]. If consumers want to switch insurance products, they must make that known by 
31 December each year and purchase a new insurance product before 1 February. The 
basic benefits package, as defined statutorily by government, is quite extensive and is 
mandatory for all Dutch citizens. Insurers are not allowed to reject any applicant for 
the basic benefits package [20], though they may do so for the supplementary insurance 
packages they offer beyond the statutory package. Government has also set up a risk 
equalisation scheme to ensure that health insurers are not disadvantaged or advantaged 
by their respective risk profiles.
 
In the health care provision market, providers deliver health care to patients. Various 
types of health care providers offer specialist medical care, including general hospitals 
(algemene ziekenhuizen, of which there were 71 in 2016), academic medical centres or 
teaching hospitals (universitair medisch centra, 8 in 2016), independent treatment centres 
(zelfstandig behandelcentra, 229 in 2016) and specialist hospitals (categorale instellingen, 76 
in 2016) [21]. In the course of each year, health care providers must report on quality 
indicators to various institutions, including the Dutch Institute for Clinical Auditing 
(DICA) and the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate (IGZ).
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Abstract 
Provider–payer contract design can contribute to achieving cost containment and 
quality improvement in health care. An example of such a contract is the Alternative 
Quality Contract (AQC). The aim of this study is twofold: (1) to identify the AQC’s 
key drivers of success, and (2) to draw transferable lessons for private health insurers 
in other countries. This study is based on semi-structured interviews with the insurer, 
AQC providers, researchers that were familiar with the AQC, and government 
representatives. The literature on the AQC was also reviewed. We conclude that 
the key driver of success is that providers are incentivized and able to steer on high-
quality and affordable care. We next draw three context-independent transferable 
lessons with respect to the implementation strategy: (1) implementing the reform on 
a large scale, (2) focusing on getting the strongest providers on board first and (3) 
starting with generous, multiple-year contracts. We also draw four context-dependent 
lessons that relate to the impact of the contracting environment on the potential 
success of the reform. These lessons involve (1) prospectively defined populations, 
(2) mandatory referrals from primary care physicians, (3) market structure (4) 
and legislation and regulations. We conclude that a payment reform similar to the 
AQC can successfully be introduced in other settings if providers are incentivized 
and able to steer. This would not require modifications to most current health 
care systems. 
1. Introduction
Countries are increasingly looking at ways to improve quality of care while containing 
the growth in health care spending. In some countries, a purchasing entity, be it a 
private insurer or a public payer, contracts providers to deliver health care on behalf 
of the people it insures. Providers and payers make contractual agreements about the 
quality, volume and price of the care to be delivered. These provider–payer contracts 
may impact health system goals such as quality, accessibility and affordability of care. 
As of yet, however, it is unclear how contract design can aid in achieving goals such as 
quality improvements and cost containment. 
 
In the United States and in Europe, a great deal of experimentation is taking place with 
regard to contract design, in an attempt to improve quality of care while containing cost 
growth. Examples include bundled payments for chronic care in the Netherlands [1, 
2], population-based integrated care such as Gesundes Kinzigtal in Germany [3] and 
various accountable care organisation (ACO) reforms in the United States [4]. This 
paper studies the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC), which has shown promising 
results with respect to quality improvements and cost growth reductions over a four-
year follow-up period [5]. Chernew and colleagues [6] have extensively described the 
AQC payment model. In brief, the model comprises a five-year contract based on a 
global payment, and it includes a two-sided risk and a pay-for-performance component. 
A detailed description of the AQC payment model is provided in appendix 1. Up to 
now it was unclear what the AQC’s key drivers of success are and what other countries 
can learn from that success [4, 7, 8].
 
The aim of this study is twofold: to identify the AQC’s key drivers of success and to 
explore whether such drivers are transferable to health care systems in other countries. 
Our study is based on ten interviews with key stakeholders to gain, aimed at gaining 
a deeper understanding of the payment model design and of how the AQC works in 
practice. Interviews were conducted with a range of parties in the greater Boston area, 
including one interview with an official of the insurance company Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Massachusetts (BCBS), four interviews at different provider organisations 
that are working with the AQC, four interviews with researchers familiar with the 
AQC, and one representative of Massachusetts government. All interviews were face-to-
face and took place in April and May 2014. In addition to the interviews, we reviewed 
the literature on the AQC.
 
This paper starts with a brief background section on the Massachusetts health care 
system (section 2), followed by a description of the AQC results in section 3. Section 
4 derives the key drivers of AQCs success. Section 5 draws some transferable lessons 
from the AQC experience for private insurers in other countries. The paper ends with 
a discussion and conclusions. 
  5
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2. Background: Massachusetts health care system
As from 1991, the Massachusetts health care system has been based on regulated 
competition, whereby payers and providers negotiate over fees. Health care payment 
rates had formerly been regulated by the state. Deregulation took place because it was 
believed that the market would do a better job in containing costs than the government 
could [9]. Nonetheless, health care costs have remained relatively high, Massachusetts 
being one of the most expensive US states [10]. Recently, the Massachusetts health care 
market has been subject to several new reforms in a further attempt to contain cost 
growth. Important aspects of the reforms include expanding insurance cover, increasing 
transparency, regulating premiums, introducing a cap on total medical expenses, and 
encouraging adoption of alternative payment methods (APMs) in Medicaid [9]. 
The Massachusetts health insurance market comprises both public payers (Medicare, 
Medicaid) and private payers. In 2013, the four largest payers in the commercial market 
were Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS), Harvard Pilgrim Health Care (HPHC), Tufts 
and United. These payers collectively hold 76 per cent of payer membership (with 
BCBS holding 40 per cent), making for a rather concentrated insurance market [10]. 
The provider side of the market is also rather concentrated, with four provider systems 
receiving almost half of all provider payments, and the largest provider system receiving 
just over a quarter [10]. 
 
In Massachusetts, most payers still pay providers on a fee-for-service basis, although 
several payers have been experimenting with APMs in both the public and the 
commercial markets. In 2013, 34.3 per cent of all people enrolled in the commercial 
market were covered under an APM [11]. The most common form of APM in this 
market employed global payments [11]. Blue Cross Blues Shield’s Alternative Quality 
Contract (AQC) is an example of such an APM. 
3. AQC results: Quality improvements and reduced spending growth 
Since the introduction of the AQC, several studies have evaluated its impact on quality 
and medical spending. Overall, the evaluations show that AQC groups were associated 
with greater quality improvements and reductions in spending growth as compared to 
non-AQC groups. AQC groups enjoyed greater quality improvements than the control 
group, with increases of 3.9 percentage points in chronic care management, 2.7 in adult 
preventive care and 2.4 in paediatric care [12]. AQC groups experienced reduced cost 
growth rates of 1.9, 3.3 and 6.8 per cent after one, two and four years, respectively, as 
compared to non-AQC groups [12, 13]. In the first year of implementation, savings relied 
mainly on changes in referral patterns, with physicians increasingly referring patients to 
lower-cost providers. After four years, savings were explained by a combination of price 
reductions (60 per cent) and reduced utilisation (40 per cent) [12]. Savings exceeded 
the incentive payments (which included bonuses and infrastructure payments) for the 
first time in 2012 [12]. 
 
In 2011, Mechanic and colleagues conducted a study that focused on the providers’ 
experiences with the introduction of the AQC [14]. Based on interviews with providers 
that were working with the AQC, and two who were not, the researchers concluded 
that, after introduction of the contracts, some of the aspects providers have put 
emphasize on include: investing in the necessary infrastructure needed to improve 
quality scores, referring patients to more affordable providers and managing high-risk 
patients. Whereas the Mechanic article focused on the provider side of the payment 
reform, we take a somewhat broader view,  focusing on the key drivers of the contract 
and on what payers can potentially learn from introducing a similar payment reform. 
We aim to ascertain what key drivers led to the quality improvements and cost growth 
reductions. Identifying the key drivers will enable us to draw transferable lessons for 
private insurers in other settings and countries. 
4. Key drivers of success: provider incentive and ability to steer on 
quality and affordability 
Under the AQC, providers have the incentive and the ability to steer on high quality and 
affordable care. We identify three factors that gave providers’ incentives to steer and 
three that facilitated their ability to steer. 
4.1. Incentives to steer
First, incentives for AQC groups to steer on high-quality and affordable care stem 
primarily from the payment model design – global budgets in combination with 
shared-savings component linked to quality improvement. Accountability for both cost 
and quality creates an incentive to offer effective care while curtailing utilisation of 
unnecessary care. More specifically, AQC groups are incentivised to ensure that their 
patients receive the right types of care delivered at the right time, at the right facility 
and by the right physician[15]. This has the potential to be both quality-enhancing and 
or cost-saving. The incentives stemming from the payment do depend on the relative 
size of the reward, which therefore has to be sufficient to incentivise a provider. 
 
A second incentive for AQC groups to steer is facilitated by having a prospectively defined 
population. Given that the AQC group members know in advance for whom they are 
accountable during the contract period, they have an extra incentive to proactively manage 
this population. Such incentives may be weakened in schemes where the definitive 
population is determined retrospectively, as in the accountable care organisations run 
by the Medicare Shared Savings Program, as uncertainty about a provider’s population 
lowers their expected reward for proactively managing patients [16]. 
  5
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As a third incentive, leadership plays an important role in transferring group-level 
incentives to individual physicians. Whilst the organisation-level incentives stemming 
from the payment model may be to steer on affordability and quality, the financial 
incentives at the physicians’ level are not necessarily in line with the contract goals. 
Physicians are paid mostly on a fee-for-service (FFS) basis, thus incentivising volume. 
 
AQC groups have different ways of getting physician’ incentives in line with the 
group goals. Some groups have physicians’ bonuses to steerage, or they pay visits to 
physicians who make relatively frequent referrals to other providers. One researcher 
observed that  behaviour partially derives from the prevailing culture, and changing 
that culture is difficult; providers are still trying to work out how to do this. As an 
insurer’s representative noted, ‘We have not been able to isolate one factor or multiple 
factors that appear to help do better. The biggest differentiator is engaged leadership 
– engaged and respected leadership.’ It takes strong leadership to overrule financial 
incentives at the individual level and get physicians to act in line with group-level 
incentives instead. The representative continued, ‘You could have a rough provider 
who decided “I’m just going to bring every patient in for every single thing”. Then 
it becomes dependent on the engaged leaders of the group to say, “You know what? 
You can’t do that because you’re disadvantaging everybody else”, and so it’s a 
layered model.’ 
4.2. Ability to steer
A first key feature that enables the proactive management of patient populations is 
the requirement that an assigned primary care physician (PCP) provide a referral for 
specialist care. This gives the PCP an opportunity to discuss the patients’ choice of 
provider. Even though patients are free in provider choice, a PCP may be able to help 
patients make more informed choices and/or may refuse a referral to a specific provider. 
Some groups are strict with regard to referral outside the network (e.g. subjecting 
referrals to peer review), whilst others are less rigorous. In addition, the extent to which 
patients follow a PCP’s recommendations will also depend on the PCP’s negotiation 
and persuasion skills and the patient–physician relationship. Relying on the patient–
physician relationship may, in fact, prove a more useful instrument than laying down 
strict rules within the organisation. ‘I worked in two systems on the provider side. One 
had hard rules about “You can’t refer outside the system and if you do you’ve got to 
go through this jury of your peers (…)”. They had more leakage than the other group 
I worked (…), which was basically work on the relationship (…), which is much more 
effective’ – so reported an insurer representative. Also, a patient’s historical provider 
choice may influence future provider choice; as one provider observed, ‘Obviously you 
respect long-standing relationships and patients that are mid-treatment, (…) It took us 
three years (…) to move from provider (…) to provider (…).’ 
 
A second important feature that enables the managing of a patient population is the 
availability of sufficient and relevant data, and the analysis of data on practice variation, 
quality indicators, claims data and information on patients’ whereabouts. Proactively 
managing this population – for example, making sure patients receive appropriate post-
hospital care and no unnecessary care – requires that providers have information on 
patients’ whereabouts. As one provider explained, they receive all the referrals from the 
insurer, and a case manager then goes over the referrals. If, for example, someone has 
a follow-up appointment at a provider outside the network, they will give them a call 
and try to reschedule the appointment to a provider inside their network.  The same 
provider states, that they will use claims data with quality info to make patients receive 
appropriate follow-up care. 
 
A third key feature is that both the incentives and the ability to work proactively are 
further encouraged and strengthened by several forms of insurer commitment. The 
first is the provision of reports. At the same time tough, other payers are increasingly 
sending such reports as well, and these tend to be formatted differently. Some providers 
are therefore carrying out such analyses themselves. BCBS nonetheless continues 
providing data on practice variation, as the insurer representative went on to say: 
‘We think there is even value in doing this even if the group is doing it themselves, 
because they see us as a partner and a collaborator, rather than an adversarial 
contracting opponent.’
 
In addition to the reports, BCBS also transfers data and knowledge via seminars and 
forums. The several channels through which data is transferred have an important 
benefit, as they bring people together and create a sense of shared commitment towards 
improving the value of care. The insurer has thereby also helped physicians learn to be 
better negotiators, which is useful when physicians discuss provider choice with their 
patients. ‘We think that negotiation skills is really what is going to matter when you’ve 
got a challenging patient in front of you; it really is a negotiation that you’re doing’, 
argued an insurer representative. 
 
To summarise, under the AQC, important factors that help strengthen a provider’s 
incentives and ability to steer include (1) the design of the payment model, (2) a 
prospectively defined population, (3) leadership, (4) requiring referrals from an assigned 
PCP, (5) data availability and (6) insurer commitment. This does not imply that simply 
satisfying these six conditions would guarantee a successful payment reform in other 
countries, nor that creating the incentives and the ability to work proactively can solely 
be achieved by fulfilling these six conditions. In the next section we therefore draw 
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Table 1. Key drivers of Alternative Quality Contract’s success
Incentive to steer Payment model design
Prospectively defined population
Engaged and respected leadership
Ability to steer Requiring a referral from an assigned PCP
Data availability
Incentive and ability to steer Insurer commitment
5. Seven transferable lessons: AQCs potential key drivers in other 
countries
Based on interviews with several key stakeholders, we derived seven transferable lessons 
from the AQC experience. The lessons outline how private health insurers in other 
countries could implement a payment reform that relies on the success factors of the 
AQC – incentives and ability to steer on quality and affordability. We draw context-
independent lessons and context-dependent lessons. 
5.1. Three context-independent transferable lessons
Three context-independent lessons from the AQC relate to the implementation 
strategy of a payment reform that relies on a steering mechanism. 
 
First, the payment reform is likely to be more successful if implemented on a large 
scale, in terms of both the number of providers and the number of patients. Being 
accountable for a large patient population is a way of risk diversification for a provider. 
A large population requires a large provider group with a sufficient number of PCPs 
(as the population is defined as the sum of all patients assigned to a PCP). The success 
of such a group of providers increases with provider–provider alignment. It is easier 
for an individual provider to do well under such a risk contract if other providers 
within the organisation also have incentives to contain costs and improve quality. As 
a representative of a provider group pointed out, ‘Our most productive relationships 
with our hospital partners are ones that where the hospital has a very strong, organised 
physician group that is working towards the same end that we are. You know, because if 
we are just 10 per cent of a hospital’s discharges and we are the only ones talking about 
what is the average cost per discharge and what is the 30-day readmission rate and 
what is the infection rate, you know you’re the exception not the rule.’ Furthermore, if 
changes must be made to the ways care is delivered, then the share of the care to which 
that applies has to be large enough to enable such a change. In addition to the benefits 
of having a large provider group for purposes of risk diversification, a payment reform 
will also benefit from the contracting of multiple AQC groups. Because, under AQC 
2.0, the spending benchmarks of the AQC groups are based on regional spending, 
all groups are competing against one another in an attempt to beat the benchmark. 
Having multiple groups operating under an AQC creates more downward pressure on 
the benchmark, and hence on total spending. 
 
A second lesson is that – given that it may take some time to implement a reform – it 
may be advisable to focus first on getting the strongest providers (financially and/or in 
terms of market power) ‘on board’. Implementing a reform is a process that requires 
considerable time and effort, which may make it difficult to get all providers on board 
at the same time. In that case, the insurer may want to focus on getting the strongest 
providers to sign the payment reform first. The cooperation of those providers in 
particular is important in that they play an important role in the reform’s ability to 
contain cost growth. If the most expensive players in the market are not incentivised 
to curb spending growth, then the reform will be less successful in containing it. At 
the same time, given their market power, the strongest providers may be the most 
challenging parties to convince. Another benefit of starting with them is that they are 
the parties most likely to be able to bear the risks associated with the contract, given 
that they manage larger populations. 
 
A third lesson is to start with generous, long-term contracts. As payment reforms 
generally require timely and costly investments, the insurer must somehow make the 
payment reform be mutually beneficial. The insurer may convince providers to join the 
payment reform by offering long-term contracts and providing financial compensation. 
An interviewed researcher said this can be seen as an investment in reengineering, 
to get providers to participate and give them the resources they need to change their 
care delivery models. This requires that contracts be of long enough duration [17], 
as it is risky to make long-term investments if there are doubts about next year’s 
contract and its details. Also, the insurer may have to offer financial compensation, in 
the form of a generous budgets, fees or bonuses, to cover the investments. Financial 
compensation may further be needed to convince parties to join, as providers may be 
hesitant to take on a contract of such lengthy duration and its associated risk stemming 
from uncertainties. 
 
After the necessary instalments are in place and the system is working properly, it may 
no longer be necessary to offer additional compensation. After the strong providers 
are on board, the insurer must try to get the remaining eligible providers to join the 
payment reform. Many remaining providers are in small, single or group practices, which 
face more challenging paths towards obtaining the staff, infrastructure, information 
technology and managerial experience to manage a risk contract for a population of 
patients. Starting with long-term contracts is still desirable, although the degree to 
which offering high financial compensation is still necessary to get providers to sign 
depends on the market power of those remaining providers. 
 
From these lessons, it follows that the insurer must have sufficient leverage vis- à-vis 
providers, as well as sufficient financial resources, capacity and must be willing to take 
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on risks in implementing the payment reform. The fact that the reform is best rolled 
out on a large scale, and the fact that convincing providers to join entails starting 
with generous, long-term contracts, implies that a considerable investment from 
the insurer is required. The insurer must have the leverage to convince providers 
to join, the financial resources to invest in them and the capacity to provide the 
non-financial support.
5.2. Four context-dependent transferable lessons 
We also derived four context-dependent lessons, which relate to key characteristics of 
the contracting environment that play a role in the potential success of the payment 
reform. Unlike the context-independent lessons, these lessons fall largely outside the 
scope of the contracting parties. 
 
First, PCP assignment is important, as it is used to define the population prospectively 
(key driver 2, see table 1). In Europe, half of the countries already require referrals 
from a PCP (whether assigned or not) [18]. However, in some countries, or for certain 
insurance products, it may not be feasible to have patients be assigned to a PCP. In that 
case, providers must thus find alternative ways to define its population prospectively, 
or at least use historical data to derive a likely cohort of individuals for whom they will 
be responsible. If the population cannot be defined on the basis of PCP assignment, 
then a population might be defined based on historical costs (for year t-1), which is 
another commonly used method in accountable care organisations [16]. In that case, a 
patient is attributed at the start of a year to the provider for whom that patient incurred 
the majority or plurality of spending in the preceding year (in terms of either total 
spending or primary care spending). 
 
Second, PCP assignment is also used to determine from which PCP the patient referral 
is required (key driver 4, table 1). In the absence of assigned PCPs, providers must 
find alternative ways to create opportunities to talk to patients about provider choice. 
Instead of requiring referral from an assigned PCP, requiring a referral from any PCP 
within the network may pose an alternative solution. Non-assigned PCPs may not, 
however, be equally capable of influencing patients in their provider choice, as the 
patient–physician relations may be stronger in longer-term relationships. In practice, 
though, patients not formally assigned to a PCP tend to keep visiting the same PCP 
anyway [18]. All in all, it is unclear whether requiring a referral from any PCP will yield 
similar results to those involving assigned PCPs.
Third, the market structure must allow for steering. Market structure must be organised 
such that a sufficient number of competing providers share the same geographic 
market to make steering possible. Effectively, all providers are competing for referrals 
from the PCP, and they will acquire referrals by offering high-quality and affordable 
care. However, given that PCPs may have a slight preference to steer patients towards 
providers within their own AQC group, the providers within that particular AQC 
group will enjoy a competitive advantage within their own patient population vis-à-vis 
outside providers. In response, some outside providers proposed a reduction in their 
fees in order to be in a different tier. It is this competition between providers that 
resulted in some providers voluntarily reducing fees to maintain their competitiveness. 
In turn, such fee reductions help competing AQC groups to stay within their budgets. 
As AQC groups have a financial incentive to stay within their budget, and the 
spending benchmarks are based on regional spending by neighbouring organisations 
in the region, all AQC groups are effectively competing with one another to beat the 
benchmark. These forces thus apply downward pressure on both the budgets and the 
fee-for-service rates. This makes the competitive environment a crucial factor in driving 
down costs and increasing quality.
 
Fourth, legislation and regulations will need to support, rather than hinder, the 
introduction of such a payment model. It is also important that laws and regulations 
create a level playing field [19]. Furthermore, antitrust legislation must allow for the 
formation of providers or provider groups that are large enough to bear the risk of such 
a payment model, while at the same time keeping price competition alive in the market 
to discourage monopoly pricing. Privacy legislation and regulations must allow for data 
exchange between providers and insurers. [19].
 
An additional issue discussed in negotiations in Massachusetts was a medical expense 
cap that had been introduced in state law. One provider argued that the cap was too 
broad, another that it had had a framing effect. Recent reforms had also improved price 
transparency in the market. One provider reported that he had consulted the reports 
and had put forward the large price variation as an argument in the negotiations. A 
final issue is that the Massachusetts health care system is structured such that there is 
both a private and a public market. One researcher observed that the pricing of the 
public payers may have spillovers into the private market, whereby parties may negotiate 
fees that lie, for instance, a certain percentage above Medicare prices. The same goes 
for physician compensation schedules. But having different types of contracts under 
different programmes and payers, which causes for mixed incentives. In such ways, 
public payers may indirectly influence outcomes in the private market. 
In sum, the context-dependent lessons relate to key characteristics of the health 
care system in question (PCP assignment), the competitive environment (number of 
competing providers sharing a geographic market) and the regulatory environment 
(including antitrust and privacy legislation). Although the contracting parties may find 
other ways to create opportunities to talk to patients about their choice of providers, 
and although alternative options also exist for defining a patient population ex ante, 
the organisation of the market structure and of public policy, laws and regulations are 
not subject to alternative options. They thus fall outside the scope of the contracting 
parties. Market structure and public policy, legislation and regulation are therefore 
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considered preconditions for implementing the reform. 
Table 2. Transferable lessons from the Alternative Quality Contract
Context-independent
Implement the reform on a large 
scale 
The payment reform is likely to be more successful on a large 
scale: both in terms of scale of providers and scale of patients 
Focus on getting the strongest 
providers on board first
If it is not possible to get all providers on board at the same 
time, the insurer may want to focus on getting the strongest 
providers on board first
Start with generous and long-term 
contracts
As payment reforms generally require timely and costly 
investments, the insurer must somehow make the payment 
reform mutually beneficial, by starting with generous and long-
term contracts
Context-dependent
Population defined based on PCP 
assignment
PCP assignment is used to define the population prospectively 
(key driver 2)
Requiring a referral via assigned PCP PCP assignment is used to determine from which PCP the 
patient requires his/her referral (key driver 4)
Market structure The provider market structure must be organized such that 
there is a sufficient amount of competing providers sharing a 
geographic market to make steering possible
Supportive laws and regulation Laws and regulation may not interfere with introducing the 
payment model (antitrust law, privacy law, etc.)
PCP= Primary care physician
6. Discussion and conclusions
The AQC results showed that provider–payer contract innovation can contribute to 
achieving system goals such as cost containment and quality improvement. Nevertheless, 
payment reforms take time and require considerable effort and commitment from 
both providers and insurers. The results suggest that achieving net savings may require 
years of investment before provider organisations have redesigned their health care 
models so as to generate meaningful reductions in their budgets. Insurers can play an 
important role, however, by supporting providers to bring this change about and be 
successful under such a contract. 
 
The key driver of AQCs success appears to be the creation of the necessary incentives 
and ability to steer on high quality and affordable care. Although other routes, such 
as prescribing medicines cost-effectively, may also contribute to cost reductions and 
quality improvements, we believe that the effective management of patient populations 
has the greatest potential to effect quality improvements and cost growth reductions 
under such provider–payer contracts. 
 
The condition that patients remain free with respect to provider choice is a challenge, 
and at the same time the selling point of the model. Given that a provider’s success 
partially relies on the extent to which it is able to steer, this freedom of choice aspect 
makes the model challenging for providers. Providers will always have to accept some 
‘leakage’, as existing patient-physician relationships or patients that are in mid-treatment 
may make it difficult or undesirable to steer patients elsewhere. Nonetheless, the free-
choice-of-providers condition remains a selling point of the model, as consumers 
appear to increasingly value that freedom. For example, in Massachusetts the number 
of health maintenance organisation (HMO) products has increased and the number 
of preferred provider organisation (PPO) products has declined in recent years [20]. In 
view of the patient preference for freedom of choice, the AQC model perhaps poses a 
good intermediate solution, giving providers the incentive to steer, and will probably 
with success for a proportion of their patients), while still safeguarding free choice. 
 
This paper drew seven transferable lessons for private insurers. In some countries, 
however, care is purchased by a public payer. For private parties, the only two 
preconditions are market structure and public policy, legislation and regulations. 
Given that government influences the regulatory framework, only market structure 
could pose a possible barrier in implementing reforms. Although anti-trust legislation 
affects market structure, market structure is difficult to change in the short run. The 
potential of reforms to boost quality may be equally effective when implemented by 
a public payer, although ability of a payment model to contain cost growth may be 
weakened if the public payer is not able to price-differentiate between providers for 
similar treatments. Under the AQC, the savings were achieved by both reduced service 
utilisation and reduced prices [5]. If a public payer cannot differentiate prices, providers 
have limited possibilities to achieve savings by referring patients to less expensive 
providers (of similar quality). They can, however, curb costs by reducing utilisation. 
 
Under the AQC, it is inevitable that providers are aware to some extent of their 
competitors’ prices, because they are responsible for paying the bills of their patient 
population. It is unclear, however, how price transparency might be affecting prices 
in the long run. Price transparency could result in either a decrease or an increase in 
the overall price level. It could lower prices if patients make price-conscious decisions 
and if providers are pressured to lower their fees to maintain competitiveness [21]. 
Yet it could also raise prices if lower-priced providers are prompted to negotiate fee 
increases after observing their competitors’ rates [21, 22]; providers may also be 
hesitant to accept lower fees from one insurer, fearing they will have to drop prices 
with another insurer as well [23]. Unfortunately, the number of empirical studies 
on price transparency and prices in health care is limited [21–24]. It is therefore 
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Another concern with respect to the sustainability of results is the impact of changing 
market structures on cost growth. In 2012, 85% of all physicians in Massachusetts were 
working under the AQC [5]. The remaining 15% were mostly small practices [5], which 
may not have been eligible for such a contract because they were not large enough to 
take on the risks of the contract or did not possess the necessary infrastructure or 
resources to manage population health. It is not clear what will happen to these smaller 
practices in future. Larger AQC groups may buy them up or they may exit the market; 
currently, small practices also have the option of joining other alternative payment 
arrangements, which include non-risk contracts focused on pay for performance. 
All these developments may result in more market power for existing AQC groups 
and/or a more concentrated provider market. It is unclear how that will affect the 
competitiveness of the market, and thereby future cost growth. 
 
This paper has some limitations. First, the number of interviews was limited to 
ten parties. By speaking with insurers, providers, researchers and a government 
representative we nonetheless attempted to get a broad perspective on the reform. The 
implementation of a payment reform remains a very dynamic process, however, in 
which many factors play a role. This chapter therefore gives merely an impression of 
the key drivers and transferable lessons. A second limitation is that it is unclear how 
the AQC might have affected the accessibility of care. Previous research indicated that 
it has promoted the affordability and quality of care, but more rigorous evaluations 
about effects on accessibility are needed before one can get a full grip of the success of 
the reform. 
 
In conclusion, the results of our AQC study show that provider–payer contracts can 
contribute to achieving cost containment and quality improvement. Creating the 
incentives and ability to steer poses one possible solution to achieving this. Such 
insights do not mean that contracting parties must implement an exact replica of 
the AQC template. They have a degree of freedom with respect to contract details. 
Although we observed that several context-dependent factors may influence the success 
of the reform, only two such factors must be considered preconditions. Implementing 
such a payment reform does not appear to require any major modifications to most 
current health care systems. In such systems, it seems we merely have to wait for an 
insurer to step up who is willing to take a chance. 
Graph 1. Pay-for-performance component
Source: Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS), 2012 [25].
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Appendix 1: Detailed description of the Alternative Quality Contract
The AQC was implemented by the health insurance company Blue Cross Blue Shield 
(BCBS) in Massachusetts in 2009. The state of Massachusetts has a health care system 
based on managed competition. It has a private and a public insurance market. The 
private insurance market is highly concentrated. In 2013, the three largest insurers 
enjoyed a common market share of 67 per cent [20], whereby the market share of BCBS, 
the largest insurer, was 40 per cent [20]. In Massachusetts, fee-for-service (FFS) has been 
the dominant payment model in provider–payer contracts [26], although alternative 
payment methods (APMs) such as global payments are increasingly being adopted. In 
the private market, APMs cover about one third of the insured population [27]. BCBS 
holds the largest percentage of APMs in the health maintenance organisation (HMO) 
market, with 90% of its HMO members currently working under an APM [27]. The 
BCBS Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) represents the biggest change so far in 
terms of contract forms.
 
Under the AQC model, BCBS contracts with different groups of health care providers 
(AQC groups) and signs a single contract with every AQC group. The contract stipulates 
that the AQC group must include a sufficient number of primary care physicians 
(PCPs) who can collectively provide care to at least 5,000–10,000 insured individuals. 
The exact number of PCPs depends on the degree of risk sharing in the payment 
model. In addition to primary care, an AQC group is free to include hospital care [15]. 
The AQC group is accountable for spending across the entire continuum of care of 
its population and for a set of quality measures focused on inpatient and outpatient 
settings. The population is defined as all BCBS policyholders that are assigned to a 
PCP in the AQC network. Patients are not restricted to the providers within the AQC 
group but need a referral from their PCP to visit health care providers outside the 
AQC group. 
 
For most organisations, the AQC payment model comprises a five-year contract based 
on a global payment with two-sided risk and a pay-for-performance (P4P) component 
[15]. The global payment is a target based on a per-member-per-month payment. The 
contract also specifies the fixed annual percentage increases of the global payment over 
the five-year period; the negotiated increases are set so that medical expense growth is 
to be halved after five years [15]. The two-sided risk component implies that if annual 
total medical spending exceeds or falls below the global payment, the respective losses 
or savings are divided between the insurer and the AQC group. The degree of shared 
savings and shared risk is laid down in the contract and varies from 50 to 100 per 
cent; the percentage of risk sharing determines how potential surpluses and losses are 
distributed, and under a 100-per-cent risk contract the provider keeps all surpluses or 
pays for the loss [6]. The pay-for-performance component depends on the aggregate 
score on a set of 64 quality indicators across process, outcome and patient experience 
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domains (for a complete list of these 64 quality indicators, see Chernew et al. [6]]). On 
the basis of this aggregate score, the AQC group is eligible for a maximum bonus of 10 
per cent of its global budget. 
 
After introduction of the AQC in 2009, the payment model underwent two important 
changes, transforming it to AQC 2.0 in 2011 [25]. Whereas under AQC 1.0 the 
annual percentage growth of the global payments was fixed, it is now linked to regional 
spending. This adjustment was made because external factors such as epidemics 
may impact total costs outside the control of the providers, and under the AQC 1.0 
budgets they could necessitate complex reconciliations at the end of the year [25]. 
Moreover, under AQC 2.0, the extent of shared saving and shared risk is now tied to 
the organisation’s performance on quality (see graph 1), and providers now also receive 
per-member-per-month quality payments. This adjustment to the pay-for-performance 
component results in more equal pay for comparable quality improvements amongst 
the AQC groups [25]. 
 
BCBS uses the payment model described above as a template when entering the 
negotiations with AQC groups. In practice, after complex and prolonged negotiations 
about contract specifics, every AQC group ends up with a slightly different and 
hence unique contract. For example, although the AQC template contains a five-year 
contract, some AQC groups have negotiated shorter contract lengths. Strong providers 
may prefer shorter contracts, as they may want to renegotiate their fees as frequently 
as possible. In addition, although the original quality metrics set incorporates 64 
indicators, some specialty hospitals have negotiated to include only a subset of these 
indicators, as some indicators were not applicable to them. 
 
In practice, under the AQC, providers are still reimbursed on a fee-for-service, because 
the relative value unit is still used as the fundamental unit of accounting. At the end of 
the year, the sum of all fee-for-service spending accrued by an AQC group’s population 
is compared to its global payment [15] and the savings or excess is calculated. 
Throughout the contracting period, BCBS provides the AQC group with data on 
the AQC group’s performance at various levels of the organisation. For example, it 
provides a daily update on hospital admissions. At the providers’ level, it provides 
monthly reports on the care delivered to the patients within their population. For 
individual doctors, it provides data on quality and referral patterns. Patient-level data 
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Abstract 
Background: Transparency in the quality of health care is an issue of growing 
importance internationally. Quality transparency is crucial for health care insurers in 
purchasing care on behalf of their policyholders, for providers in making necessary 
improvements in the quality of their care, and for consumers in choosing a provider 
when they need treatment. Conscious consumer decisions give health care providers 
incentives to deliver better quality. This paper studies the effects of health care quality 
on hospital patient volume and on patients’ choices of hospitals, and more specifically 
whether high-quality providers attract more patients. 
 
Method: Our dataset covered the period 2006–2011 and included all patients who 
underwent cataract treatment in the Netherlands. We first estimated the effect of 
quality on patient volume using simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. We 
then employed a mixed logit model to determine how patients make trade-offs between 
quality, distance and waiting time as they choose their providers. 
Results: At the aggregate level, we found that a one-point increase in ophthalmology 
quality on a scale of 1–100 was associated with a higher patient volume of 2 to 4 per 
cent for the average hospital. The effect was driven mainly by the hospital with the 
highest quality score, as it was halved when that hospital was excluded from the dataset. 
At the individual level, all else being equal, patients showed a stronger preference for 
the hospital with the highest ophthalmology quality score and appeared indifferent 
between the remaining hospitals.
Conclusion: Our results suggest that the top-performing hospital attracted significantly 
more patients than the remaining hospitals. It appears that at least a small percentage 
of consumers responded to quality differences. Such responses could strengthen 
incentives for providers to invest in quality and for insurers to take quality into account 
in their purchasing strategies.
Key words: hospital demand, patient choice, quality indicators, quality competition
1. Introduction
Transparency in hospital quality is essential as it contributes to a patients’ ability to 
make the appropriate hospital choice. After managed competition was introduced in 
the Netherlands in 2006, hospitals began negotiating with health insurance companies 
about the prices, quality and volume of care. Insurers are likely to be more incentivized 
to reward quality in their purchasing strategy if consumers indeed take quality into 
account in their provider choice. A necessary condition for efficient competition is that 
patients respond to quality differences across providers. Better-performing hospitals 
would then attract more patients, and providers would have more incentives to invest 
in quality, thereby improving the quality of care. The central question of our paper 
is whether cataract patients take quality into account as they choose a hospital for 
cataract treatment and whether high-quality hospitals attract more patients.
 
Evidence suggests that health care consumers tend to choose better-performing providers 
and are responsive to initiatives that provide quality information [1]. The decision to 
visit a hospital may depend on various factors. Not only quality considerations, but 
also the distance to a hospital, the waiting times and information obtained from third 
parties may be important factors in consumer choice. In the Netherlands, consumers 
may retrieve information on quality via their general practitioner (GP), family and 
friends, and publicly available quality data sources [2]. 
 
A number of studies have explored the impact of quality on hospital volume (aggregate 
level) or hospital choice (individual level). Most studies have found the effects to be 
positive but small, and some have found weak or non-significant effects [3–15]. Over 
time, exploring the effects of quality on hospital choice has become the preferred 
method [10]. Some studies have reported non-linear trends in consumer response to 
quality information; these tend to find that patients do avoid relatively poor-quality 
hospitals but that highly ranked hospitals do not attract significantly more patients 
[16–18]. The latter finding is counterintuitive. As in other competitive markets, highly 
ranked health care providers that excel and differentiate themselves in terms of quality 
might be expected to attract significantly more patients than their competitors. Our 
contribution to the literature will be to test this hypothesis by using a quality indicator 
that measures the reputations of Dutch hospitals performing cataract treatment in the 
period 2006–2011.
 
Cataracts are ‘changes in clarity of the natural lens inside the eye that gradually 
degrade visual quality’ [19]. Cataracts tend to develop over time and may lead to 
vision impairment and blindness [20, 21]. In 2010, cataracts were the main cause of 
blindness worldwide [20]. Blindness is more common in old age (though it may also 
occur at younger ages) and it is more common in women than in men [21]. Cataract is 
a condition that is fully treatable [20], in a surgical procedure whereby the old lens is 
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replaced with a new one [22]. Cataract treatments are fairly standard procedures and 
are associated with low medical risk [23].1 
In the Netherlands, cataract treatments may be carried out in hospitals or in 
independent treatment centres (zelfstandig behandelcentra or ZBCs). Virtually all Dutch 
hospitals provide cataract treatment. Depending on a patient’s insurance product type, 
either all providers are covered and fully reimbursed or only contracted providers are 
fully reimbursed, and patients are required to pay a (small) share of the costs for non-
contracted providers. Little selective contracting existed during the time frame of our 
study. Furthermore, to access medical specialist care, patients require GP referral but 
they are free in their choice of providers. 
 
The market for cataract treatment lent itself well to this analysis because (1) quality data 
at the treatment level was publicly available and variations in quality were reported, 
(2) cataract treatments were non-emergent and fairly standard procedures, (3) cataract 
treatments were available in practically all Dutch hospitals and (4) patients had freedom 
with respect to provider choice. 
 
This paper follows the strategy described by Pope (2009) [3], starting with an aggregate-
level analysis followed by an individual-level analysis. We begin with a brief literature 
review. Section 3 describes the dataset and the data analysis. The aggregate-level 
and individual-level results are reported in section 4, followed by a discussion and 
conclusions in section 5. 
2. Literature review
In the health economics literature, the impact of quality has been investigated at 
aggregate and individual levels. At the aggregate level, studies explore the effects of 
quality on hospital volume [3–5, 11, 12]. At the individual level they investigate the 
effects of quality on a patient’s hospital choice, relating this to other factors such 
as home-to-hospital distance and waiting time [3, 7, 8, 13–15, 17, 18, 24, 25]. One 
advantage of the individual-level approach is that it enables insights into how patients 
make trade-offs between quality and the other factors. Quality measures differ across 
studies [8]; they include mortality rates [16], readmission rates [7], patient-reported 
1 Reverse causality may be a problem in these studies, in that volume may be affecting quality 
through learning effects. We tried to rule this out by focusing exclusively on standard 
cataract treatments, thus excluding more complex cataract treatments from the sample. Our 
communications with ophthalmologists confirmed that the treatments studied here were relatively 
straightforward and could be performed by all eye specialists. The reverse causality argument 
might figure more heavily in highly complex care such as cardiology, where specialisation is more 
important.
outcomes or report cards [4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18 ] or, and – as in our study – hospital 
reputation and composite scores [3, 14, 15]. The cited studies have tended to find 
that quality has a small but positive effect on hospital volume or on hospital choice, 
although some studies found weak or non-significant effects. More research on this 
topic is warranted, as a systematic review in 2011 [26] concluded that the currently 
available evidence was too limited to show how performance data influences the 
behaviour of consumers, providers and purchasers of health care.
Since the idea of the paper is to test whether better hospitals attract more patients, we 
also cite studies that that found non-linear effects of quality information on patient 
volume or hospital choice; low quality thereby tended to negatively affect patient 
volume, whilst high quality was not associated with higher patient volumes.
 
Cutler and colleagues [16], for instance, explored the impact of risk-adjusted mortality 
rates on hospital volume for bypass surgery in New York State. They found that 
hospitals with high mortality rates treated 4.9 fewer patients per month, which would 
have amounted to a 10 per cent decline in patient volume for the average hospital. On 
the other hand, hospitals that reported low mortality rates did not experience increases 
in patient volume. It was not clear whether patients who avoided lower-quality hospitals 
did not undergo treatment or whether they attended another hospital. Similarly, a 
study by Wang and colleagues [17] found that, after public reporting, surgeons with 
poor cardiac care report cards treated significantly fewer patients but that highly ranked 
surgeons did not treat significantly more patients; the report cards did not significantly 
affect total hospital demand. Dranove and Sfekas [18] used a conditional choice model 
to test whether patients moved to better-quality hospitals after hospital report cards 
were introduced. Their sample covered 18 hospitals in the New York metropolitan area 
and included all patients living in nearby counties who underwent coronary artery 
bypass surgery (CABG) from 1989 to 1991. They found that patients shifted to better-
performing hospitals after introduction of the report cards, but that this effect was 
driven mainly by patients avoiding lower-quality hospitals. High-quality hospitals did 
not attract significantly more patients; the authors suggest that the high quality of those 
hospitals was already known prior to report card introduction [18]. 
3. Method
The main dataset we used in the present study included all patients who underwent 
cataract treatment in the Netherlands (as defined by the Dutch ‘DBC code’2 
110005540031) from 2006 to 2011. The data was obtained from the Dutch Healthcare 
2 Dutch hospital products are classified in a system of episode-based treatment bundles called 
diagnosis-treatment combinations (diagnose-behandelcombinaties, DBCs); this resembles the 
diagnosis-related group (DRG) system in the United States. 
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Authority (NZa). For each episode of treatment, the dataset contained the patient’s 
postcode, the unique hospital code and the year of treatment. The total sample 
consisted of 854,613 DBCs (the sum of the total numbers of DBCs for the years 2006 
to 2011, as specified in the first row of table 1). 
 
From this data we derived the following variables: ‘total DBCs’ (total number of 
cataract treatments), total number of hospitals (number of hospitals in which cataract 
treatment was carried out) and average distance (the average distance in kilometres 
from the patients’ postcodes to the hospital). We also obtained data from the Dutch 
Healthcare Authority for a further variable, the average waiting time in weeks; and 
we included two quality variables: a quality score for the ophthalmology specialism, 
average ophthalmologist quality, and an overall quality score for the hospital, average overall 
hospital quality. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on all the variables used. Total number of DBCs 
increased over the years and the treatments were carried out in approximately 150 
hospitals. The average hospital performed about 1,000 cataract treatment procedures 
annually. The other variables in the table are discussed in the next section. 
Table 1. Summary statistics for cataract treatment in the Netherlands, 2006–2011
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total treatment episodes 117,980 139,474 151,972 145,097 151,826 148,264
Total number of hospitals 149 149 151 152 153 153
Average distance (km) 13.48 13.20 13.66 14.26 14.44 16.40
Average waiting time (weeks) 6.73 6.71 6.22 5.23 5.25 4.85
Average ophthalmologist quality 
(scale of 1–100)
18.48 19.14
Average overall hospital quality 
(scale of 1–10)
 5.09 5.14 5.08 5.77 5.49
3.1. Data description
Quality
The two quality indicators average ophthalmologist quality and average overall hospital 
quality, summarised in table 1, were obtained from the Dutch weekly magazine Elsevier 
[27], which publishes yearly hospital quality information. 
 
The overall hospital quality indicator was published in the years 2007 to 2011 and 
was based on process, structure and outcome measures,3 although the composition of 
the indicator varied over the years. In 2007 it was based on seven quality measures, in 
2008 on twenty-three, in 2009 on six and in 2010 and 2011 on four measures. In 2011 
the indicators were for example: service and information, waiting times, safety and 
effectiveness. These four indicators were based, in turn, on 183 underlying indicators, 
such as the use of IT, whether patients with eczema could contact their dermatologist 
outside consultation hours and whether annual appointments could be scheduled on 
a single day. The scaling of the quality measures also differed across years. To enable 
comparability, we converted the annual overall hospital quality scores to a 1–10 scale. 
Graph 1a shows the average hospital quality scores per hospital for the period 2007–
2011. On the horizontal axis, hospitals are ranked based on patient volume (the lower 
the volume, the further to the right). The graph indicates a wide variation in quality.
 
Elsevier also published quality indicators for specific specialisms, including 
ophthalmology. These were based on survey information; respondents were asked to 
judge a maximum of four hospitals and to indicate whether these stood out in terms 
of their medical services and practice management. Respondents included medical 
specialists, head nurses and heads of departments such as intensive care or operating 
theatres, GPs, and managers and directors of hospitals. This indicator is therefore 
likely to capture the reputation of a hospital in terms of the specialism in question. 
This ophthalmology indicator was published for the years 2008 and 2009 only.4 In 
2008 and 2009 there were 4,787 and 4,441 respondents respectively, of whom 2,862 
and 2,519 were medical specialists. The average ophthalmologist quality scores over the 
years 2008 and 2009 are shown for each hospital in graph 1b. On the horizontal axis, 
hospitals are again ranked from high to low patient volume. The graph shows that the 
largest hospital was an outlier, with a quality score between 70 and 80; the remaining 
hospitals had scores ranging between approximately 0 and 40, with one exception 
whereby a medium-sized hospital had an average score between 50 and 60. 
3 Process indicators assess activities and tasks executed by a provider in delivering care. Structure 
indicators relate to the numbers and types of resources used in delivering care. Outcome measures 
assess the impact of the care process on patient health [28].
4 When Elsevier published a new quality indicator for ophthalmology in 2011, it was no longer 
based on surveys but on publicly available performance indicators [27]. The top-performing 
hospital referred to in our study was not among the seven best-ranked hospitals in 2011.
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Graph 1a. Overall hospital quality scores by hospitals (range 0–10)
Graph 1b. Ophthalmologist quality scores by hospitals (range 0–100)
Control variables 
The yearly data on the control variable average waiting time in weeks per hospital were 
obtained from the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa). Data was available for the years 
2006 to 2011 and the average waiting time for all hospitals in that period was five weeks 
and six days (5.80 weeks). It declined steadily over the time frame from six weeks and 
five days (6.73 weeks) in 2006 to four weeks and six days (4.85 weeks) in 2011 (table 1). 
Hospitals showed wide variations in average waiting times, ranging from 0 to 21 weeks.
 
The control variable distance was based on the number of kilometres between the 
postcode of a patient’s residence and the hospitals’ postcodes.5 The average number 
of kilometres that patients travelled to hospitals in this sample increased slightly 
over time, from 13.48 kilometres in 2006 to 16.40 kilometres in 2011 (table 1).6 The 
majority of patients did not travel far, though there were some outliers. Graph 2 shows 
the distribution of patients travelling 0–20 km, 20–40 km, 40–60 km and 60+ km; 
approximately 80 per cent attended a hospital within a 20-kilometre range, 15 per cent 
travelled 20 to 40 kilometres and very few travelled over 40 kilometres. In the total 
sample, 37 per cent of patients bypassed the closest hospital; of those who attended the 
top-performing hospital, 88 per cent had bypassed the closest hospital. 
Graph 2. Distance travelled for cataract treatment (by distance category) 
3.2. Estimation method
Aggregate-level analysis
At the aggregate level, we used a simple ordinary least-squares (OLS) model to estimate 
the effect of quality on patient volume for the years 2008–2011. Similarly to Pope 
(2009) [3], the model is estimated as follows: 
5 Another possible way to estimate patient travelling would have been in the time required 
to reach the hospital. Varkevisser and Van der Geest [24] used travel time by car between a 
patient’s postcode and the hospital postcode. Actual travel time would depend on the route and 
accessibility of public transport. Given that the Netherlands is a densely populated country with 
a good infrastructure, we felt that distance in kilometres would roughly correspond to distance 
in travelling time, especially for people travelling greater distances.
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Y
i,t
 represents the total number of cataract treatments carried out at hospital i, in year t. 
Variable w
i,t
 is the average annual waiting time in weeks for hospital i in year t. The 
term Q
i,t-1
 is a vector of lagged ophthalmologist quality and lagged overall quality of 
hospital i.7 The overall hospital quality scores for 2007–2010 were used as lagged 
quality scores for the years 2008–2011. Since we did not have ophthalmologist 
quality scores for all years for use in the regression, we used the 2008 quality scores 
as a proxy for the lagged quality indicator for 2008 and the 2009 quality scores as 
a proxy for the lagged quality indicator for 2011. Year dummies, g
t
 , were included 
to capture year-specific effects. Fortunately, the annual variation of hospital quality 
was limited, making these proxies fairly reliable.8 To explore the extent to which 
the effect of ophthalmologist quality on patient volume may have been driven by 
the top-performing hospital, we repeated the regression after omitting the top- 
performing hospital.
 
Our OLS model had two potential limitations. First, it did not control for differences 
between hospitals; we therefore ran a fixed-effects model to control for unobserved 
provider differences such as number of specialists, available resources and spare capacity 
[29]. Second, our OLS model did not allow for inclusion of the distance variable; the 
analysis was therefore continued with a patient choice model at the individual level. 
Individual-level analysis
For the individual-level analysis we employed a mixed logit model, which is generally 
used to model hospital choice on a patient level [10]. It enabled us to analyse how 
patients make trade-offs between quality, distance and waiting time. A mixed logit 
model is more flexible than a conditional logit model because it allowed for random 
taste variation, unrestricted substitution patterns and correlation in unobserved factors 
over time [30]. Under a mixed logit model, the parameters associated with each observed 
variable are not fixed, but allow for variation at the patient level. A conditional logit 
model assumes fixed parameters; differences in preferences are related to observed 
characteristics of the patient and are captured through the inclusion of interaction 




 represents the explanatory variables quality, distance and waiting time. The 
error term e
i,q,t 
is also unobserved and is assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed. Parameter b’
i,t
 is a vector of coefficients and is unobserved. Parameter b’
i,t
 
is treated as a random parameter and is integrated over all its possible values of b, then 
7 Some studies [4, 7, 8] inserted the absolute values of quality and others [3] used rankings. 
8 Indeed, we found a strong correlation of 72 per cent for lagged ophthalmologist quality scores 
in the years 2009 and 2010.
weighted by the density of b to obtain the unconditional choice probability, P
i,q,t
, of 
person i choosing hospital q in year t.
Our dataset consisted of 854,613 patients who were free to choose from 150 hospital 
locations. Unfortunately, a mixed logit model could not be computed with a data set of 
this format. We therefore reduced the dataset by confining ourselves to the years 2009 
and 2010 and by restricting the patients’ choice set. The set was reduced to the years 
2009 and 2010, because the lagged ophthalmologist quality indicator was available for 
these two years only. The individual hospital choice set was restricted to the 20 closest 
hospitals; thus, instead of having all hospitals in the choice set for all patients, we 
composed a choice set of the 20 closest hospitals for every individual, allowing for larger 
choice sets did not significantly alter the results, as the majority of the patients’ choices 
were amongst the closest 20 hospitals.9 These two restrictions resulted in 2,996,205 
patient–hospital combinations in the years 2009 and 2010 for use in the estimations. 
 
To ascertain whether people had a stronger preference for the top-performing hospital, 
we estimated the model twice, first with quality in linear form and then with quality 
dummies to allow for non-linear effects. The average score for the ophthalmologist 
quality variable in the years 2009 and 2010 was used as the quality indicator. Quality 
dummies were created for every 10-point interval up to 70–80 (as all scores were below 
80); quality dummy 0–10 was excluded to avoid multicollinearity. In both regressions, 
all coefficients were assumed to be normally distributed. 
 
In addition, the literature highlights a non-linear effect of distance whereby the 
negative utility of having to travel an additional kilometre would be expected to decline 
with growing distance. To take this non-linearity into account, we incorporated the 
following distance dummies: 0–20 km, 20–40 km, 40–60 km, 60–80 km, 80–100 km 
and 100+ km (with the last dummy variable again excluded from the regression to avoid 
multicollinearity).
 
For comparison, both regressions were also run using a conditional logit model, which 
serves as a good comparison to the mixed logit, as it generally yields similar results. The 
9 Sivey [25] and Howard [12] used a similar approach, restricting the choice set to the closest 
10 hospitals. We opted for a larger choice set, because one focus of this study was on the top-
performing hospital (for which patients were willing to travel further). When patients’ choices 
fell outside their own choice set, the mixed logit model was not able to estimate their preferences 
and they had to be dropped from the sample. Restricting the choice set to 20 hospitals eliminated 
only 2 per cent of all patients and only 7 per cent of those attending the top-performing hospital, 
whereas restricting it to the closest 10 hospitals would have eliminated 5 per cent of patients and 
18 per cent of those at the top-performing hospital. 
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mixed logit is preferred because it relaxes the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption, and it generally yields more precise estimates, though the coefficients tend 
to be of similar size [31]. 
4. Results 
Table 2a shows the correlation matrix of the hospital-level variables: patient volume, 
waiting time, ophthalmologist quality and hospital quality. Both quality variables were 
positively correlated with patient volume, but ophthalmologist quality showed a much 
stronger correlation than overall hospital quality, 47 and 15 per cent respectively. The 
correlation between the two quality variables was fairly low (12 per cent), indicating a 
large variation in quality across different specialties in hospitals. Table 2b shows the 
correlation matrix after exclusion of the top-performing hospital; the correlation of 
patient volume with ophthalmologist quality was then reduced by nearly half, from 47 
to 26 per cent, whereas the correlation with hospital quality receded only slightly, from 
15 to 13 per cent. Waiting time and patient volume are negatively correlated in both 
tables, implying that hospitals with longer waiting times experienced somewhat lower 
patient volumes. Waiting time is also negatively correlated with both quality indicators, 
suggesting that better quality hospitals generally had lower waiting times. 
Table 2a. Correlation matrix in cataract treatment: Patient volume, waiting time and quality





Waiting time -0.1778 1.0000
Ophthalmologist quality 0.4748 -0.1434 1.0000
Overall hospital quality 0.1518 -0.1144 0.1176 1.0000
Table 2b. Correlation matrix in cataract treatment: Patient volume, waiting time and quality 
(excluding top-performing hospital)





Waiting time -0.1587 1.0000
Ophthalmologist quality 0.2568 -0.1153 1.0000
Overall hospital quality 0.1259 -0.1087 0.0841 1.0000
4.1. Aggregate-level results
Table 3 shows the aggregate-level results in terms of the impact of quality on patient 
volume. The first two columns represent the analysis based on all hospitals, with and 
without inclusion of overall hospital quality (columns 2 and 1 respectively). The two 
columns show that ophthalmologist quality was positively correlated with patient 
volume. In the years 2008 and 2009, a one-point increase in ophthalmologist quality 
(on a scale of 1–100) resulted in approximately 57 and 64 more patients, respectively, 
for the average hospital, translating into a patient volume increase of 4 per cent. Over 
time, this impact diminished somewhat: in 2010 and 2011, a one-point increase in 
ophthalmologist quality was associated with a patient volume increase of about 
2 per cent. Column 2 shows the results after addition of overall hospital quality to 
the regression. The results show that overall hospital quality is insignificant. Overall 
hospital quality does also not appear to affect the results for ophthalmologist quality, as 
the effect of ophthalmologist quality on patient volume is similar in columns 1 and 2. 
The remaining indicator, waiting time, was significantly and negatively associated with 
patient volume: an increase in waiting time by one week resulted in 66 fewer patients, 
or a patient volume decline of 4 per cent for the average hospital. 
 
The same analysis was then repeated after omission of the top-performing hospital 
from the regression, with results shown in columns 3 and 4. A comparison of columns 
1 and 2 with columns 3 and 4 indicates that the positive effect of quality on patient 
volume was driven largely by the top-performing hospital. After it was eliminated from 
the sample, the effect of ophthalmologist quality on patient volume was halved, and in 
2010 and 2011 it was no longer significant. In 2008 and 2009, a one-point increase in 
ophthalmologist quality would now result in 27 and 28 more patients, which translates 
into a patient volume increase of about 2 per cent).
In addition to the OLS model, a fixed-effects model (not reported here) was also 
estimated using the same variables. In the fixed-effects model none of the variables 
turned out significant.10
10 Results are available on request. The fixed-effects model yielded non-significant outcomes because 
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Table 3. Patient volume, ophthalmologist quality and overall hospital quality 
All hospitals Without top-performing hospital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ophthalmologist quality 2008 56.56***          
(10.35)
52.96***             
(10.84)
33.76**         
(11.23) 
27.09*          
(11.64)
Ophthalmologist quality 2009 63.93***       
(11.44)
61.43***              
(11.73)
31.90*             
(12.97)
27.95*              
(13.09)
Ophthalmologist quality 2010 34.08***        
(9.08)
35.55***             
(9.64)
15.67             
(10.74)
14.40              
(11.45)
Ophthalmologist quality 2011 34.07***             
(9.21) 
32.77**         
(9.73)
5.69              
(11.03)
1.06          
(11.61)
Overall hospital quality 2008 18.40           
(38.28)
13.85           
(34.73)
Overall hospital quality 2009 43.62          
(39.71)
39.49           
(36.02)
Overall hospital quality 2010 -47.56            
(59.58)
-48.57         
(54.04)
Overall hospital quality 2011 25.61             
(44.88)
38.94                        
(40.81)
Waiting time -66.11***            
(15.24)
-66.75***       
(16.96)
-64.60***         
(14.11)
-65.68***            
(15.12)
N 317 284 313 280
adjusted R2 .27 .26 .10 .08
1) Year dummies are not presented here.
2) * Significant at p < .05; ** significant at p < .01; *** significant at p < .001.
3) Sample sizes in columns 2 and 4 are smaller because the overall hospital quality indicator was 
missing for 33 hospitals. 
4.2. Individual-level results
Individual-level results are presented in table 4. For every variable, the mean and 
standard error of the coefficient are shown in the first row. The second row shows the 
value of the standard deviation of the coefficient and the corresponding standard error.
Table 4, column 1, confirms the aggregate-level findings in that people prefer quality and 
hospitals that are associated with lower waiting times. The indicator of ophthalmologist 
quality was positive (0.032) and statistically significant. The mean coefficient on 
waiting time was negative (-0.01) and statistically significant. The individual-level results 
further suggest that patients preferred hospitals that were close by and that the effect 
of distance on hospital choice was non-linear. The mean coefficient on the distance 
dummies grew smaller as distance grew larger; for example, people preferred hospitals 
within a range of 0–20 kilometres as opposed to 20–40 kilometres, with corresponding 
mean coefficients of 7.50 and 4.53. The gap between the coefficients narrowed as 
distance grew (7.50 - 4.53 > 4.53 - 2.22 > 2.22 - 1.19), implying that the negative utility 
derived from having to travel an additional kilometre declined with distance.
 
Although the quality and distance indicators could not be interpreted individually, 
the willingness to travel for quality could be estimated. This was done by comparing 
the utility derived from quality with that derived from distance: the coefficient on 
ophthalmologist quality was .032, and the difference between the utility gained from 
choosing a hospital within 0–20 kilometres, as opposed to 20–40 kilometres, was 2.97 
(7.50 − 4.53). This suggests that patients valued a hospital within the 0–20-kilometre 
range 9 times more than a hospital with a 10-point higher quality score. In other words, 
for every ten patients, one patient would choose to travel 20 to 40 kilometres for a 
10-point quality gain, whilst the other nine patients would attend a hospital within 
20 kilometres. The results also allow us to calculate, more specifically, how many 
additional kilometres patients were willing to travel for a one-point quality increase. 
For example, if a hospital were located within 20 kilometres, the negative utility for 
travelling an additional kilometre was 2.97 ÷ 20 = 0.15. This implies that patients were 
willing to travel 0.032 ÷ 0.15 = 0.2 kilometre extra for a one-point increase in quality.
 
Table 4, column 2, suggests that people had strong preferences for the top-performing 
hospital, but appeared indifferent between the remaining hospitals. The coefficient 
mean on ophthalmologist quality scores of 70–80 (2.53) was more than twice those 
of the remaining quality dummies, suggesting that patients had a stronger preference 
for the top-performing hospital. As the coefficient means on the remaining quality 
dummies were similar (0.80, 0.90, 1.09 and 0.87), patients appeared indifferent 
between these hospitals. . Hospitals falling in these categories were however preferred 
over hospitals in the reference group (ophthalmologist quality 0–10). 
 
Patients showed moderate variation in making trade-offs when choosing a hospital. 
For some variables, the standard deviation of the coefficient was significant, implying 
patient heterogeneity. More specifically, column 2 indicates patient heterogeneity for 
hospitals with quality scores ranging between 70–80 and of 30–40; for the remaining 
quality categories, patient heterogeneity was not significant. Nor did patients vary 
significantly in how they valued distance (excepting the distance dummy of 0–20 km 
in the first regression).
The results of the conditional logit analysis that we performed as a robustness check 
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Table 4. Mixed logit estimates of associations between ophthalmologist quality, distance to hospital 
and waiting time
(1) (2)
Parameter Value (SE) Value (SE)
Ophthalmologist quality Mean of coefficient 0.032*** (.00)
SD of coefficient 0.01*** (.00)
Ophthalmologist quality 
70–80
Mean of coefficient 2.53*** (.02)
SD of coefficient 0.70*** (.05)
Ophthalmologist quality 
50–60 
Mean of coefficient 0.80*** (.04)
SD of coefficient 0.20 (.13)
Ophthalmologist quality 
30–40
Mean of coefficient 0.90*** (.02)
SD of coefficient 0.96*** (.03)
Ophthalmologist quality 
20–30 
Mean of coefficient 1.09*** (.01)
SD of coefficient 0.01 (.02)
Ophthalmologist quality 
10–20 
Mean of coefficient 0.87*** (.01)
SD of coefficient 0.01 (.01)
Distance 0–20 km Mean of coefficient 7.50*** (.06) 7.54*** (.06)
SD of coefficient 0.11** (.04) 0.00 (.01)
Distance 20–40 km Mean of coefficient 4.53*** (.05) 4.55*** (.06)
SD of coefficient 0.02 (.02) 0.00 (.01)
Distance 40–60 km Mean of coefficient 2.22*** (.06) 2.26*** (.06)
SD of coefficient 0.18 (.10) 0.05 (.03)
Distance 60–80 km Mean of coefficient 1.19*** (.06) 1.25*** (.06)
SD of coefficient 0.07 (.06) 0.02 (.05)
Waiting time Mean of coefficient -0.01*** (.00) -0.02*** (.00)
SD of coefficient -0.00 (.00) 0.00 (.00)
Log likelihood -242,184 -240,920
N of observations 2,665,880 2,665,880
1) Year dummies are not presented here.
2) * Significant at p < .05; ** significant at p < .01; *** significant at p < .001
 
5. Discussion and conclusions
This paper explores trends in quality on hospital volume and hospital choice. Both 
the aggregate-level and our individual-level results suggest that quality had a positive 
impact on volume and hospital choice, similar to previous studies [3-5, 7, 10, 13, 
14]. The positive effect was non-linear, with the top-performing hospital attracting 
significantly more patients than would be expected based on linear quality differences. 
In contrast, some previous studies found non-linear effects whereby patient volume for 
poorly performing providers declined after quality reporting but failed to increase for 
high-quality providers [6, 16–18]. Those findings may have been related to the types of 
treatment and quality variables considered. For example, Cutler and colleagues [16], 
Dranove and Sfekas [18] and Wang and colleagues [17] all relied on mortality rates for 
cardiac care. As the risk and severity of complications for such complex treatment are 
likely to be higher than those for the relatively simple cataract treatments we studied 
here, people might be more sensitive to quality differences in the bottom market segment 
and respond by avoiding poor performers. Mennemeyer and colleagues [6] showed that 
available information about mortality rates that diverged from patients’ expectations 
did not significantly alter market shares, whilst media reports of unexpected deaths 
had a significant negative impact. The negative information on unexpected deaths may 
have driven patients away, a phenomenon again reflected in the bottom segment of 
the market only. The distributions of the quality variables may have also been different 
in other studies. Our results suggest a strong impact at the top of the hospital market 
because our dataset contained a clear outlier in the upper segment, whereas the datasets 
used in other studies may not have contained such outliers. 
 
Our findings suggest moderate variation in how patients make trade-offs. Patients 
tended either to value quality and choose the top-performing hospital, or they chose 
the nearest hospital. Although the top-performing hospital in our study had attracted 
many people living further away, patients appeared over the years to be increasingly 
travelling further to other hospitals as well. We cannot explain this new trend in the 
market on the basis of our limited dataset, but the implication may be that other aspects, 
such as marketing, newly available quality measures11 or enhanced competition, have 
played a role. For example, the liberalisation of the Dutch hospital market has led to 
more specialization of hospitals, and new clinics have also entered the market.
 
Health care quality has many different dimensions and in many countries increasing 
efforts are being undertaken to measure quality. Yet that is a slow process, and reliable 
output quality indicators are still not available for many hospital treatments. Our 
research incorporated two quality indicators: one for overall hospital quality and one 
for specialism-specific quality. The two indicators may not fully reflect the underlying 
quality of hospital; they may also reflect hospital reputation. We employed them 
11 The fact that Elsevier altered its quality indicators could have had a negative impact on the 
market position of the top-performing hospital. In addition, an increasing number of other 
quality indicators have become available in recent years. The Dutch website www.kiesbeter.nl, 
for instance, collects and publishes quality indicators. These are process indicators such as how 
a patient values communication with ophthalmologists and nurses and communication about 
medicines. We also tested whether patient choice was related to these process indicators. Although 
we do not report the results here, we found very weak positive correlations with hospital choice 
for two process indicators only, whilst a third indicator, communication with ophthalmologists, 
was weakly and negatively correlated with hospital choice. Over the years of our study, these 
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because they were available to the public. Some patients may have actually used that 
information in choosing a hospital; others may have obtained recommendations from 
general practitioners. Hence, our results may also be partly explained by other hospital 
attributes (such as reputation) or by quality information from other sources (such as 
general practitioners), which may, in turn, be intercorrelated with the quality indicators 
we used. Unfortunately, the ophthalmology-specific (lagged) quality indicator was 
available for 2009 and 2010 only. As a result, in our individual-level analyses we could 
only include those two years, and in our aggregate-level analyses we had to use proxies 
for the remaining years. That weakened our ability to interpret the effects of quality on 
volume and patient choice.
 
In addition, with respect to the ophthalmologist quality indicators, the top-performing 
hospital formed a clear outlier that largely drove the results. This requires caution 
in interpreting our results, which may be very market-specific. Moreover, the quality 
variable in question was based on a survey and it probably incorporates other quality 
aspects besides reputation, such as outcome, process and structural quality indicators. 
Since the survey results were based on the opinions of GPs and other medical 
specialists, the indicator may also be positively correlated with referral patterns (as 
survey respondents may have provided referrals themselves). A limitation of this 
variable is therefore that differences in quality scores are difficult to interpret; since 
cataract treatment is relatively easy to perform, differences in medical outcomes are 
likely to be small. However, the fact that the top-performing hospital was a clear outlier 
is confirmed by its reputation; it has acquired the status of centre of excellence and has 
recently received several additional awards for its quality.
 
Because our dataset was too large for conducting a mixed logit model, we were forced 
to make decisions with respect to reducing the sample size. We restricted the choice set 
to the 20 closest hospitals for every patient involved; allowing for larger choice sets did 
not significantly alter the results. 
 
Whether a ‘winner-takes-most’ strategy is applicable to other types of medical 
procedures would probably depend on the nature of the treatment and on specific 
market characteristics. Our findings suggest that for relatively standard cataract 
treatments it is possible to become a dominant player in the market. However, for some 
medical procedures a winner-takes-all strategy may be less appropriate. For example, 
in the market for kidney transplantation, the availability of transplant organs is an 
important factor, and for emergency treatment the ready accessibility of care may be 
foremost. A winner-takes-most strategy may be more rewarding for chronic diseases, as 
the patients involved may be more sensitive to quality differences. Further research is 
needed to explore whether a winner-takes-most phenomenon, as we have observed in 
Dutch cataract treatment, occurs in other specialisms as well. 
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Distance
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     20–40 km 4.51*** (.06) 4.47***  (.06)
     40–60 km 2.22*** (.06) 2.22*** (.06)
     60–80 km 1.18*** (.06) 1.21*** (.06)
Waiting time -.01*** (.001) -.01*** (.001)
Log likelihood -242,203 -241,138
N of observations 2,665,880 2,665,880
1) Year dummies are not presented here.
2) * Significant at p < .05; ** significant at p < .01; ***significant at p < .001
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This thesis has explored how the purchasing of health care can promote the three system 
goals in the Dutch health care system: quality, affordability and accessibility of care. We 
first investigated current contracting practice in the health care purchasing market for 
two of the largest care sectors, specialist medical care and behavioural health care. 
Second, we drew upon experiences with the purchasing of care abroad and investigated 
what aspects of contracting contributed to quality and affordability there. We focused 
on quality and affordability, because the Netherlands has historically scored well in 
terms of accessibility [1]. Given that health care is local and highly context-dependent, 
we investigated how the key drivers behind quality improvement and cost containment 
could translate to the Dutch setting. Third, we explored how patients choose a health 
care provider on the health care provision market, and more specifically what role 
quality plays in their choice of providers. These aims were translated into the following 
six research questions:
Research questions related to the health care purchasing market
1. What are the key elements of current contracting practice for hospital-based 
care in the Netherlands? (chapter 2)
2. What elements would an optimal provider–payer contracting strategy have? 
Balancing customisation and transaction costs in contracting care (chapter 3)
3. What elements are involved in the purchasing and contracting process for 
specialist medical care? (chapter 4)
4. What is the role of health insurers in a managed competition model? (chapter 
4)
5. What can we learn from provider–payer contracting experiences abroad? 
(chapter 5)
Research question related to the health care provision market
6. To what extent do patients take quality into consideration in choosing health 
care providers? (chapter 6)
In this final chapter, we first summarise our key findings in response to these six research 
questions (section 2). In section 3, ‘Reflections on the Key Findings’, we discuss the 
findings in a broader context in terms of the three goals of the health care system: 
quality, affordability and accessibility. Section 4 provides some policy recommendations 
for the Dutch health care system. Considerations for further research are discussed in 
section 5 and the limitations of the study in section 6. This chapter ends with some 
concluding remarks in section 7.
2. Key findings
2.1. What are the key elements of current contracting practice for hospital-based 
care in the Netherlands?
As from 2006, Dutch private insurers purchase care from health care providers; prior to 
that, the government was responsible for allocating budgets. On the basis of our findings 
on the purchasing of specialist medical care in 2012 (chapter 2), we observed that 
providers were contracted mostly on the basis of either a global budget (plafondafspraak) 
or a lump-sum payment (aanneemsom). Under a global budget arrangement, providers 
were reimbursed for claims up to a certain threshold. Under a lump-sum arrangement, 
providers received a fixed payment for a specific time period irrespective of volume. 
Some smaller providers were contracted on a fee-for-service (FFS) basis. The selective 
contracting of providers was rare. Rather, selective contracting took place at the disease 
level, meaning that the respective treatments were only eligible for reimbursement if 
the providers met certain standards such as minimum volume norms.
 
Contracts also included arrangements to control the quality and the volume of care. 
For example, placing a volume cap on a set of treatments was for example used to 
contain volume levels. Contracts tended to adopt quality indicators from professional 
organisations (beroepsgroepen) and some insurers introduced their own quality 
indicators. Nonetheless, in the 2012 contracts quality still appeared to play a minor 
role. Most contracts were for a period of one year, though multiple-year contracts were 
also employed. Contracts tended to be incomplete, allowing for renegotiation under 
specific circumstances, such as unanticipated changes in volume levels. 
2.2. What elements would an optimal provider–payer contracting strategy have? 
Balancing customisation and transaction costs in contracting care
In chapter 3 we explored how payers make trade-offs in tailoring contract design and 
the associated transaction costs in the purchasing of behavioural health care services. 
Health care providers vary in terms of attributes such as size, revenue levels and care 
types. Such differences may give reason to conclude divergent provider–payer contracts 
with a variety of associated incentives. Since larger providers may be able to take on 
higher levels of financial risk than smaller providers, for example, a large provider 
may be allocated a global budget, whereas a smaller provider receives a fee-for-service 
contract). Adjusting contract design to specific provider characteristics does entail 
additional transaction costs, however, so the optimal contracting strategy would 
embody careful trade-offs in terms of the degree of provider-level customisation and 
the associated transaction costs. 
 
For the purchasing of behavioural health care, private insurers were found to adopt 
their own purchasing strategies. These resulted in more payer-level than provider-




to the design of the financial budget (for instance, the number of sub-budgets) and 
performance incentives (for instance, the number of fee increments). 
 
To realise some of the benefits of tailored contracts, payers may offer different templates 
to different provider groups. Providers falling into different groups may thus be subject 
to different contract templates that rely on characteristics such as revenue levels or 
provider type. Negotiations may lead to a further fine-tuning of contract design, 
although payers may choose to negotiate face to face only with larger providers that 
have revenue levels beyond a certain threshold. 
 
We concluded that insurers do make trade-offs between transaction costs and 
customisation in the sense that (1) they offer providers group-level customisation and 
(2) for further fine-tuning of the contracts they tend to negotiate face to face with large 
providers only. 
2.3. What elements are involved in the purchasing and contracting process for 
specialist medical care? 
In chapter 4 we analysed the purchasing process for specialist medical care based on 
reviewing the literature and interviews with providers and insurance officials. We 
distinguished the purchasing cycle into four phases: (1) the purchasing strategy, (2) 
the provider–payer negotiations, (3) monitoring and (4) reconciliations. Affordability, 
volume and quality were frequently mentioned themes in the purchasing of care. In 
the vision and mission statements of individual insurers, included in their purchasing 
documents, various strategies were designed to proactively manage quality, affordability 
and volume. In the provider–payer negotiations, however, insurers experienced 
practical difficulties in fulfilling some of those goals. For example, incorporating quality 
indicators proved challenging, because many existing indicators were not considered 
suitable for use in purchasing care. Realising volume shifts from one provider to 
another was challenging when that would be at the expense of another provider that 
was averse to accepting a correlative decline in its budget. Moreover, exerting rigorous 
control via budgets was not always desirable or easy in an unpredictable environment, 
so that reconciliations sometimes took place. 
2.4. What is the role of health insurers in a managed competition model? 
To lay down the insurers’ role in a system of regulated competition, we studied Alain 
Enthoven’s theoretical model of regulated competition and then went on to analyse the 
role of health insurers specifically for the Dutch system. We did this by identifying the 
tasks for insurers as laid down in the Dutch Health Insurance Act and the Negotiators’ 
Agreement on Specialist Medical Care in 2014–2017, as concluded additionally in 
2013 by the umbrella organisations of providers and insurers together with the Dutch 
health ministry. From Enthoven’s theoretical model we determined that the following 
players occupy key roles: the sponsor (which might be an employer, a government entity 
or a health insurance purchasing cooperative), the health plans and the consumers [2]. 
Enthoven envisaged the following roles for the sponsor: establishing equity, selecting 
health plans, organising the process of enrolment, creating demand that is price-elastic 
and managing risk selection [2].
 
The Dutch system proved to be structured rather differently, starting with a different 
set of players: insurers, providers and consumers. In that system, insurers were expected 
to purchase care based on quality at an affordable price on behalf of their insured 
populations. Their statutory tasks included an acceptance obligation (acceptatieplicht), 
a duty of care (zorgplicht), avoidance of premium differentiation, transparency in 
insurance policies, financial accountability in accordance with sector standards and 
invoice monitoring [3]. The Negotiators’ Agreement on Specialist Medical Care 
included additional measures such as an expense cap for specialist care and a shift 
towards result based payment [4]. 
2.5. What can we learn from provider–payer contracting experiences abroad?
This research question was addressed by drawing on experiences in one of the largest-
scale payment reforms in health care, the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) in 
Massachusetts (chapter 5). The AQC has been linked to both reductions in cost growth 
and improvements in quality as compared to a control group [5]. 
 
We determined that the key driver behind the quality improvement and cost growth 
reduction was that health care providers were willing and able to work proactively in 
the interest of quality and affordability. Factors that contributed to that willingness 
included the incentives stemming from the payment model design, the prospectively 
defined population and leadership. The ability to proactively manage patients was 
facilitated by required referrals from primary care providers and the availability of 
data (on quality, prices, patients’ whereabouts and other matters). Finally, insurer 
commitment fostered both the incentives and the ability to work proactively. 
 
Issues to consider in implementing such a reform would start with generous, long-term 
contracts, a focus on getting the strongest providers on board first, and the large-scale 
implementation of the reform. However, because health care is local, similar payment 
reforms in other countries or regions might not necessarily yield the same results as 
the AQC in Massachusetts. Factors that might impede successful implementation 
in such contexts are difficulties with prospectively defining insured populations and 
with assigning a primary care doctor to every patient, as well as unfavourable market 
structures, legislation and regulations. Such factors form potential hindrances to patient 




2.6. To what extent do patients take quality into consideration in choosing health 
care providers?
In our analysis in provider choice and hospital volume levels for cataract treatments 
(see chapter 6), we found that the patients with cataracts took quality into account in 
their provider choice. We used two different indicators for quality: a hospital quality 
indicator and a quality indicator for the ophthalmology specialism. The analysis showed 
that patients were more responsive to the specialism-specific quality indicator than to 
the overall hospital indicator. 
 
Moreover, it emerged that patients were especially responsive to a single top-performing 
hospital but were more or less indifferent between the remaining hospitals (though 
they did avoid hospitals in the lowest segment). We conclude that patients were willing 
to travel for high quality but were evidently less willing to do so for small quality 
differences. Over time, patients that travelled further from home were meanwhile 
increasingly travelling to other hospitals than the top-performing hospital.
3. Reflections on the key findings: Implications for quality, affordability 
and accessibility
In this section we reflect on the common goals of the Dutch health care system: quality, 
accessibility and affordability. Table 1, column 2, summarises the main findings with 
reference to the common goals. In column 3, we list some policy recommendations to 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.1.1. Financial incentives 
Currently, quality plays a minor but growing role in the purchasing of health care in 
the Netherlands. In contract design, that is apparent in provisions such as general 
agreements with respect to quality (such as protocols), entry conditions (eligibility for 
contracts), conditions for selectively contracting certain treatment procedures and the 
use of multiple-year contracts. The threat of selective contracting has exerted some 
pressure to keep quality and volume levels high, and as a result some providers are 
actively seeking opportunities to collaborate with other providers. In addition, some 
insurers have engaged providers to come up with their own list of quality indicators 
and to work on a project basis on improving quality of care. 
 
Quality could play a greater role in contract design. Coupling financial consequences 
to quality indicators would be a major step forward that is worth considering. This 
is also seen in initiatives like the AQC [6], where the shared-savings component is 
linked to quality. In the AQC, quality is defined in 64 quality indicators that form one 
aggregated score. Although it is important to realise that not all aspects of the quality of 
care can be captured in 64 indicators, that does not mean one should abstain altogether 
from linking financial compensation to quality indicators. A fully comprehensive set 
of quality indicators would not be feasible, or even desirable, as the administrative 
burden to providers that would come with such extensive reporting would outweigh 
the benefits. A comprehensive set of indicators is therefore not the goal either, but we 
do want to aim for a quality indicator set that is fit for purpose.
 
In the process of composing and introducing such a set, we may want to consider the 
following. Even though many indicators that are currently being reported on are not 
considered suitable for the purchasing of health care, there are many others to choose 
from (an average hospital reports on a few thousand indicators). Choosing a suitable set 
should therefore be feasible. To create sufficient or widespread support from providers 
in adopting such a set, it might also help to compose a set collectively or to draw 
on indicators that have already been jointly established (the ZN standards are a good 
example of such an initiative). With respect to selecting a set of indicators, focusing on 
the disease burden and incorporating both process and outcome indicators are things 
to keep in mind. Lastly, it is important to realise that introducing a quality indicator 
set is also a process of learning by doing, in which some indicators may gradually turn 
out less suitable and be dropped whilst new ones are incorporated. 
 
Another, more drastic, step forward would be to change to payment models such 
as global payments and bundled payments, in which groups of providers become 
responsible for the quality of care. Such models would replace current practices of 
individually contracting providers based on lump-sum payments or global budgets, as 
is now done for hospitals and behavioural health care providers. Changing the way 
health care is delivered may, however, require heavy investments from the provider side. 
If insurers want to bring about this change, they may need to accommodate providers 
by offering long-term and more generous contracts, at least during the initial phase.
3.1.2. Non-financial incentives
As seen from the insurer BCBS’s experiences with the AQC, non-financial incentives 
may also contribute to provider performance. Providing benchmark information, for 
example, helps providers to get a better grasp on where there is room to improve. 
Providing benchmark information is an important contribution that only the insurer 
can make in the system, as insurers have a unique position with respect to claims 
data. A step further would be to organise events in which providers come together 
to share knowledge about best practice; practitioners may learn about new ways to 
improve care based on experiences from their colleagues. Thus, rather than telling 
practitioners how to improve care, the insurer would take a much more facilitating 
approach, tapping into the intrinsic motivation of health care providers to improve 
care. Gradually, Dutch insurers seem to be adopting such an approach in efforts such 
as working with providers more closely in pilot projects designed to explore how to 
improve care together. Practice variation is increasingly being discussed as well. 
 
In conclusion, it has not been easy to incorporate quality in the purchasing of health 
care, but progress has been made. Additional steps can be taken to stimulate quality 
via contract design, by linking (bonus) payments to quality scores, and by moving on 
to other payment model types in which providers simultaneously hold accountability 
for the quality of care and the budget. The potential impact that a health insurer 
can have goes beyond contract design alone. Providing benchmark information and 
opportunities for practitioners to learn about best practice may also help boost the 
quality of care. 
3.2. Affordability
3.2.1. The difficulty of containing cost growth in a market with uncertainty 
Government and insurers are both employing instruments to contain cost growth in 
health care. The government encourages joint responsibility for curbing health care costs 
in cooperation with insurers and with providers of specialist medical care, behavioural 
health care and primary care [7–10], who are to reach agreements on maximum growth 
rates for segments of care. Such agreements set national growth targets, but they do not 
specify how such targets might translate into growth targets for individual players. They 
thus leave room for some providers to grow or shrink at a faster pace than others. 
Insurers pursue various strategies to steer on affordability as they purchase care. Some 
examples are contracting providers based on a global budget or lump-sum payment, 
reducing price variation, experimenting with new forms of payments, efforts to 




are contracted mostly on the basis of global budgets or lump-sum payments, which 
put ceilings on the total amounts to be reimbursed. Some contracts explicitly refer 
to the growth percentages set out in the administrative outline agreement (bestuurlijk 
hoofdlijnenakkoord or BHA). Insurers also make efforts to reduce price variation so as to 
arrive at more market-consistent prices. They experiment with new forms of payment, 
such as shared savings. And they also create provisions with respect to care activities 
like prescribing drugs. 
 
Although various strategies are attempted, managing affordability can be challenging in 
practice. Whereas an insurer may want to lower costs through substitution, an increase 
in the receiving provider’s budget will be readily accepted, but a corresponding or 
larger cut in the other provider’s budget may be rather daunting. And although most 
larger providers might agree on maximum reimbursements, reconciliations take take 
place if costs turn out higher than the negotiated total. Unanticipated policy changes, 
the introduction of new drugs and other events beyond the providers’ control may have 
an impact on providers costs. Hence, reconciliations may sometimes be in place. That 
does, however, compromise the effectiveness of such payment models in keeping the 
system affordable. 
 
Even though providers tend to be contracted based on global budgets or lump-sum 
payments, and even though administrative outline agreements have put clear maximum 
growth targets in place for specified segments of care, rigorously controlling such 
targets can present a challenge in practice, because there is considerable uncertainty. 
That does not mean such agreements do not help keep the system affordable. They 
do provide some sense of direction. Such effects were apparent in some health care 
contracts, which explicitly referred to the BHA maximum growth target. They were 
also evidenced in the Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer) report that concluded 
that the administrative agreements had likely contributed to cost containment in 
the period 2012–2015 [11]. The existing uncertainty is basically a given in the health 
sector, and that will not be different in the future. Some uncertainty can be reduced 
by keeping the level of policy changes to a minimum, but the health care sector will 
always be subject to a degree of uncertainty. Some contracts now add provisions to 
accommodate potential market shifts, such as modifications in the maximum prices 
set by the Dutch Healthcare Authority, unforeseen hikes in volume or alterations in 
insured populations. Contracts are also increasingly stipulating courses of action in the 
event that unanticipated changes occur. Not everything can be anticipated, however, 
so contractual agreements will to some degree remain prone to ex-post customised 
solutions. 
3.2.2. Introducing more risk to an already unpredictable environment: Waiting for the burning 
platform? 
Payment models associated with higher levels of financial risk for providers may improve 
the affordability of the system. Under such models, providers accept higher levels of 
accountability for performance (be it in terms of quality or efficiency). Introducing 
more risk to providers is not without risk, however. If risks are too high, good-quality 
providers could go bankrupt. Payers are nonetheless increasingly experimenting with 
newer types of payment models, such as bundled payments and global payments, which 
imply higher levels of risk for providers. 
 
In the Netherlands, bundles of care are increasingly being implemented and 
experiments with shared savings are being launched, although on a lesser scale than 
in the United States (where it has been introduced in Medicare). The Dutch health 
insurance company Menzis and some ‘pioneer sites’ are now working with shared 
savings on a project basis [12, 13]. Payment models with even greater levels of risk (such 
as the global payments implemented in Massachusetts) have not been introduced in 
the Netherlands thus far. The burning platform in Massachusetts was perhaps higher 
than it is in the Netherlands, and a next step in payment experimentation may require 
a stronger trigger to bring about change. 
3.3. Accessibility 
3.3.1. Freedom of provider choice is highly valued and expensive, but we hardly make use of it
In the Netherlands, the freedom of patients to choose their doctor is highly valued. 
Even though insurers are allowed to contract health care providers selectively, they are 
required to sufficiently reimburse care from non-contracted providers so that it does 
not form a hindrance to accessing care (hinderpaalcriterium). Debates about reducing 
this reimbursement rate led to a proposal in 2014 to eliminate this hindrance criterion. 
Ultimately, the upper house of Parliament rejected the proposal, as some feared it 
would jeopardise the patients’ freedom to choose their health care providers [14].
 
In practice, we have seen that certain other aspects of contract design could also 
affect the accessibility of care. Although most hospitals were contracted, they were not 
necessarily contracted for the entire spectrum of care. Providers were increasingly seeking 
collaboration, and attempts were being made to concentrate services. If treatment for 
a specific diagnosis had not been contracted at the hospital of choice, patients could 
be required to make copayments, although only a small number of diagnoses were 
affected and the level of co-payment remained relatively low. Some contracts included 
provisions requiring that care delivery be continued even after maximum reimbursable 
levels were reached (doorleverplicht). These might help to preclude an underprovision of 
care if reimbursement ceilings have been negotiated. 
 
Though nearly all hospitals are contracted and much emphasis is put on safeguarding 
provider choice, we found that Dutch patients rarely make use of this privilege in 
practice. Several studies have shown that the majority of patients choose to attend 




cent, respectively, of non-emergency orthopaedic care and neurosurgery care patients 
went to the nearest hospital [15]. Similarly, we have shown in chapter 6 that roughly 75 
to 80 per cent of patients with cataracts chose a hospital within 20 kilometres of home. 
This raises the question of whether we are paying too much for a privilege people seem 
to barely make use of.
In terms of the overall system goals in Dutch health care, we conclude that the 
purchasing market performs rather well in terms of care accessibility. The role of 
quality in the purchasing market is minor but growing, and further steps are needed. 
With regard to the affordability of care, the private market parties had some difficulty 
to rigorously manage health care costs in practice. 
4. Regulating a system of managed competition
4.1. Managing Enthoven’s theoretical model versus managing the Dutch system in 
practice
The Dutch health care system is based on Enthoven’s theoretical model of managed 
competition. Enthoven defined the following set of players: a sponsor (an employer, 
government or purchasing cooperative), a health plan (covering both insurance and 
care provision) and the consumers. The sponsor assumes an important role in the 
system and has the following set of defined tasks: setting rules for equity (such as 
ensuring that everyone is covered and that no premium differentiation exists across 
individuals), managing the enrolment process (for example, giving insured persons the 
option to re-enrol elsewhere; providing information on the level of cover), creating 
price-elastic demand (such as making quality information accessible) and avoiding risk 
selection (for example providing standardised cover; analysing switching behaviour) [2].
 
The Dutch model is structured rather differently. The tasks of insurers overlap to 
some degree with those that Enthoven envisaged for the sponsor, while some other 
sponsor tasks are assumed by government. Insurers, for example, are subject to a duty 
of care and an acceptance obligation. Tasks such as creating a risk adjustment scheme 
have been taken on by government. In addition to the different set of players, another 
fundamental difference is that vertical integration does not exist in the Netherlands, 
and is indeed prohibited. Hence, rather than having competing comprehensive care 
organisations, the Dutch system has opted to have competing insurers and competing 
providers. 
 
To regulate the market, the Netherlands has also chosen a different path. Against 
Enthoven’s recommendation to not introduce government-imposed budget constraints 
on health care spending, the Netherlands has adopted expense caps for specialist medical 
care, behavioural health care and primary care. Enthoven argued that introducing such 
caps could result in denial of care and that it would be difficult to hold onto such 
caps in practice [2]. In case government intervention were needed, he recommended 
instruments targeted at specific goals. The Dutch system is, however, not the only 
health care system based on managed competition that has opted for medical expense 
caps; the state of Massachusetts has also introduced such a cap [16].
 
Given that the Dutch system has been implemented differently from Enthoven’s 
theoretical model, and because the Dutch system now works slightly differently to what 
was envisaged when managed competition was launched, it might now be time to take a 
second look at the Dutch government’s role in the system. On the basis of our findings 
in this thesis about the performance and functioning of the current system, we shall 
now propose some specific considerations for managing the Dutch system in future.
4.2. Policy recommendations for the Dutch health care system
We would draw attention to some key considerations in policy design, providing 
suggestions for each of the declared system goals of quality, affordability and accessibility. 
4.2.1. Quality
Facilitate development of a uniform, and preferably compact, quality indicator set for the 
purpose of health care purchasing.
Currently, as we have seen, the professional associations (beroepsverenigingen) in the 
Dutch health care sector have been developing indicators for specific fields of health 
care, such as cancer care [17] and emergency care [18], in addition to the ZN standards 
established jointly by insurers, providers and patients [19]. This is a step in the 
right direction, and extending such efforts across a broader spectrum of care would 
be desirable. The professional associations are, and will remain, responsible for the 
quality and the respective standards of care in a private system. However, should the 
market parties fail to extend such efforts to the broader spectrum, the government may 
need to step in to promote this by commissioning for example the National Health 
Care Institute (Zorginstituut Nederland) to take on that role. It could appoint a group 
of informal leaders (with authority) that operate across the entire spectrum of care to 
set up a uniform (and preferably compact) quality indicator set that covers a certain 
percentage of the disease burden. 
4.2.2 Affordability
Consider continuing the administrative outline agreements.
The Dutch Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer) has evaluated the impact of the 
administrative outline agreements on curtailing the rise in health care expenditures. It 
focused on the period 2012–2015 and concluded that the financial arrangements in the 
accords probably helped to lower expenditures during that period [20]. New agreements 
have been signed since then, for specialist medical care (for 2014–2017 and 2018) [4, 21], 




The fact that the agreements have contributing to curbing cost growth in the past 
does not automatically mean they will do so in the future, as Erik Schut and his 
colleagues have argued [23]. Growing discontent with negative ramifications such as 
waiting lists and the quality of elder care may make ongoing cost growth reduction less 
likely. The authors also point out that the willingness to support the agreements was 
partially explained by the economic recession prevailing at the time. Despite that, new 
agreements have been signed. It is unclear how long the government should prolong 
that approach, but it does appear to maintain some pressure on the system. 
Keep policy changes to a minimum.
Minimising policy changes would help increase transparency with respect to trends in 
health care volume, prices/costs. Although maintaining policy unchanged is not feasible 
in a changing and unpredictable world, it seems advisable to keep policy change to an 
absolute minimum. Every time a potential change is considered, we would recommend 
that a careful trade-off be made between the micro gain of the policy change and the 
macro loss of increased difficulty to detect trends in cost and volume data. If market 
parties are unable to detect such trends, that makes it more difficult for insurers to 
purchase care effectively in terms of costs and prices and for providers to identify room 
for improvement. 
Assign the task of purchasing care from local authorities back to insurance companies.
We recommend shifting health care purchasing tasks from local councils back to 
insurers, in order to benefit from their greater experience and capacities. The purchasing 
of care is a difficult task that requires expertise, scale and time. Even insurers sometimes 
experience difficulty in getting innovation off the ground. In addition, insurers and 
local authorities have different organisational goals: whereas the insurers’ interest is 
to keep costs down, local authority budgets tend to be based on last year’s costs. The 
spending of one such market party may affect the spending of the other. That would 
warrant either combining the two parties or leaving care purchasing to one party. With 
cost containment high on the agenda, it appears that insurers would be more up to the 
task than are local health authorities. 
Introduce a minimum price difference between insurance product types.
Dutch insurers offer different types of insurance products, but the uptake of insurance 
products that put restrictions on cover remains quite limited [24]. There are roughly 
three types of health care insurance products in the Netherlands: services-in-kind 
policies (naturapolissen), reimbursement policies (restitutiepolissen) and combination 
policies (combinatiepolissen). Under reimbursement policies, all the health care is paid 
for by the insurer; under services-in-kind policies, contracted care is fully reimbursed 
and the majority of expenses for non-contracted care are reimbursed [24]. Combination 
policies include features from both types. The uptake of products that restrict cover 
(in terms of either provider choice or reimbursement rates for non-contracted care) 
has been rising, but it is still rather low – 13.1 per cent in 2017 [24]. To encourage 
uptake of such products, government could impose a minimum price difference 
between insurance products offering roughly the same cover but differing in the level 
of provider choice (as was done in Massachusetts [25]). A higher uptake of such policies 
could give insurers more leverage in negotiations with providers, thereby improving the 
affordability of the system. 
4.2.3. Accessibility
Increase the minimum price difference between contracted and non-contracted care providers.
In the current purchasing market, accessibility of care appears to be high, but Dutch 
patients hardly make use of that privilege. Here lies a chance to reduce cost growth, 
as free choice comes at a price. Increasing the minimum price difference between 
contracted and non-contracted providers would make it more attractive for insurers 
to selectively contract providers. That would create more leverage for insurers in 
negotiations and thereby ultimately strengthen their ability to contain cost growth. 
4.3. Trade-offs in system goals: A political choice
This section has provided several recommendations relating to the three system goals of 
quality, affordability and accessibility. (For an overview of the policy recommendations 
per system goal, see table 1, column 3.) Overall we can conclude that the accessibility 
of care in the purchasing market is rather high and that putting some limitations on 
accessibility would be in favour of the affordability of the system. In the end, though, 
how such trade-offs are made is a political choice.
5. Considerations for future research
Purchasing health care: A gamma science rather than a beta  science
The findings in this thesis suggest that the purchasing of health care is not purely a 
beta science: it is a gamma science. In research, payment models have been addressed 
as rather technical affairs. Although a thorough understanding of different payment 
model types and corresponding incentives is highly valuable, research would also 
benefit from a better understanding of how such incentives translate into practice 
when contracts are incomplete. From interviews with providers and insurers about the 
purchasing of specialist medical care in the Netherlands, we found that prices at the 
product level were sometimes finalised after the contract period had already started, 
and that lump-sum or global-budget arrangements could be subject to reconciliations. 
This calls for a different approach to researching the impact of payment reforms on 
outcomes in health care. A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, 
would be desirable. 
 
Reconciliations are sometimes inevitable, and it is not always clear when to show 




example, an insurer may choose to reconcile, and that may improve the relationship with 
the provider. In the long run, however, it may hamper the insurer’s ability to contain 
cost growth. It is not always clear-cut how the benefits of investing in relationships will 
weigh up against the ability to contain future cost growth. More insights into what 
aspects an insurer should rigorously try to control and when to show leniency may help 
in finding a balance. 
6. Limitations
This thesis is an attempt to gain more insights into the functioning of the health 
care purchasing market in the Netherlands. The system is relatively new, as regulated 
competition was introduced in 2006. Knowledge about regulated competition is still 
rather limited, because few countries have adopted similar systems in recent times. It 
appears that the Dutch system has not yet matured, making it difficult to draw long-
term conclusions. Nonetheless, we hope our research has created better insights into 
the current functioning of the system, thus helping it to progress another step further. 
 
Theoretically a lot is known about types of payment models and the associated 
incentives. However, a contract entails more than financial agreements, and such 
non-financial aspects also affect incentives. That complicates the analysis of incentives 
stemming from contract design. Due to the scarcity of research on contract design in 
practice, there was no clear format on how to analyse such contracts. We therefore built 
our own theoretical framework for contract analysis (chapter 2).
 
We have focused on the purchasing of specialist medical care and behavioural health 
care. That was a deliberate choice, as those two segments represent a large share of 
Dutch health care costs. We examined the types of contractual agreements in those 
segments in terms of quality and financial arrangements, and we analysed the process 
of purchasing care. Given that care segments tend to show variations in respects such 
as types of care and the size and number of providers in the market, the lessons we 
have drawn from the purchasing of specialist medical care and behavioural health care 
are not necessarily transferable to other care segments. The role that quality plays in 
the purchasing of care, or even the purchasing process itself, could be very different for 
primary care than for an area like specialist medical care. 
 
Our research therefore had limitations that stemmed largely from our position at 
the front line of the functioning of a regulated health care system. At the same time, 
this relatively unexplored field granted us the opportunity to contribute to a better 
understanding of the functioning and potential of the Dutch health care system. 
7. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this thesis was to explore how the purchasing of health care can contribute 
to quality improvement, cost containment and accessibility in the Dutch health care 
system. That system is based on Enthoven’s model of managed competition. We found 
that the Dutch health care system is not an exact replica of that model and that some 
assumptions made in the model are challenged by the findings in this thesis. 
 
The Dutch purchasing market performs well when it comes to the accessibility of care, 
but with respect to quality and affordability it appears difficult for health insurers to 
assume a directive role. They have taken on a more facilitating role instead. It seems 
that, in the current system, aspects such as benchmark information and provider–
provider and insurer–provider collaboration play important roles in the functioning 
of the system, where both quality and cost containment are high on the agenda. These 
are significant contributions an insurer can bring to the system, and they cannot 
be delivered by a government-based purchasing party. Government does, however, 
continue to play an important role in the system, maybe an even more important role 
than was foreseen when the system was introduced. 
 
The Dutch managed competition system does not work as initially envisaged. After ten 
years of implementing managed competition, progress has been made, but the system 
has still not matured. It takes a lot of time for a health care system to converge into a 
well-functioning system, but we are on our way. A significant lesson that derives from 
this thesis is that more is possible within the current system, and that an optimally 
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Average per capita expenditure for health care has been rising in OECD countries in 
recent decades (2001–2014), although at varying paces [1]. The way in which health 
care providers are paid for their work is increasingly seen in many countries as a strategy 
to contain cost growth while creating incentives to improve the quality of care. Some 
countries have focused on engaging market forces and have implemented some form of 
regulated competition [2]. It was introduced in the Netherlands in 2006 in the form of 
three markets: the health care provision market, the health care purchasing market and 
the health care insurance market. This thesis investigates how the Dutch health care 
purchasing market can further the government-defined health system goals of quality, 
affordability and accessibility.
 
In chapter 2 we analyse provider–payer contracts on the basis of economic contract 
theory, focusing in particular on the principal–agent theory, the transaction cost theory 
and the property rights approach. We define six contract characteristics based on those 
theories: the allocation of property rights, contract duration, incentive alignment, 
the degree of contract completeness, risk allocation and protective measures. This 
framework is then used to analyse provider–payer contracts concluded in 2012 for the 
provision of medical specialist care. It emerges that contract duration was relatively 
short, that quality played a minor role in contract design, and that contracts were 
relatively incomplete, leaving room to renegotiate during the course of the contract. 
 
Chapter 3 explores how payers make trade-offs in provider-tailored contract design and 
the associated transaction costs in purchasing behavioural health care. The analysis is 
based on the insurers’ purchasing strategies for behavioural health care and a selection 
of provider–payer contracts signed in 2014 and 2015. Variation in contract design is 
found to be largely explained by differences across payers, as opposed to differences 
across providers. Payers may, however, adopt differing contracting strategies vis-à-vis 
different groups of providers (based on attributes such as provider revenue levels, 
provider type and provider quality). This allowed for a degree of customised contract 
design at relatively low transaction costs. Negotiations could lead to further refinement 
of contract design. Here, too, payers might make trade-offs, deciding, for example, to 
not necessarily pursue face-to-face negotiations with all providers, but rather to focus 
on certain groups, such as those exceeding a certain revenue level. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the role of health care insurers in the purchasing market. We 
analyse first the insurers’ roles in a system of regulated competition based on Alain 
Enthoven’s theoretical model of managed competition; we subsequently describe the 
insurers’ statutory tasks as laid down in the Dutch Health Insurance Act. We then 
explore how insurers were fulfilling their role in practice by drawing on vision and 
mission statements of individual insurers and by conducting interviews with several 
insurers and hospitals. It emerges that the tasks assigned to the insurers in the Dutch 
system showed a degree of overlap with the tasks Enthoven had envisaged for the 
sponsor. Although Dutch insurers performed well in fulfilling their statutory tasks, 
they experienced practical difficulties in meeting the expectations with respect to 
purchasing care based on price and quality. We conclude that insurers might need to 
be given more latitude and that the insurers’ role might need to be reconsidered. In 
addition, the role of government in the Dutch system is probably greater than would be 
expected from the theoretical model, particularly in terms of facilitating target setting 
and putting pressure on the system. 
 
In chapter 5 we analyse the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) developed by the 
insurance company Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts in the United States. The 
AQC is one of the foremost innovations with respect to provider–payer contracting in 
health care. Overall, AQC groups were associated with higher quality improvements and 
lower cost growth than non-AQC groups [3]. We identify the key drivers of its success 
and draw transferable lessons for implementing similar payment reforms in other 
settings. We show that providers under AQCs were able and willing to steer patients to 
high-quality, affordable providers. Lessons to be considered in implementing payment 
reforms are to start with generous, long-term contracts, to implement the reforms on a 
large scale, and to focus on getting the strongest providers on board first. Contextual 
factors such as the ability to define a population prospectively, required referral from 
a primary care provider, market structures, and legislation and regulations play further 
roles in the success of a payment reform. 
 
In chapter 6 we take a sidestep from the health care purchasing market to examine 
the Dutch health care provision market. We investigate the role played by quality in a 
patient’s choice of a health care provider for cataract treatment in the period 2006–
2011. More specifically, we test whether high-quality hospitals attracted more patients 
than other hospitals. We first estimate the impact that quality had on provider volume 
levels and then employ a mixed logit model to analyse how patients made trade-offs 
between quality, waiting times and distance from home. Results indicate that a one-
point increase in quality was associated with a volume increase of two to four per 
cent. Quality was found to steer more patients to the top-quality provider in particular, 
whereas no large differences were seen in patients’ choices amongst the remainder of 
providers (though patients did prefer the remaining hospitals over those classed in the 
lowest segment).
 
Chapter 7 discusses the key findings of this thesis, concluding that (1) the Dutch 
purchasing market performs particularly well in terms of accessibility; (2) the role of 
quality in the purchasing of care is limited but increasing; and (3) in practice it is 
rather difficult for insurers to contain cost growth in a changing environment. The 
insurers take on a somewhat different role than had been envisaged when the system 
reforms were implemented: a more facilitating role rather than a more directive one. As 




It therefore appears that government, even under managed competition, has a key role 
to play in pressuring the system to maintain affordability and putting quality on the 
agenda. The Dutch government has indeed taken up those responsibilities. Hence, 
even though the reformed health care system does not function as envisaged, it still 
performs rather well and is heading in the right direction. The current system affords 
room for further progress. Purchasing health care entails more than just setting the 
right financial incentives in the design of provider–payer contracts.
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In de OECD landen, zijn de gemiddelde kosten per capita in de afgelopen jaren 
gestegen (2001-2014), danwel op een variërend tempo [1]. De wijze waarop landen 
zorgaanbieders bekostigen wordt in toenemende mate gezien als een strategie om 
kosten te beteugelen en prikkels tot kwaliteitsverbetering te introduceren. Diverse 
landen zijn geïnteresseerd in het introduceren van marktwerking en hebben 
een vorm van marktwerking geïntroduceerd [2]. In 2006 werd in Nederland 
het model van gereguleerde concurrentie geïntroduceerd. Hiermee werden drie 
markten geïntroduceerd, de zorgverleningsmarkt, de zorginkoopmarkt, en de 
zorgverzekeringsmarkt. In dit proefschrift onderzoeken we hoe de zorginkoopmarkt 
in Nederland kan bijdragen aan de systeemdoelen (i.e. kwaliteit, betaalbaarheid en 
toegankelijkheid van de zorg). 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 hebben we inkoop contracten geanalyseerd op basis van economische 
contracttheorie, namelijk de principaal agent problematiek, de transactiekostentheorie 
en de eigendomsrechtentheorie. Op basis van deze theorieën zijn zes contract 
eigenschappen gedefinieerd. De contracteigenschappen zijn: de allocatie van 
eigendomsrechten, contractduur, afstemmen van belangen, mate van (on)volledigheid, 
risico verdeling, en beschermingsmaatregelingen. Vervolgens hebben we dit raamwerk 
gebruikt om de  contracten voor medisch specialistische zorg in 2012 te analyseren. 
De contracten hebben een relatief korte contractduur, kwaliteit speelde een kleine 
rol in de contracten en de contracten waren relatief onvolledig met ruimte om te 
heronderhandelen gedurende het contractjaar. 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzochten we hoe verzekeraars afwegingen maken in het bieden van 
maatwerk in de inkoopcontracten en de daarmee gepaard gaande transactiekosten bij 
de inkoop van de geestelijke gezondheidszorg (GGZ). Dit was gebaseerd op de GGZ 
inkoopdocumenten van de verzekeraars en een selectie van inkoopcontracten uit 2014 
en 2015. Uit de analyse bleek dat de verschillen tussen de contracten voor een groot 
deel te verklaren waren door verschillen tussen verzekeraars in plaats van verschillen 
tussen aanbieders.  Verzekeraars kunnen verschillende inkoopcontracten hanteren 
voor verschillende groepen aanbieders (gebaseerd op bijvoorbeeld het omzet niveau 
van de aanbieder, aanbieder type en de kwaliteit van de aanbieder), hetgeen een zekere 
mate van maatwerk biedt, tegen relatief lage transactiekosten. Onderhandelingen 
kunnen tot een verdere verfijning van het contract leiden. Ook hier maken verzekeraars 
afwegingen, waar een verzekeraar ervoor kan kiezen om niet met alle aanbieders face-
to-face te onderhandelen, maar in plaats daarvan louter face-to-face onderhandelt met 
aanbieders boven een bepaald omzet niveau. 
 
In hoofdstuk 4 analyseerde we de rol van de verzekeraar binnen het gereguleerde 
concurrentie model op de inkoopmarkt. Eerst hebben we de rol van de zorgverzekeraar 
binnen een stelsel van gereguleerde concurrentie geanalyseerd op basis van het 
theoretische model van Enthoven en de taken zoals deze gedefinieerd zijn in de 
Samenvatting
Zorgverzekeringswet. Daarna bestuderen we hoe de verzekeraar zijn rol invult in de 
praktijk op basis van de visie/missie van de individuele verzekeraars, en interviews met 
diverse verzekeraars en ziekenhuizen. Op basis van deze analyse zien we dat de taken 
die de verzekeraars binnen het Nederlandse stelsel hebben toegewezen gekregen een 
zekere mate van overeenkomst hebben met de taken die Enthoven had neergelegd 
bij de sponsor. De Nederlandse verzekeraars vervullen de wettelijke taken goed, maar 
ondervinden praktische belemmeringen bij het invullen van de verwachtingen rondom 
het inkopen van zorg op basis van prijs/kwaliteit. Op basis hiervan concluderen we dat 
we de verzekeraars wellicht meer ruimte moeten geven en de rol van de verzekeraar 
moeten heroverwegen. Daarnaast speelt de overheid wellicht een grotere rol in het 
systeem dan verwacht op basis van het theoretische model, in de vorm van het stellen 
van concrete doelstellingen en het uitoefenen van druk.  
 
In hoofdstuk 5 hebben we het ‘Alternative Quality Contract’ (AQC) van de 
Amerikaanse verzekeraar Blue Cross Blue Shields (BCBS) bestudeerd. Het AQC is 
een van de grootste innovaties geweest op het gebied van inkoop in de zorg. De AQC 
groepen werden over het algemeen geassocieerd met grotere kwaliteitsverbeteringen 
en een lagere kosten groei dan de controle groep [3]. In dit hoofdstuk hebben we de 
succesfactoren van het AQC gedefinieerd en hebben we vervolgens lessen getrokken 
voor het implementeren van een soortgelijk model in andere settings. Hieruit bleek 
dat aanbieders onder het AQC zowel bereid als in staat waren om patiënten naar 
hoge kwaliteit en betaalbare aanbieders te verwijzen. Verder bleek dat het starten 
met genereuze en meerjarencontracten, het implementeren van de hervorming 
op grote schaal en het richten op de grote spelers in de beginfase lessen zijn bij het 
implementeren van een soortgelijke hervorming. Daarbij spelen contextuele factoren 
zoals het vooraf afbakenen van een populatie, het verplicht stellen van een verwijzing, 
de markt structuur en wet en regelgeving ook een rol in het succes van de hervorming. 
 
In hoofdstuk 6 nemen we een zijstap van de inkoopmarkt naar de zorgverleningsmarkt. 
In dit hoofdstuk bestuderen we in hoeverre de kwaliteit van zorg een rol speelt in 
de aanbieder keuze van een cataract patiënt in Nederland in de periode 2006-2011. 
Specifiek bestuderen we of hoog kwaliteit aanbieders significant meer patiënten 
aantrekken ten opzichte van andere aanbieders. Ten eerste testen we wat de impact 
is van kwaliteit op patiënten volumes (van de aanbieder), ten tweede gebruiken we 
een mixed logit model om in kaart te brengen hoe patiënten afwegingen maken met 
betrekking tot kwaliteit, wachttijden en afstand. Een kwaliteitstoename van 1 punt werd 
geassocieerd met een 2 tot 4 procent volume groei voor de aanbieder. Daarnaast vinden 
we dat patiënten met name gevoelig zijn voor hoge kwaliteit en dat  verschillen tussen 
de resterende zorgaanbieders niet tot grote verschillen leiden wat betreft aanbieder 
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In hoofdstuk 7 worden de hoofdbevindingen van dit proefschrift besproken. We 
concludeerden dat: a) de inkoopmarkt met name goed presteert op het gebied van 
toegankelijkheid van zorg; b) de rol van kwaliteit bij de inkoop van zorg is klein maar 
deze neemt wel toe; en c) het is niet eenvoudig voor een verzekeraar om de kosten 
te beteugelen in een veranderlijke omgeving. De verzekeraars nemen een andere rol 
in dan we met de introductie van de hervormingen hadden bedacht, in plaats van 
een rol als regisseur nemen de verzekeraars eerder een faciliterende rol in. Dit leidt 
ertoe dat verzekeraars in mindere mate verantwoordelijk gesteld kunnen worden 
voor het beteugelen van de kosten in de zorg. Het lijkt erop dat zelfs in een systeem 
van gereguleerde concurrentie de overheid daarom een belangrijke rol speelt in het 
uitoefenen van druk op het systeem om de betaalbaarheid te garanderen en kwaliteit 
op de agenda te zetten. De Nederlandse overheid heeft deze verantwoordelijkheden 
inderdaad op zich genomen. Het system werkt dus niet zoals we op voorhand bedacht 
hadden, maar het functioneert vrij goed en we gaan de goede kant op. We eindigen 
met de conclusie dat er binnen het stelsel nog ruimte is voor verdere verbetering, en 
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